

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

0	1	C	T	M	N	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5
LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER													LICENSE TYPE					CAT								

CON'T

REPORT
SOURCE

L 6 0 2 0 0 3 3 6 7 0 8 1 2 8 0 8 0 9 0 8 8 0 9

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While the 12U diesel was being run for surveillance testing, a 125 VDC (Bus 201A) ground

0 3 | alarm was received. The 13U diesel was verified operable and the plant was operated in

0 4 | accordance with the Action Statement 3.8.1.1.a of Technical Specifications. The ground

0 5 | was corrected and the 12U diesel returned to operable status within 8 hours.

0	6
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0	7	
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0	8
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8 9

0 9

SYSTEM CODE

CAUSE CODE

CAUSE SUBCODE

COMP. SUBCODE

VALVE SUBCODE

COMPONENT CODE

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(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 80 - SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 029 - CODE 03 - TYPE L - NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER							
B	18	Z	19	Z	20	0 0 0 0	N	23	N	24	A	25	F	0	1	0	
33		34		35		37		40	41		42		43			44	47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of the ground was frayed insulation on one wire in the Bendix connector which
1 1 | connects the speed sensor to the governor allowing a bare wire to contact the connector
1 2 | shell causing a short circuit. The connector leads were removed, cut back, stripped,
1 3 | reconnected and covered with heat shrink tubing.

1	4	
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

FACILITY STATUS 1 5 E 29 % POWER 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance Test 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 4 34

A COUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA		

7	8	9	11	12	13	80
			PERSONNEL INJURIES			
			NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	(41)	

[illegible]

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		11		12		13		14		15		16		17		18		19		20		21		22		23		24		25		26		27		28		29		30		31		32		33		34		35		36		37		38		39		40		41		42		43		44		45		46		47		48		49		50		51		52		53		54		55		56		57		58		59		60		61		62		63		64		65		66		67		68		69		70		71		72		73		74		75		76		77		78		79		80		81		82		83		84		85		86		87		88		89		90		91		92		93		94		95		96		97		98		99		100	

7 8 9 10
PUBLCITY (15) 64 NRC USE ONLY 80

ISSUED DESCRIPTION

2 0 N 44 NA

9160 64

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

NAME OF PREPARED

J.S. Harris

PHONE: 203/447-1791

NRC USE ONLY

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 80-049/03L-0

Description

On August 10 and 11, 1980 SSW P208B tripped. On August 11 and 17, 1980 SSW P208E tripped. On each occasion the trips resulted from thermal overload of their respective breaker's B1533 and B1444. Immediate investigation revealed no cause for these trips. A detailed analysis was initiated to ascertain the cause of the trips and recommend corrective action.

Cause & Corrective Action

The analysis indicates that the major conditions contributing to these trips are:

1. An improvement in the SSW inlet water flow due to maintenance performed during the refuel LV outage.
2. A reduction in heat transfer capability of the TBCCW system in non essential loops.
3. The number of SSW pumps in operation.
4. The inlet water level to the SSW pumps.
5. The inlet water temperature to the SSW pumps.

It is believed at this time that simultaneous operation of four SSW pumps with specific inlet water levels shifted the dynamic operating characteristic of B & E SSW pumps and resulted in protective trips of their respective breaker.

Permanent corrective action is being contemplated; meanwhile, inlet water temperature decrease has alleviated the problem.

Emergency mode of operation requires two pump operation and therefore the safety margin, in this mode has not been reduced.

Following the completion of the analysis and implementation of permanent corrective measures an update report will be issued.