



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TIC

AUG 22 1980

State of Illinois
Department of Public Health
ATTN: Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief
Division of Nuclear Safety
535 West Jefferson Street
Springfield, IL 62761

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice 80-30 titled "Potential for Unacceptable Interaction Between the Control Rod Drive Scram Function and Non-essential Control Air at Certain GE BWR Facilities" was sent to the following licensees on August 19, 1980:

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company
Zimmer (50-358)

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)

Commonwealth Edison Company
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
LaSalle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)

Consumers Power Company
Big Rock Point (50-155)

Dairyland Power Company
LACBWR (50-409)

Detroit Edison Company
Fermi 2 (50-341)

Illinois Power Company
Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)

Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.
Duane Arnold (50-331)

8009160 052

State of Illinois


- 2 -

AUG 22 1980

Northern Indiana Public Service Company
Bailly (50-367)

Northern States Power Company
Monticello (50-263)

Sincerely,



Helen Pappas, Chief
Administrative Branch

Enclosure: IE Information
Notice No. 80-30

cc w/encl:
Mr. D. W. Kane,
Sargent & Lundy
Central Files
Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

August 19, 1980

IE Information Notice No. 80-30: POTENTIAL FOR UNACCEPTABLE INTERACTION
BETWEEN THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE SCRAM FUNCTION
AND NON-ESSENTIAL CONTROL AIR AT CERTAIN GE
BWR FACILITIES

Continued NRC evaluation of possible failure modes of the control rod drive system related to the Browns Ferry event (IE Bulletin 80-17), has identified a potentially significant single failure mechanism which could degrade the scram function. The slow loss of non-essential control air pressure could degrade the scram function at certain facilities which have relatively poor communication between the scram discharge volume (SDV) and the scram discharge instrumented volume (SDIV) such that the SDIV drains more rapidly than the SDV drain rate into the SDIV.

The significance of such a single failure warrants transmission of an interim assessment by the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facility. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Enclosure:

Memo from C. Michelson to
H. Denton, dated August 18,
1980

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

Entire document previously
entered into system under:

ANO 8006190057

No. of pages: 5