



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-416/80-27 and 50-417/80-17

Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
Jackson, MS

Facility Name: Grand Gulf

Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417

License Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119

Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, MS

Inspector: J. Blake 12/22/80
J. Blake Date Signed

Approved by: A. R. Herdt 12/22/80
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on November 24-26, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 19 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings, and Follow-up of Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e)).

Results

Of the three areas inspected, no violations or deviation were identified in one area; two violations were found in two areas (Violation - Control of temporary CRD system pipe supports - Paragraph 3; Violation - Control of CTO activities - Paragraph 5).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *C. K. McCoy, Plant Manager
- *H. L. Morgan, Construction Superintendent
- *J. W. Yelverton, QA Supervisor
- *J. M. Kelley, QA Representative
- S. F. Tanner, QA Representative

Other Organizations

- R. L. Scott, Bechtel, Project QA Manager
- D. M. Lake, Bechtel, Field Construction Manager
- J. R. Valdez, Bechtel, QA Engineer
- H. Weber, Bechtel, CTO Supervisor
- B. Thomas, Bechtel, CTO Engineer

NRC Resident Inspector

- *A. G. Wagner
- *L. W. Garner

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 26, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The reason for having to "upgrade" Unresolved Item No. 50-416/80-19-01 to violation status was discussed in detail. The apparent attitude/ lack of training problem evidenced by the improper handling of the RHR valve limit switch cover was also discussed. The licensee stated that the concerns about the control of the CTO Program would be addressed in craft training sessions.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-416/80-19-01): Temporary CRD System Pipe Supports. At the time that this item was identified the licensee was conducting an evaluation of the responsible subcontractor's QA Program implementation. The licensee issued a stop work order on the subcontractors activities until the program was under control; this order was given verbally on August 15, 1980 followed by a letter on August 18, 1980. At that time the licensee informed NRC Region II that a potential 50.55(e) problem had been identified. (This problem is being tracked as licensee identified

item No. 50-416/80-23-13). The results of the licensee's appraisal of the subcontractor verified that the supports in question were in fact temporary supports but the subcontractor's program did not provide a mechanism for documentation and control of temporary installations. As such, this item is reclassified as a violation of the site QA Program in that the licensee approved subcontractor QA Program did not adequately control the temporary installation of material in safety-related systems. This item has been classified as a Violation, and will be identified as item No. 416/80-27-02 "Control of Temporary CRD System Pipe Supports."

(Closed) Infraction (50-416/80-19-02): Failure to provide calibration and control procedures for torque wrench multipliers. (This item also tracked as potential 50.55(e) under MP&L No. PRD 80-62.) The item of noncompliance correction was discussed in MP&L letter No. AECM 80/250 dated 10/13/80 and the 10 CFR 50.55(e) aspects were discussed in MP&L letter No. AECM 80/278 dated 11/7/80. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and verified that the torque multipliers are now in the calibration program.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-416/80-20-26): FW-35 RT Coverage. The licensee has verified that the complete weld and base material area of interest was covered during the radiographic inspection of the subject weld. There are no further questions at this time.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-416/80-20-24; 50-417/80-13-24): Issue of Materials without Authorization. The licensee's response in letter AECM 80/274 dated November 6, 1980 described the corrective actions taken for this item. The inspector verified the implementation of the corrective actions and there are no further questions at this time.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Observation of Work.

The reactor coolant pressure boundary piping is being installed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1974 Edition through summer 1974 Addenda.

During observation of piping activities inside containment the following activities were witnessed:

a. Handling of Valve Components

The inspector observed the rigging and handling of the components for valve No. Q1B33F060A. During the handling of the internals for this valve, inspection work required by CR No. 5000 was in process. CR No. 5000 reported several visual inspection deficiencies which required resolution. The items which could not be resolved by documentation review were a carbon steel rust stain on an area of the ball, and an arc strike. The corrective action for these two items involved grinding

and polishing to remove the indications followed by an acid etch of the stain area and liquid penetrant inspection of both areas. The inspector witnessed the acid etch and the liquid penetrant inspections.

There were no violations or deviations in this areas of the inspection.

b. Checkout and Turnover Organization Activities

During inspection of RCPB piping installed in Unit 1 on November 25, 1980, the inspector observed a mechanic hammering on Valve F009E12 limit switch housing cover with a piece of steel plate. When that mechanic and the other mechanic involved with work on the valve were asked what was going on they stated that they could not get the bolt holes lined up to re-install the cover because the hinges were bent. The inspector then asked what procedure was being followed for the work involved and was told that the mechanics worked for "CTO" and they followed the instructions of the engineer in charge. When asked about the proper procedure for taking care of a problem such as the bent hinge, the mechanics stated that they would remove the hinges and straighten them, and proceed to start disassembly. When asked again about the proper procedure for identifying nonconforming items the mechanics stated that they should inform the engineer in charge.

Further discussion with the mechanics revealed the following:

The mechanics were a part of a "Checkout and Turnover Organization" (CTO) team engaged in the stroking of RHR valve No. F009E12. To conduct this exercise the mechanics were instructed by the engineer in charge to remove the limit switch housing cover, conduct other activities to energize and operate the valve as directed by the engineer and finally to replace the cover. The inspector asked if any instructions such as precautions or requirements had been relayed to them (i.e., gasket surface cleanliness, gasket condition inspection, tightness requirements for Allen head screws, etc.). The mechanics stated that they were only told to replace the cover. This situation was discussed with the licensee's QA Representatives who determined that the operation involved was under the CTO Manual Chapter 5 Section 19 "Motor Operated Valves Test"; Paragraph 8.0 "Restoration; 8.1 Replace the limit switch housing, gasket and cover. Secure all Hardware". Further review of the CTO manual showed that Chapter 4 Section 6 of the manual requires that a startup field report be initiated whenever a component or piece of equipment is found to be damaged. This start up field report is then used as the basis for the generation of whatever paper work is required to initiate the repair of the component or piece of equipment.

The inspector informed the licensee that the activities witnessed would be cited as a violation of the QA Program for the site. The licensee and Bechtel management stated that the personnel in the CTO would be re-trained in the importance of proper identification and repair of damaged equipment. This is identified as item No. 416/80-27-03 "Control of CTO Activities".

6. Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e))

a. Previously Identified Items

The following items were reviewed during this inspection:

- (1) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-12-09; 50-417/80-08-05 (MP&L PRD No. 80-12): Electro-Hydraulic (EH) Control Actuator Selection. The licensee has determined that this item is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). The justification for this decision is presented in the licensee's letters to NRC No. AECM 80/158 dated 7/21/80 and AECM 80/220 dated 9/15/80. The inspector reviewed the letters and discussed the data presented with the licensee. There are no further questions at this time.
- (2) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-12-16; 50-417/80-08-07 (MP&L No. PRD 80-22): Incorrect Schedule Piping in Fuel Pool. The licensee has determined that the use of heavier than specified piping schedules for this application has not compromised the support design for this piping system. This item was determined to be not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) as justified in MP&L letter AECM 80/247 dated 10/10/80. The inspector reviewed the documentation in file PRD 80-22 and has no further questions at this time.
- (3) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-12-21; 50-417/80-08-11 (MP&L No. PRD 80-27): Pratt Valve Pneumatic Actuators-Bettis Robot. This item was determined to be not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) as discussed in MP&L's letter NO, AECM 80/127 dated 6/11/80. There are no further questions at this time.
- (4) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-12-22; 50-417/80-08-12 (MP&L No. PRD 80-28): Inadequate Sensitivity of Radiographic Film. This item was inadvertently opened in two NRC reports. The item will continue to be monitored as Item No. 50-416/80-13-01; 50-417/80-09-01.
- (5) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-23-05; 50-417/80-14-05 (MP&L No. PRD 80-50): Anchor Bolt Pull-out Strength. This item originally opened in NRC Report No. 50-416/80-19 against Unit 1 as item 50-416/80-19-03. This item will be tracked as item No. 50-416/80-19-03; 50-417/80-14-05.
- (6) (Closed) Item No. 50-416/80-23-10 (MP&L No. PRD 80-51): Nonconforming RHR Field Weld. The weld was determined to be in conformance with ASME requirements.

b. The following potentially reportable items have been reported to NRC Region II and are assigned numbers for tracking purposes.

- (1) Item No. 50-416/80-27-01; 50-417/80-17-01, (MP&L No. PRD 80-08): "Limitorque Motor Operators Malfunction."