

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | 1  
 | 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | I | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | 5  
 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 66  
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 56

CONT  
 6 1  
 REPORT SOURCE L 6 | | 5 | | - | | 3 | 4 | 6 | | 7 | | 1 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 1 | | 8 | | 2 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 9  
 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

1 2 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  
 (NP-33-81-08) On 1/27/81 at 2222 hours, the 345 KV switchyard bus "K" tripped and  
 3 locked out, de-energizing Startup Transformer 02. The plant was in Mode 5. It  
 4 returned to service 1/28/81. On 2/1/81 at 0620 hours, a similar instance occurred in  
 5 which "J" bus tripped and locked out de-energizing Startup Transformer 01. The sta-  
 6 tion was then in Mode 3. The station entered the action statement of T.S. 3.8.1.1 at  
 7 the second occurrence. There was no danger to the public or station personnel. In  
 8 both cases, there was an automatic transfer of loads to the operable startup transformer.

9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE  
 E I 11 C 12 Z 13 T R A N S F 14 Z 15 Z 16  
 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
 17 LER/RD REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
 8 1 22 - 23 24 25 8 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  
 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPR-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
 A Z Z Z - 3 7 Y Z Z 9 9 9

1 0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)  
 The "K" bus trip occurred due to action from a directional ground current relay and  
 1 1 that the C phase lightning arrester on Startup Transformer (SU XFMR) 02 appeared charred.  
 1 2 The B phase lightning arrester on SU XFMR 01 had faulted. Under MWO 81-1400 SU XFMR  
 1 3 02 was returned to service at 2331 hours on 1/28/81. Under MWO 81-1426, SU XFMR 01  
 1 4 was returned to normal at 1920 hours on 2/1/81.

5 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)  
 C 28 0 0 0 29 NA 44 A 31 Operator observation 80  
 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
 Z 33 Z 34 NA 44 NA 45  
 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)  
 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA 80  
 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)  
 0 0 0 40 NA 80  
 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)  
 Z 42 NA 80  
 2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
 N 54 NA 80

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-08

DATE OF EVENT: January 27, 1981 and February 1, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of Startup Transformer #02 in Mode 5 and Loss of Startup Transformer #01 in Mode 3

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On January 27, 1981 at 2222 hours, 345 KV switchyard bus K tripped and locked out, de-energizing Startup Transformer 02 and causing the station 13.8 KV bus being powered by Startup Transformer 02 to fast transfer to Startup Transformer 01. Being in Mode 5 the station did not enter the action statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 which requires the operability of only one circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system. These requirements were being met.

On February 1, 1981 at 0620 hours, a very similar instance occurred in which "J" bus tripped and locked out, de-energizing Startup Transformer 01 and causing the station 13.8 KV bus A to fast transfer to Startup Transformer 02. Being in Mode 3, the station entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 which requires the operability of two independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system. The action statement requires that within one hour the correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability be verified. This must be re-verified every eight hours thereafter until both circuits are restored to operable status. These requirements were met.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Investigation by maintenance personnel revealed that the K bus trip had occurred due to action from a directional ground current relay and that the "C" phase lightning arrester on Startup Transformer 02 appeared charred. Subsequent testing verified that the lightning arrester was in fact damaged and shorted. This could have been caused by an internal failure or from being struck by a bolt of lightning or electrical surge.

In the cause of the Startup Transformer 01 trip, testing determined that the "B" phase lightning arrester had faulted. There was no visible evidence of the fault. It should be noted here that the weather was similar at the time of both occurrences. In both instances the weather was snowy and wet.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. In both cases there was an automatic transfer of loads to the operable startup transformer.

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Corrective Action: Under Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 81-1400 the failed lightning arrester on Startup Transformer 02 was removed. The 02 Transformer was returned to service at 2331 hours on January 28, 1981 without the lightning arrester. Under MWO 81-1426, the failed lightning arrester on Transformer 01 was removed, and the transformer was returned to service at 1920 hours on February 1, 1981. These actions were taken pending receipt of replacement parts.

Installation of new lightning arresters was done under Facility Change Request 81-050. On February 7, 1981 the 02 Transformer was removed from service to install new lightning arresters. The work was completed and 02 again returned to service at 1800 hours on February 7, 1981. On February 8, 1981, the 01 Transformer was removed from service to install new lightning arresters. The work was completed and 01 again returned to service at 1540 hours on February 8, 1981.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences.

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