

POOR ORIGINAL



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-20

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY

PALISADES PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-255

1.0 Introduction

I&E Bulletin 79-06A, Revision 1, listed several areas of concern to be evaluated by licensees as a result of the Three Mile Island-2 accident including improvement of the reliability of auxiliary feedwater systems. By letter dated July 31, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to Section 3.5 of the Technical Specifications appended to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 for the Palisades Plant which would revise the limiting conditions for operation for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The proposed changes are designed to further ensure the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system by providing more comprehensive and complete limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements.

2.0 Discussion

The changes proposed by the licensee would modify section 3.5 of the Technical Specifications to require that both auxiliary feed pumps and the firewater makeup to the auxiliary feed pump suction be operable whenever primary plant temperature is above 325°F. This requirement could be relaxed to allow maintenance on one auxiliary feedwater pump or the fire pumps, but the licensee would be required to place the plant in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours if an auxiliary feedwater pump or the firewater makeup would become inoperable for greater than 72 hours. If one auxiliary feedwater pump and the firewater makeup supply were to both become inoperable, then the licensee would place the plant in hot standby within one hour, in hot shutdown within the next 6 hours, in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours unless corrective actions are completed to restore redundancy to the auxiliary feedwater system. With both auxiliary feedwater pumps out of service, then power would be reduced within 24 hours to the lowest level consistent with reliable main feedwater system operation.

### 3.0 Evaluation

The proposed changes would improve the probability that adequate feedwater capability is available at all times by specifying more stringent limiting conditions for operation of the auxiliary feedwater system. The requirement that both auxiliary feedwater pumps and the firewater makeup to the auxiliary feedwater pump suction be operable makes it more likely that some source of auxiliary feedwater would be available at all times. If one auxiliary feedwater pump and the firewater makeup supply were to both become inoperable, then a plant shutdown within one hour would be the most prudent course of action, considering the lack of redundancy which would then exist in the auxiliary feedwater system.

If both auxiliary feedwater pumps were to become inoperable, then the plant should be placed in a stable operating condition and action should be taken immediately to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump as soon as possible. The plant cannot be cooled down in a normal fashion without any auxiliary feedwater pumps and continued, stable, power operation using the main feedwater system capability is therefore the preferred mode of operation.

The proposed changes are consistent with current licensing requirements set forth in the Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering reactors. Based on this and the above considerations, we find these changes acceptable for inclusion in the Palisades Technical Specifications.

### 4.0 Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

### 5.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based upon the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: October 20, 1980