

SMUD

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT □ 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211

December 30, 1980

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director  
Region V Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
1990 North California Boulevard  
Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202  
Walnut Creek, CA 94936

Re: Operating License DPR-54  
Docket No. 50-312  
Reportable Occurrence 80-48

Dear Mr. Engelken:

In accordance with Technical Specifications for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Section 6.9.4.2(c) and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.b(3), the Sacramento Municipal Utility District is hereby submitting a thirty-day report of Reportable Occurrence 80-48.

On December 1, 1980, while reviewing the ISI program and associated surveillance procedures it was discovered that two remotely operated reactor building isolation valves were not tested as required by Technical Specifications section 4.4.1.3.

The valves, HV-26105 and HV-26106, are the suction valves from the reactor building's emergency sump to the decay heat removal system. Originally these valves were tested on a quarterly basis by DHR Valve Surveillance Tests SP 203.06 A/E. In March of 1980 the valves were deleted from the quarterly surveillance tests pursuant to the revised testing criteria associated with the ISI program. The valves, due to being single isolation valves whose failure to reclose during testing would result in loss of containment integrity, were considered impractical to stroke during power operation. As a result the valves were removed from the Quarterly test and were to be added to the applicable surveillance test which requires testing at cold shutdown.

During this time period numerous surveillance tests were being revised to implement the ISI program (ASME Code, Section XI). Since a cold shutdown was not anticipated, those surveillance tests associated with a cold shutdown were not immediately revised. In August of 1980, due to failure of the thrust bearing on the main turbine, the plant was taken to cold shutdown. The surveillance procedure, SP 203.06 C/D, Quarterly DHS and CBS Valve Test and Inspection at Shutdown, had not been revised to include testing of HV-26105 and HV-26106. As a result the valves were not tested and the occurrence thereby constitutes a failure to perform a surveillance test at the required frequency.

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Mr. R. H. Engelken


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During the Plant Review Committee's review of this occurrence it was decided that the cold shutdown procedure would be revised to assure that the valves are tested at the next cold shutdown. This revision was made effective December 30, 1980. Additionally, in April 1980 the Plant Review Committee Charter was revised. In that revision the committee was assigned the responsibility of determining which associated procedures must be revised when evaluating any procedure change. This is documented in the minutes of the meeting and becomes an "action item" for an assigned individual. This method of review will minimize similar occurrences in the future.

There were no plant transients nor power reductions associated with this event.

Sincerely,



J. J. Mattimoe  
Assistant General Manager  
and Chief Engineer

JJM:HH:rm

cs: Inspection & Enforcement  
Washington, D. C. (30)  
Management Information &  
Program Control (3)