NRC FORM 366 (7 77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	O H D B S 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
0 1 CON'T	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6
	EVENT DATE (8)	1 2 Ø 6 8 Ø
	REPORT DATE (9)	Ø 1 Ø 2 8 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-80-112) On 12/6/80 at 0923 hours a control room operator was attempting to
0 3 stroke valve CV5006 for troubleshooting purposes but it would not move. Additional
0 4 attempts to open the valve were unsuccessful. CV5006 was declared inoperable, and
0 5 the station entered Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. There
0 6 was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. CV5006 was
0 7 already in its required safety position. Penetration P33 is also isolated by CV5008
0 8 which was operable.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	S D	X	Z	Z Z Z Z Z Z	Z	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 Ø	—	Ø 8 7	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	X	Z	Z	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y	Y	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the failure is unknown at this time. Troubleshooting to the containment
1 1 penetration indicates the problem is beyond the penetration inside containment. Con-
1 2 trol power to the valve was disabled with the valve in the closed position. Further
1 3 troubleshooting and corrective action will be conducted under Maintenance Work Order
1 4 IC-814-80 during the next outage.

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	C	Ø Ø Ø	NA	C	Troubleshooting for grounds on DC buses

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	Ø Ø Ø	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	Ø Ø Ø	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

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DVR 80-200

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-112

DATE OF EVENT: December 6, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inoperable Containment Purge Inlet Isolation Valve, CV 5006

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On December 6, 1980 at 0923 hours while electricians were troubleshooting for grounds on the 125/250 VDC system, a problem was discovered with CV 5006. CV 5006 is on the containment purge inlet line and is the containment side isolation of penetration P33. When the control room operator attempted to stroke the valve open, it would not move. Additional attempts to open the valve were unsuccessful. CV 5006 was declared inoperable in the closed position, and the station entered Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The technical specification requires this containment isolation valve to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 with an isolation time of 10 seconds. Action Statement (b) requires the isolation of the affected penetration within 4 hours by the use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position. The condition was met.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the failure is unknown at this time. Troubleshooting to the containment penetration indicates the problem is beyond the penetration inside containment. Therefore, further troubleshooting will be conducted the next time containment is accessible to determine the root cause of the failure.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. CV 5006 was already in its required safety position. Penetration P33 is also isolated by CV 5008 which was operable.

Corrective Action: Control power to the valve was removed with the valve in the closed position. This made the station in compliance with Action Statement (b) of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. Further troubleshooting and corrective action will be conducted under Maintenance Work Order IC-814-80 during the next outage.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar occurrences.

LER #80-087