LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

400	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	11L Q A D 2 2 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 EIGENSE CODE 14 15 S LICENSE NUMBER 5
O 1	REPORT LUG 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5 7 1 2 0 1 8 0 8 1 12 2 9 8 0 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
0 2	The "RHR System II Supply from Diesel Generator" annunciator alarmed for no apparent
0 3	reason. An investigation revealed that fuse FII in panel 902-33 was blown, thus
0 4	making the relay logic circuit for RHR System II inoperable. The fuse was replaced
0 6	but blew again on 12-2-80. All components associated with the RHR System II logic
0 6	circuit could have been manually operated from the Control Room had the need arisen.
0 7	RHR System I logic was also operable and unaffected by this occurrence.
0 8	80
7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
	17 REPORT 8 0 - 0 3 3 COMPONENT
	ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NORM SUB- SUPPLIER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER S
1 0	The cause of the blown fuse was a grounded wire in the Unit Two Diesel Generator
11	to Bus 24-1 circuit breaker auxiliary contacts. The wire was repaired and the fuse
1 2	replaced. All circuits affected by this blown fuse were inspected and found
[1]3]	satisfactory.
114	
7 8	FACILITY STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 28 0 9 9 29 N.A LA 31 Operational Event
	2 10 12 13 44 45 46 ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 NA 45 45
7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA NA NA
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE SECRIPTION NA NA
20	PUBLICITY OESCRIPTION 49 101060 H82 NA H82 NA H82 NA H82
	NAME OF PREPARER Dary1 Clark PHONE: 309-654-2241, ext. 170 }

1. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 80-33/03L-0

II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station

III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two

IV. DUCKET NUMBER: 050-265

V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

At 2315 hours on December 1, 1980, Unit Two was operating steady state at 822 MWe and 2481 MWt. At this time, the 'RHR System II Supply from Emergency Diesel' annunciator alarmed for no apparent reason. An investigation revealed that fuse F-II in the 902-33 panel was blown, thus making the relay logic circuit for RHR System II inoperable. The fuse was replaced and the alarm cleared and the relay logic circuit reenergized. On December 2, 1980, the alarm came up again. Work Request Q09578 was written to investigate the cause of the blown fuse.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The consequences of this occurrence were minimal. The 'RHR System II Supply from Emergency Diesel' alarm was caused by the drop-out of relay 10A-K1B, which senses when the diesel generator circuit breaker closes into the emergency bus. With the blown fuse, the automatic initiation function of RHR System II was inhibited. The 'C' and 'D' RHR pumps and valves associated with these pumps could have been manually operated from the Control Room if necessary. RHR System I logic was not affected by this occurrence. Both Core Spray and all high pressure injection and cooling systems were operable. Safe operation of the reactor was not affected as a result of this occurrence.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of the occurrence is designated as equipment failure. The blown fuse was caused by a grounded wire in the 4KV Unit Two Diesel Generator to Bus 24-1 circuit breaker auxiliary contacts. The wire had rubbed on the wiring harness inside the breaker cabinet and had worn off the wire insulation. The logic system was supplied by the 125 VDC battery.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The worn wire and blown fuse were replaced. The Control Room alarm cleared and the RHR relay logic circuit was re-energized. All circuits affected by this problem were inspected and operation of relay 10A-KIB was verified.