


OYSTER CREEK



NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION



Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a Member of the General Public Utilities System

(609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388 • FORKED RIVER • NEW JERSEY • 08731

December 23, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
641 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-56/3L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-56/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

*Ivan R. Finrock, Jr.*  
Ivan R. Finrock, Jr.  
Vice President Generation

IRF:dh  
Enclosures

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)  
Office of Management Information and Program Control  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-56/3L

Report Date

December 23, 1980

Occurrence Date

December 4, 1980

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, the Main Steam Line high flow indicator switches RE-22C and RE-22G tripped at values greater than the desired setpoint as given in the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, item B.2.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power:     Reactor           1817 MWt  
           Generator         627 MWe

Flow:       Recirculation   15.2 x 10<sup>4</sup> gpm  
           Feedwater         6.73 x 10<sup>6</sup> lb/hr

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, December 4, during performance of the "High Flow in the Main Steam Line Test and Calibration" (Surveillance Procedure 619.3.005), high flow indicator switches RE-22C and RE-22G tripped at values greater than the Technical Specification limit of <97.5 psig. The testing yielded the following data:

<u>Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint (PSIG)</u>	<u>As Found(PSIG)</u>	<u>As Left(PSIG)</u>
RE-22A	<97.5	91.5	91.5
RE-22B	<97.5	97.0	91.5
RE-22C	<97.5	98.5	93.0
RE-22D	<97.5	96.5	92.5
RE-22E	<97.5	96.5	93.0
RE-22F	<97.5	97.0	92.0
RE-22G	<97.5	98.5	93.0
RE-22H	<97.5	96.5	92.5

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence was attributed to instrument repeatability. The switches are set to trip at  $92.5 \pm 1$  psig and the long-term repeatability of the instruments is approximately  $4-6$  psig (2-3% of full range). It is possible for the instrument to trip at a value as high as 99.5 psig and still operate within the design accuracy, yet exceed the Technical Specification limit of 97.5 psig.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Main Steam Line will isolate due to a line break as sensed by either a high temperature or a high flow condition.

Each main steam line contains four (4) high flow sensors, which are part of the logic system which will initiate closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV). The logic system contains 2 channels, and a signal from both channels is required to initiate MSIV closure. In addition, each channel containing four (4) sensors is further divided into 2 circuits.

The safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal. With the existing logic system, there is only a temporary loss of redundancy in one of the channels due to the non-conservatism of switches RE-22C and RE-22G. Although switches RE-22C and RE-22G are located within the same channel, switches RE-22D and RE-22H would have actuated at the desired setpoint and would have supplied the signal necessary from that channel to initiate the MSIV closure.

Corrective Action

Pressure switch RE-22C was reset to trip within  $92.5 \pm 1$  psig, as were the remaining switches which had tripped within the desired range (note the "As Left" values in the Description of Occurrence section). Sensor RE-22G at first could not be adjusted to trip at the desired level, due to a problem with the microswitch. The microswitch was replaced and the instrument then operated properly and was reset to trip at the desired level. After consideration of the frequency of occurrence of set point drift associated with ITT Barton differential pressure indicating switches with snap-action switches, the PORC recommended replacement of these devices with a more suitable qualified model.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: ITT Barton  
Model: 228A pressure indicating switch  
Range: 0-200 psig