PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
2301 MARKET STREET
P.O. BOX 8699
PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101
(215) 841-4000

December 17, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Dear Mr. Grier:

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Cowgill, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on December 4, 1980.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-278
Report No.:	3-80-28/1T
Report Date:	December 17, 1980
Occurrence Date:	December 3, 1980
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD #1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 3.5.C.1 states that "the HPCI Subsystem shall be operable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor pressure is greater than 105 psig, and prior to reactor startup from a Cold Condition, except as specified in 3.5.C.2 and 3.5.C.3 below."

A002
S
1/1

Description of the Event:

During testing on December 1, 1980, the HPCI steam supply valve MO-3-23-14 did not fully close as described in LER 3-80-27/1T. Later attempts to stroke the valve were successful. On December 3, 1980, after satisfactory testing of remaining ECCS systems and the RCIC system, the HPCI system was taken out of service and declared inoperable to work on the valve. The valve

operator and valve were disassembled, inspected, and reassembled by December 5, 1980. No conditions were found which could have caused the valve to operate improperly. Due to minor scratches, the valve stem and stem packing were replaced. The valve was satisfactorily tested and the HPCI system returned to service on December 6, 1980.

Probable Consequences of the Occurrence:

During the period HPCI was inoperable, all ECCS systems and the RCIC system were either known to be operable or were tested to verify operability. Additionally, operation of this valve is not required for containment isolation.

Cause of the Event

This event was caused by the HPCI system being inoperable for the valve inspection.

Corrective Action:

After the valve failed to fully close during testing, it was disassembled, inspected, reassembled, and successfully tested as described above.

Very truly yours.

A J Weigand for MJC

M. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division - Nuclear

Attachment

cc: Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management & Program Analysis