

Portland General Electric Company
Trojan Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 439
Rainier, Oregon 97048
(503) 556-3713


December 22, 1980
CPY-1198-80


Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1990 North California Blvd.
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specifications, Paragraph 3/4.6.3.1.2a, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 80-26, concerning a situation where prior to the 1980 Refueling Outage containment hydrogen sample isolation valves were not verified to be operable within the 18-month Technical Specification requirement.

Sincerely,


C. P. Yundt
General Manager


CPY/GGB:na
Attachments

c: LER Distribution List

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1. Report No.: 80-26
2. a. Report Date: December 22, 1980
b. Occurrence Date: November 26, 1980
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048
4. Identification of Occurrence:

Prior to the 1980 Refueling Outage, Containment hydrogen sample isolation valves MO-5677 and MO-5678 were not verified to be operable upon receiving a Containment Isolation Signal within the 18-month Technical Specification requirement of 3/4.6.3.1.2a. Approximately 24 months had elapsed between testing.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 1 at 100% of rated power when this item was discovered.

6. Description of Occurrence:

During engineering review of POT-25-2f, it was discovered that the periodic test procedure did not verify the closure of Containment hydrogen sample isolation valves MO-5677 and MO-5678 upon receiving a Containment Isolation Signal. These valves had been tested by PICT-22-2 on 4/12/80 and 3/29/78 which is not within the 18-month Technical Specification requirement.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence was an error in the drafting of POT-25-2f and inadequate technical review of subsequent revisions.

8. Analysis of Occurrence:

This event had no effect on either plant or public safety. The plant was never in a condition to require a Containment Isolation Signal for closure of these valves during the time when surveillance requirements were not met. Periodic 92-day valve cycling per POT-3-3 technical specifications requirements proved that the valves could have been manually closed from the control room if required. The valves functioned properly when tested on 4/12/80 with a Containment Isolation Signal.

9. Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action taken was to verify that the valves were tested by PICT-22-2 during the 1980 Refueling Outage. Permanent corrective action includes revision of POT-25-2f to include the required closure verification and review of POT-25-2 to ensure no other omissions exist.