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ELECTRIC ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT		December 19, 1980	inter DEC
U.S.Nuclea Washington, Attn:Mr.R Opera	clear Reactor Regulation Regulatory Commission). C. 20555 Obert A. Clark, Chief ting Reactors Branch #3 Lon of Licensing	IT UN SERVICES	224 ANI 10 51
	NRC Requirements fo	Dockets Nos. 50-317 % 50-318 or Aux Feed Systems	
Refere		ted 11/18/80 from A. E. Lundva	ll, Jr.

- (b) Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1, Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment
- (c) Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment
- (c) ANSI/ANS-51.10-1979, Auxiliary Feedwater System for Pressurized Water Reactors

Gentlemen:

In phone conversations with the NRC we have discussed our position on a High Energy Line Break (HELB) analysis for the third train to our Aux Feedwater System. We feel that as long as the third train is only used for emergencies a HELB analysis is not required. We present the following for your review.

In reference (b), page 3.6.1-16, a High-Energy Fluid System is defined as follows: "Fluid systems that, during <u>normal plant conditions</u>, are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of the following are met: a. maximum operating temperature exceeds 200°F, or b. maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig." Normal Plant Conditions are defined as: "Plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power, hot standby, or reactor cooldown to cold shutdown condition." Finally, Upset Plant Conditions are defined as "Plant operating conditions during system transients that may occur with moderate frequency during plant service life and are anticipated operational occurrences, but not during system testing." Due to the fact that the third train would not be used during normal plant conditions, as contrasted to upset plant conditions, it would not be classified as a High Energy System.

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Item e. on page 3.6.2-14 of reference (c); states: "Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks may be postulated in the piping of those fluid systems that qualify as high-energy fluid systems for only short operational periods but qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems for the major operational period." Moderate energy systems are defined in reference (b) as: "Fluid systems that, during normal plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are met: a) maximum operating temperature is 200°F or less, and b) maximum operating pressure is 275 pair or less." Footnote 6. on page 3.6.2-14 of reference (c) states that, "An operational period is considered "short" if the fraction of time that the system operates within the pressure-temperature conditions specified for high-energy fluid systems is about 2 percent of the time that the system operates as a moderate-energy fluid system (e.g., systems such as reactor decay heat removal system qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems, however, systems such as auxiliary feedwater systems operated during FWR reactor startup, hot standby, or shutdown qualify as high-energy fluid systems)." Attached you will find justification for why we feel we can meet the 2% criteria for classifying the system as a moderate-energy system. We feel that the footnote 6 comment relative to aux feed systems being classified as high-energy fluid systems is in reference to those used for normal plant conditions.

Section 3.2.2.3 of reference (d) states, "For systems or portions of systems which operate only during conditions II, III, or IV, pipe breaks need not be considered as initiating events." If the system were used for Condition I events (with the exception of testing) a HELB analysis would have to be performed. ANSI N18.2-1973, section 2.1 defines the four plant operating conditions as:

(1)	Condition	1	Normal Operation
(2)	Condition	II	Incidents of Moderate Frequency
(3)	Condition	III	Infrequent Incidents
(4)	Condition	IV	Limiting Faults

We feel that this reference added further clarification to the references from the Standard Review Plan.

In summary, based upon the above references, we will administratively control the use of the motor-driven train of the auxiliary feedwater system to emergency operation only. Piping failures will be analyzed in accordance with Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1. We will not restrict the use of the existing steam-driven train as it has already been reviewed and approved in our FSAR section 10A.5

Should you have any questions, feel free to contact us. In the interest of maintaining our schedule for the Aux Feedwater Modification, we request that you reply to this letter no later than 15 January 1981.

truly yours.

R. F. Ash Chief Nuclear Engineer

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cc: J. A. Biddison, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Messrs. E. L. Conner, Jr. - NRC J. W. Brothers - Bechtel D. G. Eisenhut - NRC P. W. Kruse - CE W. Essel - CE

ATTACHMENT

Expected Run Time Hours on Motor Driven AFW Train for 18 Month Fuel Cycle

Item 1 Cooldowns

Assume one (1) cooldown requiring use of AFW system because Main Feed unavailable - 20 hrs. run time per occurrence - 20 Hrs Total

Item 2 Testing

STP-0-5 2 hrs per month during cycle -36 Hrs TotalPost Maintenance Testing10 Hrs Total

Item 3 Usage after Ry trip

Assume nine (9) trips per cycle, duration of use equal to 9 1/4 hrs per trip -

83.25 Hrs Total

TOTAL RUN TIME 149.25 Hrs

No. of hrs in 18-month cycle = 365 x 24 x 1.5 = 13,104 hours % of Run Time for Motor Driven AFW Train = 149.25 + 13,104 x 100 = 1.14%