



M80-2601

FILE: RR 2 (NP-32-80-12)

December 1, 1980

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Director, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Enclosed are three copies of the supplemental information sheet, for Licensee Event Report 80-058. These sheets have been revised, and the revisions are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each sheet. There has been no change to the LER form.

Please destroy your previous copies of this supplemental information for LER 80-058 and replace with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray  
Station Superintendent  
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Encl: 40 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director  
Office of Management Program Analysis  
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Luis Reyes  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Encl: 1 copy

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-80-12

DATE OF EVENT: July 24, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of decay heat flow

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 5 with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: At 0955 hours on July 24, 1980, the control room operators observed a loss of decay heat flow. They noticed that there was no indication for the valve position of decay heat isolation valve DH12. The running Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was stopped to prevent damage due to a loss of suction. At 1011 hours the bypass valves (DH21 and DH23) were opened and system venting began. At 1045 hours the Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was restarted and 1300 gpm flow verified. Decay heat flow was lost for a 50 minute period.

At 2232 hours on July 24, 1980, personnel were attempting to clear lights on Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channel 4 following Instrument and Controls personnel completion of Facility Change Request 79-439A. Unaware that the trip circuit for decay heat isolation valve DH11 had been restored, he adjusted the constant current adjustment potentiometer (CCAP) switch level. This caused the output bistable (B/S) BA413 to reset, which resulted in the decay heat isolation valve DH11 to close. Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was tripped immediately by the operator. At 2234 hours, DH11 was reopened and the pump restarted with flow of 1300 gpm verified. Decay heat flow was lost for a two minute period.

1 | At 1554 hours on August 3, 1980, Instrument and Control personnel were performing work on bistable BA413 under Maintenance Work Order IC-547-80. When the bistable was removed, isolation valve DH11 went closed. Decay Heat Pump 1-1 was stopped to prevent damage. This caused decay heat flow to be stopped for three minutes until the bistable could be replaced and the pump restarted.

These occurrences placed the unit in violation of Technical Specification 3.4.1 which requires at least one decay heat pump be in operation while the unit is in Mode 5.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the 0955 hours occurrence was personnel error. While working in disconnect cabinet CDE-11B2, construction electricians were pulling wires and shorted out a fuse clip. This blew the 3 amp fuse in the valve control circuit causing DH12 to travel closed.

The occurrence at 2232 hours was attributed to procedural inadequacy. Insufficient guidance on the Maintenance Work Order covering the work with regards to system restoration led to steps being done out of sequence. The personnel were under the impression that TP35 slide link was open and TB35 points 25 and 26 were jumpered per ST 5031.01, SFAS Monthly Test, which was being performed to check out Maintenance Work Order

IC FCR 79-439A, SFAS Reactor Coolant System Pressure to T-sat. In fact, an I&C technician had just removed the TP 35 slide link and the jumper for TB 35 points 25 and 26 to establish the normal system condition.

The occurrence at 1554 hours on August 3, 1980, was attributed to personnel error. The maintenance specialist had previously reviewed the SFAS drawings for the maintenance work order and concluded the bistable could be removed with no special precautions. He incorrectly determined that the bistable de-energized the output relay to allow DH11 to open, when actually the relay is energized by bistable BA413 to allow DH11 to open.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. In all three cases the loss of decay heat flow caused no significant increase in RCS temperature. There was no damage to the decay heat pump since it was stopped immediately when the valve was confirmed shut.

Corrective Action: The first event was corrected by opening the DH11 and 12 bypass valves DH21 and DH23. Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was revented and restarted on the bypass at 1045 hours. The blown fuse was replaced, DH11 and DH12 were opened at 1051 hours, and DH21 and DH23 were closed. Flow was verified at 1300 gpm. The details of the event and electrical work practices were discussed with the construction electrician and his supervisor.

In the second case where decay heat flow was lost, DH11 was reopened. Decay Heat Pump 1-2 was restarted and flow verified at 1300 gpm. Additional pertinent guidance will be provided on future maintenance work orders with regards to system restoration.

In the third event the bistable was reinstalled. DH11 was opened and Decay Heat Pump 1-1 was started. Flow was restored by 1557 hours on August 3, 1980. A tag will be attached to this module indicating that its removal will allow DH11 to go closed. Two modules controlling core flood valves have been identified as operating in a similar manner and will also be tagged to prevent inadvertent closing of the valves. The maintenance specialist who made the error was cautioned to use more diligence in doing his work.

Technical Specification Admendment 28 issued August 21, 1980 eliminates the requirement of always maintaining power on DH11 and DH12. This should eliminate inadvertent closings such as those experienced during this outage.

Failure Data: Previous loss of decay heat flow due to personnel errors were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-32-77-05, NP-32-77-09 and NP-33-80-54 (80-044).

Previous losses of decay heat flow due to procedural error were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-32-77-03, NP-33-80-53 (80-043) and NP-33-80-71 (80-057).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | \_\_\_\_\_ (2) | \_\_\_\_\_ (3) | \_\_\_\_\_ (4) | \_\_\_\_\_ (5)  
7 8 9 | LICENSEE CODE | 15 | LICENSE NUMBER | 25 26 | LICENSE TYPE | 30 | 57 CAT | 58

CON'T  
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE (6) 05000346 (7) | \_\_\_\_\_ (8) | 120180 (9)  
7 8 | 60 | DOCKET NUMBER | 68 69 | EVENT DATE | 74 75 | REPORT DATE | 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 3 | SEE LETTER  
0 4 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 5 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 6 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 7 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 9 | \_\_\_\_\_ (11) | \_\_\_\_\_ (12) | \_\_\_\_\_ (13) | \_\_\_\_\_ (14) | \_\_\_\_\_ (15) | \_\_\_\_\_ (16)  
7 8 9 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (810) | \_\_\_\_\_ (18) | \_\_\_\_\_ (19) | \_\_\_\_\_ (20) | \_\_\_\_\_ (21) | \_\_\_\_\_ (22) | \_\_\_\_\_ (23) | \_\_\_\_\_ (24) | \_\_\_\_\_ (25) | \_\_\_\_\_ (26)  
21 22 | EVENT YEAR | 23 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 24 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 28 29 | REPORT TYPE | 30 31 | REVISION NO. | 32

\_\_\_\_\_ (27) | \_\_\_\_\_ (28) | \_\_\_\_\_ (29) | \_\_\_\_\_ (30) | \_\_\_\_\_ (31) | \_\_\_\_\_ (32) | \_\_\_\_\_ (33) | \_\_\_\_\_ (34) | \_\_\_\_\_ (35) | \_\_\_\_\_ (36) | \_\_\_\_\_ (37) | \_\_\_\_\_ (38) | \_\_\_\_\_ (39) | \_\_\_\_\_ (40) | \_\_\_\_\_ (41) | \_\_\_\_\_ (42) | \_\_\_\_\_ (43) | \_\_\_\_\_ (44) | \_\_\_\_\_ (45) | \_\_\_\_\_ (46) | \_\_\_\_\_ (47) | \_\_\_\_\_ (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 1 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 2 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 3 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 4 | \_\_\_\_\_

1 5 | \_\_\_\_\_ (28) | \_\_\_\_\_ (29) | \_\_\_\_\_ (30) | \_\_\_\_\_ (31) | \_\_\_\_\_ (32)  
7 8 9 | FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | 10 12 | OTHER STATUS | 44 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | 45 46 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | 80

1 6 | \_\_\_\_\_ (33) | \_\_\_\_\_ (34) | \_\_\_\_\_ (35) | \_\_\_\_\_ (36)  
7 8 9 | ACTIVITY RELEASED | 10 11 | CONTENT OF RELEASE | 12 13 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | 44 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | 45 80

1 7 | \_\_\_\_\_ (37) | \_\_\_\_\_ (38) | \_\_\_\_\_ (39)  
7 8 9 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 10 11 | TYPE | 12 | DESCRIPTION | 13 80

1 8 | \_\_\_\_\_ (40) | \_\_\_\_\_ (41)  
7 8 9 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 10 11 | DESCRIPTION | 12 80

1 9 | \_\_\_\_\_ (42) | \_\_\_\_\_ (43)  
7 8 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | 10 | DESCRIPTION | 11 80

2 0 | \_\_\_\_\_ (44) | \_\_\_\_\_ (45) | \_\_\_\_\_ (46) | \_\_\_\_\_ (47) | \_\_\_\_\_ (48) | \_\_\_\_\_ (49) | \_\_\_\_\_ (50) | \_\_\_\_\_ (51) | \_\_\_\_\_ (52) | \_\_\_\_\_ (53) | \_\_\_\_\_ (54) | \_\_\_\_\_ (55) | \_\_\_\_\_ (56) | \_\_\_\_\_ (57) | \_\_\_\_\_ (58) | \_\_\_\_\_ (59) | \_\_\_\_\_ (60)  
7 8 9 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | 10 | DESCRIPTION | 11 80

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER \_\_\_\_\_ PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_