AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE February 6, 1981
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Extension 251

MONTH January, 1981

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	464	17	0
2	463	18	0
3	470	19	0
4	472	20	0
5	444	21	0
6	121	22	0
7	0	23	0
8	0	24	0
9	0	25	0
10	0	26	0
11	0	27	0
12	0	28	0
13	0	29	0
14	0	30	0
15	0	31	0
16	0		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

8102120135

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
DATE February 6, 1981
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Extension 251

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: January, 1981
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 934
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 890

Notes

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe):
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any:

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	744	744	30,053
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	134.0	134.0	14,518.2
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	2,882.1
14. Hours Generator On-Line	127.9	127.9	13,175.7
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	1,731.42
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	191,873	191,873	27,096,679
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	62,434	62,434	9,037,768
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	51,729	51,729	8,316,230
19. Unit Service Factor	17.2	17.2	44.4
20. Unit Availability Factor	17.2	17.2	50.6
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	7.8	7.8	32.9
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	7.7	7.7	32.3
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	82.8	82.8	27.6

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: February 3, 1981
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY		
INITIAL ELECTRICITY		
COMMERCIAL OPERATION		

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH January, 1981

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE February 6, 1981
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 251

No.	Date	Type[1]	Duration (Hours)	Reason[2]	Method of Shutting Down Reactor[3]	Licensee Event Report #	System Code[4]	Component Code[5]	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
11	81 1 6	F	616.1	A	1	NP-33-81-01	CB	PUMPXX	The unit was shutdown to repair the seals in the Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-2 and 2-1. See Operational Summary for further details.

1
F: Forced
S: Scheduled

2
Reason:
A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
B-Maintenance or Test
C-Refueling
D-Regulatory Restriction
E-Operator Training & License Examination
F-Administrative
G-Operational Error (Explain)
H-Other (Explain)

3
Method:
1-Manual
2-Manual Scram.
3-Automatic Scram.
4-Continuation
5-Reduction
6-Other

4
Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161)

5
Exhibit I - Same Source

(9/77)

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
January, 1981

Reactor power was maintained at approximately 55 percent power until 0734 hours on January 6, 1981 when a shutdown was initiated because of problems with the seals in the Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-2 and 2-1. The unit was taken off line at 0751 hours on Janaury 6, 1981 and remained there for the rest of the month.

The reactor coolant pump seals were repaired. One new seal cartridge was installed, the other three were rebuilt and installed.

While maintenance was being performed on an electrical penetration, water was discovered in the containment electrical penetration. An ensuing investigation resulted in finding moisture in all east electrical penetrations. A comprehensive plan to deal with the moisture problem was developed and is being implemented.

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: January, 1981

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: February, 1982

3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: May, 1982

4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what, in general, will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

   Reload analysis is scheduled for completion as of December, 1981. No technical specification changes or other license amendments identified to date.

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information. January, 1982

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

   None identified to date.

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

   (a) 177 (b) 44 - Spent Fuel Assemblies
   8 - New Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

   Present 735 Increase size by 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

   Date 1988 (assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained)

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 79-169

SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System

COMPONENT Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve, RC-2A

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: On May 25, 1979, modifications to the Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) for FCR 79-169 were completed. The modifications included changing the relief setpoints for the PORV from 2255 psig to 2400 psig, and changing the low setpoint to 2350 psig.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The above change in the setpoint for the PORV in conjunction with the change in the Reactor Protection System(RPS) high pressure trip setpoint (FCR 79-170) should prevent the actuation of the PORV during anticipated transients.

SAFETY EVALUATION:

All safety analysis for B & W plants assume that the vent capacity of the PORV will not be available. Thus, these analysis are unchanged by an increase in its setpoint.

The change proposed in FCR 79-169 does not constitue and unreviewed safety question for the following reasons.

(1) The probability of occurence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated int the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) has not been increased.

(2) The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type other than any evaluated previously in the FSAR has not been created.

(3) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR: 80-065

SYSTEM: Lake Water System

COMPONENT: Motor Operated Valves MV2927 and MV2928

CHANGE TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-065 has been written to revise Electrical Drawing No. E-48B Sheet 27, Revision 6 to reflect the as built conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE: While investigating NCR 210-78, it was found that more interlocks were connected in the MV2927 and MV2928 control schemes in addition to the TIS contacts shown in the Elementary wiring diagram E-48B, Sheet 27, Revision 6. MV2927 and MV2928 are located in the control scheme inside control panels C6708 and C6709.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: This FCR involves only the revision of drawings to as-built conditions and therefore an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 80-067

SYSTEM: Containment Ventilation System

COMPONENT: Containment Cooler Fan #3

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-067 has been written to revise Bechtel Drawings E-58B, Sheets 2A and 2C to reflect the as built conditions.

REASON FOR CHANGE: To correct a possible drafting error on Drawings E-58B, Sheet 2A and 2C, so as to reflect the as built conditions of the internal wiring of breakers BE1501 and BF1501.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This FCR involves only a drawing revision to reflect as built conditions, and therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 80-104

SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System

COMPONENT: RC Flow Transmitters

CHANGE TEST EXPERIMENT: FCR 80-104 has been written to revise Bechtel Drawing M-567 to reflect the actual plan view location of FTRC1A1, A2, A3, A4 and 1A, and FTRC1B1, B2, B3, B4 and 1B as shown on Johnson Service Co. Drawings YF-FP-RC01A Sheet 1, and 1/F-FP-RC01B Sheet 1.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The Bechtel instrument location drawings should accurately reflect the actual instrument location for the purposes of training, trouble shooting and maintenance. Furthermore, this information is extremely important in times of limited access to instruments.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This FCR involves only a drawing revision to reflect as built conditions and therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 80-122

SYSTEM: Reactor Coolant System

COMPONENT: RC42, RC43, RC44, RC45

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: On May 29, 1980, modifications on Reactor Coolant Valves RC42, RC43, RC44 and RC45 for FCR 80-122 were completed. The modifications made to the valves included grinding of the canopy and seal welding the bonnet to the valve using a fillet weld.

REASON FOR CHANGE: In order to remove the bonnet for valve repair, the canopy weld must be ground out. Tolerances for rewelding the canopy can not be met to allow reassembly via a canopy weld.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Sealing the bonnet to the body with a fillet weld will not affect the ability of valve to perform its safety function. This valve modification has the concurrence of the valve manufacturer, Rockwell International. An unreviewed safety question does not exist.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO: 80-167

SYSTEM: Seismic Supports

COMPONENT: Hanger PSV-1-H1

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: On June 19, 1980, the rear snubber in hanger PSV-1-H1 was changed from a remote reservoir to a local reservoir.

REASON FOR CHANGE: To enhance snubber maintenance.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Changing the hydraulic fluid reservoir for PSV-1-H1 from remote to local will not affect the functioning of the snubber. Furthermore, proper functioning will probably be enhanced, since there will be less opportunity to trap air in the snubber tubing, and hence, adversely affect snubber operations. An unreviewed safety question does not exist.