## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

### REGION III

Report No. 50-409/80-09

Docket No. 50-409

License No. DPR-45

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue - South La Crosse, Wisconsin 5:01

Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

Inspection At: La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI

Inspection Conducted: August 1-31, 1980

Inspectors: W. L. Forney or M. W. Branch

D. C. Boyd

Albayd Approved By: D. C. Boyd, Chief, Projects Section 4

Inspection Summary

Inspection on August 1-31, 1980 (Report No. 50-409/80-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the licensee's operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; followup action to IE Bulletins, IE Circulars and open inspection items. This inspection involved a total of 300 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors including 32 inspectorhours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were found in six areas; four items of noncompliance were found in one area (Infraction-failure to accomplish ORC review and approval of a facility change. Infraction-failure to provide two manual valves on a system exposed to both containment and outside atmosphere, Infractionviolating containment integrity while reactor was at power. Deficiencyfailure to make prompt telephone notification to NRC Operations Center of a significant event.)

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### DETAILS

## 1. Persons Contacted

\*R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
\*J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
\*G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
\*L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
\*L. Krajewski, Health and Safety Supervisor
\*H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor
S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer
W. Angle, Process Engineer
\*M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor
\*W. Nowicki, Instrument and Electrical Supervisor
R. Wery, QA Specialist
\*G. Joseph, Security and Fire Protection Supervisor
\*L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor
\*P. Schaffers, Radiological Engineer

\*Denotes those present at exit interview

In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.

## 2. General

During the month of August the plant experienced several forced shutdowns due to leaks on control rod drive seals and to replace a leaking seal on the Forced Recirculation Pump 1A. The plant also experienced a reactor trip on August 22, due to shorting of reactor feed pump controllers and another reactor trip on August 29 due to a loss of seal water to the force circulating pump seals. Repairs have been satisfactorily completed on the above items.

## 3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of August 1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of August 1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the alternate core spray and the electrical distribution systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

The inspectors noted, after a review of unresolved item  $80-06-02^{1/2}$  that the licensee had installed and later removed an unapproved modification to the shell side vent of the shutdown condenser.

The modification consisted of removing the pipe cap from a 1/2" top shell vent and attaching a valve, connecting piping, pump and tygon tubing to allow recirculation of the condenser contents for corrosion control.

This modification installation and subsequent removal resulted in the following items of noncompliance.

- The installation and removal of the modification was accomplished without the required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1.6.d. safety evaluation or review. This is an infraction.
- b. The installation of the above mentioned modification contained only one manual valve in lieu of two manual valves required by TS 2.1.2.5 for lines between containment and the atmosphere. This is an infraction.
- c. The removal of the above mentioned modification during operations resulted in a breaking of containment integrity, which is a violation of TS 4.2.1.1. This is an infraction.

The inspectors also noted several items of concern Radiological Control Areas. Rope barriers for the main turbine cubical were found not to be securely attached. The licensee has remounted these signs and they now appear to be securely attached. A tracerlab source was found to be left unattended in the lunch room. Licensee locked up the source and discussed this item with all Health Physics personnel. Inspectors are satisfied with licensee's action.

The inspectors noted that the calibration source, used for the flow verification of environmental air sampler air flow meters, was not in

<sup>1</sup>/IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/80-06, paragraph 3

current calibration. It was also noted that the flow meter for stock air flow is not calibrated. This is considered to be unresolved item 80-09-01.

## 4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

Control Rod Drive #28 seal replacement Control Rod Drive #21 seal replacement Control Rod Drive #5 seal replacement Forced Recirculation Pump 1A seal replacement

Following completion of maintenance on the Control Rod Drive #28 and Forced Recirculation Pump 1A, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

## 5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Nuclear Instruments and Emergency Diesel Generators and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel. The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities: Boron and Emergency Core Spray Controls and Valves test data, Reactor Building Containment Building test data, Shutdown test of Core Spray System test data.

No items of noncompliance were noted.

#### 6. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

79-03A, Longitudinal weld defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Piping.

80-16, Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc. models 1151 and 1152 Pressure transmitters with either "A" or "D" Output Codes.

No items of noncompliance were noted.

### 7. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

80-16 - Operational Deficiencies in Model 510DU Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters

No items of noncompliance were noted.

### 8. Plant Trips

Following the plant trips on August 8, August 22, and August 25, 1980 the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee. All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on August 9, August 25, and September 3, 1980.

During a review of the licensee's actions following a reactor scram on August 25, 1980 the inspectors noted that the licensee had failed to make the required one hour notification to the NRC Operations Center. The phone call was made within one hour after being informed by the NRC Resident Inspector that it was reportable item and should be reported. A discussion with the operating staff indicated that at the time of the reactor trip the reporting requirements were discussed and it was determined not to be a reportable event. The Operations Engineer subsequently discussed this matter with the operating staff and instructed them on the reporting requirements of ACP 02.8 and that this document should be used to determine reportable events.

This item is a deficiency.

# 9. Followup on Open Inspection Items (OII)

(Closed) OII 80-06-02<sup> $\frac{1}{2}$ </sup>: Review of item by inspector revealed three (3) items of noncompliance, see paragraph 3.

## 10. Unresolved Items

Unresolve: items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.

## 11. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee stated that they would develop procedures to ensure calibrated standards are used to flow check environmental monitor air flow meters and also ensure that stock flow meters are calibrated.

1/IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/80-06, paragraph 3