



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-321/80-35 and 50-366/80-35

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
270 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Inspection at Hatch near Baxley, Georgia

Inspector: R. F. Roger R. F. Roger for 7-11-80
Date Signed

Approved by: H. C. Dance H. C. Dance 9-11-80
Date Signed
H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 15 - August 15, 1980

Areas Inspected

This inspection involved 75 inspector-hours on site in the areas of technical specification compliance, reportable occurrences, housekeeping, operator performance, overall plant operations. Quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventative maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities and surveillance activities.

Results

Of the eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in ten areas. One item of noncompliance was found in the area (Infraction - reactor startups with inoperative scram volume level switches, paragraph 9).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *M. Manry, Plant Manager
- *T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager
- *T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- R. Nix, Superintendent of Maintenance
- C. Coggins, Superintendent of Engineering Services
- W. Rogers, Health Physicist
- C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 18, August 8 and August 20, 1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs, auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During abnormal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.

6. Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant

conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the the inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions equipment caution and danger tags and component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshifts and weekends.

7. Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO's) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.

8. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector verified by observation and interview during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organization of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, that search practices were appropriate, and that escorting and communications procedures were followed.

9. Scram Discharge Volume Testing Per IE Bulletin 80-17 (Units 1 and 2)

On July 3, 1980, IE issued IE Bulletin 80-17 which described the failure of 76 of 185 control rods to fully insert during a scram at TVAs Browns Ferry Unit 3 on June 28, 1980. The Bulletin required various investigative actions by all BWR facilities. Supplements 1 and 2 to this Bulletin were issued on July 18 and July 22, 1980. They contained additional requirements based on information received from the initial Bulletin 80-17 tests.

The Hatch facility response to Bulletin 80-17 is essentially complete. The Manual and automatic scram tests were performed on July 20 and 21st for Unit 1 and July 26 and 31st for Unit 2. Procedural revisions were required and operator training has been completed. The inspector witnessed the manual scram test on each unit and verified that the licensee complied with other Bulletin requirements. The inspector also physically inspected the scram discharge systems on both units to attest to its design adequacy. One problem was noted during the manual scram test on Unit 2. Two (2) of the high level scram discharge volume switches, 2C11-NO13A&D, failed to signal high water level in the SDV. Further investigation revealed that the switch floats were crushed from the top. The licensee's surveillance

procedures for checking these floats only required a functional test with water every cycle. This was last performed successfully on Unit 2 on April 9, 1980. Subsequent review of computer post trip logs indicated that these switches did not actuate after scrams on June 2, 1980, June 14, 1980, July 11, 1980, and July 26, 1980. Contrary to technical specification requirements, on protective instrument operability, the licensee then re-started the reactor on four occasions with these two switches inoperable. The failure of the two switches (A&D) on the Post Trip Log should have been detected by the licensee and appropriate corrective action taken at the time. Since this occurrence, the licensee has modified the surveillance procedures HNP-1-3004 and HNP-2-3004 to require a functional test with water than an electrical check at Technical Specification required intervals. The licensee also committed to functionally testing these switches after every scram. The licensee's restart of the Unit 2 reactor with less than the minimum number of operable channels of protective system instruction on four separate occasions is contrary to Technical Specification 3.0.4 and is an infraction (366/80-35-01).