

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 | C | T | H | N | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58  
 LICENSEE CODE      LICENSE NUMBER      LICENSE TYPE      CAT 58  
 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 9  
60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
 REPORT SOURCE      DOCKET NUMBER      EVENT DATE      REPORT DATE  
 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On October 7, 1980 at 1400 hours during routine surveillance, Reactor Vessel Low Water  
 0 3 | Level Scram and Low-Low Level Isolation Functional and Calibration Test, level switch  
 0 4 | LIS-263-57B tripped slightly outside its allowable band (T.S. Table 3.2.2). There were  
 0 5 | no consequences.  
 0 6 |  
 0 7 |  
 0 8 |

9 | 9 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16  
 SYSTEM CODE      CAUSE CODE      CAUSE SUBCODE      COMPONENT CODE      COMP. SUBCODE      VALVE SUBCODE  
 I B      E      E      I N S T R U      S      Z  
 17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER      18 | EVENT YEAR      19 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.      20 | OCCURRENCE CODE      21 | REPORT TYPE      22 | REVISION NO.  
 8 0      —      0 1 5      /      0 3      L      —      0  
 23 | ACTION TAKEN      24 | FUTURE ACTION      25 | EFFECT ON PLANT      26 | SHUTDOWN METHOD      27 | HOURS      28 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED      29 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.      30 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER      31 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
 E Z      Z      Z      0 0 0 0      Y      Y      N      Y 0 1 0

1 0 | Failure of the switch to trip at its desired setpoint was attributed to dust in the  
 1 1 | switch mechanism. The switch was cleaned, adjusted to its required setpoint and  
 1 2 | satisfactorily tested.  
 1 3 |  
 1 4 |

5 | 8 | 9 | 30 | 32  
 FACILITY STATUS      % POWER      OTHER STATUS      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION  
 H      0 0 0 0      NA      B      Routine Surveillance  
 6 | 8 | 9 | 35 | 36  
 ACTIVITY CONTENT      AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY      LOCATION OF RELEASE  
 Z      Z      NA      NA  
 7 | 8 | 9 | 37 | 38 | 39  
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES      NUMBER      TYPE      DESCRIPTION  
 0 0 0      Z      NA  
 8 | 8 | 9 | 40 | 41  
 PERSONNEL INJURIES      NUMBER      DESCRIPTION  
 0 0 0      NA  
 9 | 8 | 9 | 42 | 43  
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY      TYPE      DESCRIPTION  
 Z      NA  
 0 | 8 | 9 | 44 | 45  
 PUBLICITY ISSUED      DESCRIPTION      NA  
 N      NA

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NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT TO LER 80-14/3L  
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY  
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1  
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21  
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

An engineered safety feature instrument setting was found to be less conservative than that established by Technical Specifications.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the plant was shut down for a planned refueling outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On October 7, 1980 at 1400 hours during routine surveillance, Reactor Vessel Low Water Level Scram and Low-Low Level Isolation Functional and Calibration Test, it was discovered that level switch LIS-263-57B tripped slightly outside its allowable band at 92.0 inches of water. The trip level setting of this switch is required by Technical Specification Table 3.2.2 to be 79 (plus 4, minus 0) inches above the top to the active fuel, which corresponds to an instrument setting of 93.78 (plus or minus 1.4) inches of water for the level switch in question.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of this switch to trip at its desired setpoint was attributed to dust in the switch mechanism.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The switch in question is one of four switches arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic system, set to trip when reactor water level is 79 inches above the top of the active fuel. This trip initiates closure of the Group 1 primary containment isolation valves and also activates the emergency core cooling subsystems and starts the emergency diesel generator and the gas turbine generator and trips the reactor recirculation pumps. Failure of the switch in question to trip at its desired setpoint did not result in a loss of system integrity. The remaining switches in the trip system were found to be within the allowable setpoint band and would have performed the required action upon receipt of a reactor low-low water level signal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The level switch was cleared, reset to its required setpoint and satisfactorily tested.

The switch in question is Yarway Model 4418C with a range of 40 to 500 inches.