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Mr. A. Philip Bray Vice President and General Manager General Electric Company Nuclear Power Systems Division 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125

Dear Mr. Bray:

In your letter to Chairman Ahearne, dated March 7, 1980, you furnished your views and comments on the subject of BWR containment inerting for use in the Commission's consideration of certain proposed inerting requirements of BWR containments. We are now responding to your letter, cited above, since the Commission has elected to go forward with the rulemaking proceeding dealing with inerting of Mark I and II BWRs.

The Commission has benefited from and considered the information and comments provided to date by the General Electric Company on this topic.

Recognizing the importance of this issue, the Commission has made a serious effort to obtain all relevant input on the matter. This is illustrated by the chronology of events that have occurred to date, a copy of which is enclosed. As discussed by the NRC staff at various Commission briefings, there are several factors which impact on the inerting question. They include the potential overall accident risk reduction, the possible reduction of safety margins via inerting, the cost and operational impact due to inerting, as well as considerations of delay until more thorough studies have been completed in the accident scenarios and safety system design bases.

The degree of risk reduction due to inerting is difficult to determine using state-of-the-art techniques. Probabilistic risk assessment studies, although useful, must be viewed as only one of the factors in the inerting decision recognizing the uncertainty associated with inability to treat intermediate states for the various accident scenarios. Furthermore, potential safety margin decreases due to inerting has not been demonstrated to be significant, based on operational experience to date. Cost and operational impacts, similarly, have been shown to be small.

In view of the above and the demonstrated sensitivity of the small volume Mark I and II containments to the effects of hydrogen generation from large amounts of metal-water reaction, the Commission believes it would be prudent to consider + Commission believes to the commission believes and the commission believes to the commission believes to

To this end, the proposed interim rule has been published in The Federal Register (45FRG5466) for comment. Since, as we understand it, you have had certain related studies that will be completed during the time frame of the comment period, I strongly urge that any new information be transmitted in the form of comments to the proposed interim rule.

Sincerely,

(Signed) T. A. Rehm

William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure: Chronology of Events

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

February 22, 1980	Staff issued SECY 80-107, Interim
	Hydrogen Control Requirements for Small
	Containments.
March 19, 1980	Commission Briefing on SECY 80-107.
March 28, 1980	Commission requested additional informa-
	tion Re: SECY 80-107.
April 22, 1980 June 20, 1980	Staff issues SECY 80-107A and SECY 80-107B
	as responses to Commission's Requests of
	March 28, 1980.
June 26, 1980	Commission Briefing on SECY 80-107 series.
July 11, 1980	ACRS Meeting on Sequoyah.
July 15, 1980	ACRS Letter on Sequoyah.
August 14, 1980	Commission Briefings on Hydrogen at
August 21, 1980	Sequoyah.
August 28, 1980	ACRS Meeting on Hydrogen Control.