U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-546/80-26; 50-547/80-26

Docket Nos. 50-546; 50-547

License Nos. CPPR-170; CPPR-171

Licensee: Public Service of Indiana 1000 East Main Street Plainfield, IN 46168

Facility Name: Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Marble Hill Site, Jefferson County, Indiana

Inspection Conducted: July 22-25, and August 18-21, 1980

Inspectors: f. Z. C. Cordero (July 23-25, and August 18-21, 1980) C. M. G. L. (July 22, 1980)

9/12/80 9/12/80 9/12/80

Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 22-25, and August 18-21, 1980 (Report No. 50-546/80-26; 50-547/80-26)

Areas Inspected: Status of SPP-12; audit of the verification program being conducted by Sargent and Lundy (S&L) at Chicago Bridge and 1:on (CB&I) Kankakee, Illinois; review of Corrective Action Request dispositions; observation of Essential Service piping installation. This inspection involved a total of 45 inspection hours on site by two (2) NRC inspectors.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

Persons Contacted

Fublic Service of Indiana (PSI) and Management Analysis Company (MAC)

*L. Ramsett, Quality Assurance Manager

*C. Beckham, Quality Engineering Manager

*D. Ingmire, Construction Verification Coordinator

W. Camp, QA Records Supervisor (MAC)

T. Marcella, MAC

*R. Kime, Construction Manager

*M. Juvik, EDS Nuclear

R. Turner, MAC

Cherne Contracting Corporation (Cherne)

Craig Jergens, QA Engineer

Sargent and Lundy (S&L)

P. Kosieniak, QC EngineerM. Kurtz, QC CoordinatorM. Schuster, QC Division Head

Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI)

A. Clark, ANI - PSI

*Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

Functional or Program Areas Inspected

The functional or program areas inspected are discussed in Sections I and II attached.

Section I

Prepared by Z. C. Cordero

Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2

1. Review of SPP-12, Document Verification for ASME III Piping, Hangers and Materials

The inspector reviewed the final report submitted by Sargent and Lundy (S&L) dated August 13, 1980, and noted the following:

- a. Sargent and Lundy reviewed all the Certified Material Test Reports (CMTR) associated with the ASME Code related fabrication of component supports. It was noted that no finding was addressed with regards to the incorrect use of materials utilized to fabricate code items as addressed by the ASME audit letter dated January 26, 1980, and Stewart Mechanical Enterprises Inc. letter to Newberg dated February 7, 1980. The licensee assured the inspector that this matter will be further verified.
- b. SPP-12 (Document Verification Procedure for ASM^C III Piping and Materials) requires a 100% review of recoil packages associated with SPP-4 (Physical Inspection and erification of In-Place Safety Category I Piping and Hangers).

The inspector noted that documentation review was performed on only 101 hanger packages out of the required 130 packages according to the final report submitted by Sargent and Lundy on August 13, 1980. The licensee agreed to examine this matter and complete the necessary hanger package reviews. This is an unresolved item. (546/80-26-01; 547/80-26-01)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

2. Review of the Corrective Action Request (CAR) dispositions

The Physical Survey Team (PST) reported on May 28, 1980, that a generic internal cleanliness problem existed on the Essential Service Piping. A Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. PC-0578 was written up on June 16, 1980. The inspector noted that the corrective action implementation date on the CAR is "after re-start of Category 1 work by S.M.E." Heavy corrosion due to stagnant water was observed by this inspector on the piping system. The inspector advised the licensee to implement CAR No. PC-0578 promptly and that the work is not within the scope of the "Stop Work Order" but under the scope of maintenance type of work. The licensee agreed to disposition CAR No. PC-0578 in a timely manner. This is an unresolved item. (546/80-26-02; 547/80-26-02)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Observation of Essential Service Water Piping Installation

The inspector noted on August 19, 1980, that a strong flow of water appears to be washing out the compacted material around the suction pipes. The inspector is concerned about the possible voids created by the washing away of the fill material. The inspector further noted that the suction pipes appear to be sloped inwards towards the middle of the pipe, then the slope goes upward. The licensee has assured the inspector that no problem exists and that these conditions had been identified before except for the reported sloping of the pipe which will be verified prior to resumption of work activities.

This is an unresolved item. (546/80-26-03; 547/80-26-03)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

SECTION II

Prepared by C. M. Erb

Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief Engineering Support Section 2

Review of S&L Verification Program for Radiography Performed at Marble Hill by Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBI)

The licensee representative said that the above program had just been completed by the S&L team and suggested that the results could best be observed at the S&L office in Chicago. The survey team for radiography from S&L consisted of 3 individuals with Level III qualifications in radiography.

Approximately 965 welds representing total radiographic requirements were examined with most of these radiographs being spot examinations. A few of the radiographs, for example around the personnel and equipment airlocks, represented 100% of the weld as required by ASME NE 5000. The Unit 1 and 2 containment liners were built to the guide lines outlined in ASME Division II Trial Edition of April, 1973.

About 40 discrepancies were found between the radiographs, readers' sheets, and weld maps. Of these discrepancies, only two involved the quality of the weld as shown on the radiographs. R.C. No. RT-5, a Unit 1 containment weld, was interpreted as having a hollow bead by the survey team. On the fuel pool liner, a weld was identified as having a linear indication and thus unacceptable. These two welds together with about 38 other clerical mistakes or identification problems will be written up on correction request forms and submitted to the licensee. The licensee will then issue nonconformance paper work and a solution plus corrective action will be worked out with CBI. CBI has completed four 25,000 gallon carbon steel tanks for diesel oil storage. They have also completed two recycle stainless steel hold up tanks. These tanks were built to the requirements of ASME Section III, 1974 Edition, Winter 1975 Addenda.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section I, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.

Exit Meeting

The inspector met with site staff representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) on August 21, 1980. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings.