.771 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 (2)0 1 CON'T 0 3 0 9 0 8 8 0 9 5 0 0 9 0 5 8 REPORT 0 8 0 1 (6) SOURCE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During normal power operation, it was discovered by operator observation that the 0 2 Axial Power Distribution (APD) setpoints on D channel were out of tolerance in the 0 3 non-conservative direction. The other three channels were operable at the time and 0 4 would have provided a necessary trip of the reactor if necessary. Technical 0 5 Specification 1.3(8), Table 1.1, item 8, and Figure 1.2 applies. 0 6 0 7 COMP CODE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE NISITIRIU S 16 (13) REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPOR REPORT NO CODE NO. ER RO 0 121 013 REPORT 0 NUMBER PRIME COMP COMPONENT NPRD-4 ACTION SUBM TTED METHOD HOURS 3 FORMSUB G | 2 | 2 | 3 SUPPLIER N 24 N (25) Z (21 0101010 Y 1 (23 (26) B Z CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) During trouble shooting, it was discovered that wafer #6, contact #1 of the Flow 10 Dependent Setpoint Selection Switch, a Grayhill 42A36-8-2-5N, was making poor contact. This poor contact fed a 0% power indication into the APD calculator thus making the calculator calculate setpoints for 0% power. The switch was cleaned and returned to service. 4 80 METHOD OF OTHER STATUS (30) Operator Observation (32) % POWER NA A 0 1(28) (31 5 30 CONTENT ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 NA NA (33) 6 (34) 80 11 POSURES DESCRIPTION 39 0 38 NJURIES PERSONNEL DESCRIPTION 41 MBER 80 OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) Z (42) DESCRIPTION NA 9 20 PUBLICITY NAC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) NA 8010030418 NED (44 2 0 69 402-426-4011 M. Core PHONE .. NAME OF PREPARER .

LER 80-020 Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

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The Reactor Protection System uses a two-out-of-four to trip logic. One channel at a time may be bypassed, placing the system in a two-out-of-three to trip logic. When the setpoint was found out of tolerance, the system was immediately placed in the two-out-of-three logic mode. Therefore, the function of the R.P.S. was only slightly degraded as the other three channels were operable during this time and A, B and C channels had setpoints within tolerance. At no time would the R.P.S. have failed to perform its design functions, that is, to safely shutdown the reactor. See attachment 2 for further technical information.



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ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

One of the inputs to the APD calculator is from the flow dependent setpoint selector switch. The switch is normally used in the 4-pump position only and is only moved out of that position to perform surveillance on the RPS. The switch on "D" channe' was making poor contact on one contact which fed the APD calculator information that indicated the reactor was at the 0% power setpoints. The switch was cleaned by rotating several times through full travel and returned to 4-pump operation. The applicable portions of the APD surveillance test, ST-RPS-12, F.2, were performed to prove operability of the reactor protective system. No further corrective action is anticipated.



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ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

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This is the first occurrance of setpoints being out of tolerance due to a selector switch malfunction.