Attachment 1
TLL 477

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: P A T M I 2 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 8 2 2 8 0 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 9 2 2 8 0 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During performance of Surveillance Procedure 4331-SA2, two bottles in the Cable
03 Room and Transformer Room Fire Suppression Systems were observed to be below the
04 minimum for Halon content (below 95% full charge weight). One bottle each was in
05 the main and reserve banks; therefore, both banks were declared inoperable and the
06 action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.10.3 was entered. This event had no effect on
07 the plant, its operation, or the health and safety of the public.
08

09 | SYSTEM CODE: A B (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: X (13) | COMPONENT CODE: X X X X X X (14) | COMP SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 0 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 3 9 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: A (18) | FUTURE ACTION: G (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS: 0 0 0 0 (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: C 2 8 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Small Halon Losses are normal & expected but by procedural deficiency the bottles
11 were allowed to approach the limit too closely over successive surveillance inter-
12 vals thus allowing this overshoot. The low main bank bottle was replaced restoring
13 to operable the main bank within 45 minutes. The procedure will be revised to allow
14 a greater bank between the recharge limit and operability requirements.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: X (28) | % POWER: 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): Recovery Mode | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Routine surveillance testing

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES
18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: N/A

PUBLICITY
20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): N/A | NRC USE ONLY

8010030412 NAME OF PREPARER Steven D. Chaplin PHONE (717) 948-8461

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-2

EVENT DATE - August 22, 1980
LER 80-039/03L-0

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On August 22, 1980, at 1630 hours as a result of performing Surveillance Procedure 4331-SA2, "Fire System Halon System Check", it was determined that two bottles were below 95% of the full charge weight (94% and 93%), as required by the Technical Specifications. Both bottles were in the "Cable Room and Transformer Room" Fire Suppression System with one bottle in the main bank and the second in the reserve bank. Therefore, both banks were declared inoperable and the action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.10.3 was entered.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

With small Halon losses being normal and expected over the 6-month interval of the surveillance period, the Halon weight was allowed to approach the 95% full charge weight too closely over successive surveillance intervals before recharging the bottles. This situation could happen because the applicable procedure did not specify the point at which the bottles should be recharged, thus ensuring that an appropriate margin be maintained such that this condition would not be experienced.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

A bottle with greater than 95% full charge weight was transferred from the reserve bank to the main bank, replacing the low main bank bottle. The main bank was therefore restored to an operable status within 45 minutes, thus eliminating the need to establish an hourly fire watch as required by the action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.10.3.

LONG TERM

Procedure 4331-SA2 will be modified to specify a bottle recharging criteria, such that a larger band will exist between the minimum limit at which recharging will be required and that point necessary for system operability. This procedure change will be completed by October 31, 1980.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A