UNITED STATES MUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report of Operations Inspection

IE Inspection Report No. 050-010/76-06 IE Inspection Report No. 050-237/76-06 IE Inspection Report No. 050-249/76-05

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 60690 Chicago, Illinois

> Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Morris, Illinois

Licenses No. DPR-2 No. DPR-19 and No. DPR-25 Category: C

BWR (GE) 200 & 810 Mwe Type of Licensee:

Type of Inspection:

Routine, Unannounced

Dates of Inspection: March 23, 25-26, 29-31, 1976

Principal Inspector: P. H. Johnson R (Final

Accompanying Inspectors:

R. C. Knop (March 23, 1976)

R. D. Martin fle

4/22/76 (Date)

4/22/10

(Date)

(Date)

(March 23 and 25, 1976) J. E. Kohle

J. E. Kohler (March 23, 25-26, 1976)

H. B. Kister

(March 29-30, 1976)

4-22-76

Other Accompanying Personnel: None

RC Harp

Reviewed By: R. C. Knop, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1

4/22/16 (Date)

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Summary

Dresden 1: Inspection on March 23, 25-26, and 29-31 (76-06): Review of plant operation, reportable occurrences, station procedures, design changes, and plant cleanliness.

Dresden 2 and 3: Inspection on March 23, 25-26, and 29-31 (76-06 and 76-05): Review of plant operation, reportable occurrences, plant cleanliness, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation, equipment calibration, and surveillance program. One noncompliance item wis noted for Unit 2, related to implementation of calibration procedures.

Enforcement Items

The following item of noncompliance was identified during the inspection:

Infraction

Contrary to Paragraph 6.2.A.5 of the Dresden 2 Technical Specifications and the licensee's approved calibration procedure, pressure switch 263-51B was not unisolated following a calibration performed in December 1975. (Paragraph 7.d., Report Details)

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

Not reviewed.

Other Significant Items

A. Systems and Components

- A significant increase in Unit 1 off-gas release rate was observed on March 29, 1976. (Paragraph 9, Report Details)
- Cracks were discovered in the Unit 2 HPCI and isolation condenser steam line safe ends on March 24 and April 6, 1976, respectively. (Paragraph 8, Report Details)

- 2 -

- B. Facility Items (Plans and "cocedures)
 - Management expressed an intention to implement changes which will provide for improved housekeeping. (Pargraph 2, Report Details)
 - Management stated that an appropriate retention period would be established for completed jumper log records. (Paragraph 3.b., Report Details)
- C. Managerial Items

None.

- D. Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee
 - Contrary to Paragraph 6.2.A.1 of the Dresden 1 Technical Specifications and Procedure 200-S-1, an activity sample of the "C" waste sample tank was not taken after filling on November 8, 1975, prior to transferring tank contents for reprocessing. (Paragraph 7.i., Report Details)
 - Contrary to Paragraph 6.2.A.1 of the Dresden 2 Technical Specifications and DOP 700-6, the "B" traversing in-core probe was not verified to be in its shield following operation on January 7, 1976. (Paragraph 7.e., Report Details)
 - 3. Contrary to Paragraph 3.7.B.1 of the Dresden 3 Technical Specifications, the Unit 3 diesel generator was removed from service for maintenance on March 3, 1976, while the "A" train of the standby gas treatment system out of service. (Paragraph 7.h., Report Details)
- E. Deviations

None.

F. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

An unresolved item-' involving possible loss of secondary containment in the event of offsite power loss was determined to represent an item of noncompliance which had been reported and corrected by the licensee. (Paragraph 7.h., Report Details)

1/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/76-04.

- 3 -

Management Interview

A management interview was conducted by Mr. Johnson with Mr. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent, and other members of the station staff at the conclusion of the inspection. The following matters were discussed:

- A. The inspector presented the following comments related to his review of reportable occurrences:
 - 1. One item of noncompliance was apparent, in that a pressure switch was not returned to service following a calibration performed in December 1975. The inspector questioned the adequacy of techniques used to verify valve positions and noted that the related calibration checklist did not provide a sign-off for unisolating the instrument following calibration. (Paragraph 7.d., Report Details)
 - The inspector described three noncompliance items which had been identified and corrected by the licensee.
 - The inspector stated that although the content of licensee 3. event report forms to date had generally been acceptable, the Unit 1 reports reviewed during the inspection did not present sufficient information with adequate clarity to permit an understanding of the prob'em during initial review. Two Unit 3 reports related to turbine control valves also were not adequately clear, in that the reports did not establish whether failure of safetyrelated components was involved. The inspector noted that more thorough review by the onsite review function would have identified the inadequacies. He also stated that more familiarity with reporting requirements was needed. Licensee representatives stated that additional emphasis would be given to these areas. (Paragraph 7, Report Details)
- B. The inspector stated that a review of Unit 1 design changes had been conducted, with no noncompliance items identified, although two minor discrepancies associated with the diesel generator low temperature alarm had been disclosed. (Paragraph 6, Report Details)
- C. The licensee was informed that a review of Unit 1 procedures had been conducted, with no noncompliance items identified.

- 4 -

The inspector noted that although no specific time limit is established in the Technical Specifications, some temporary procedure changes were requiring as long as three months for completion of onsite review. Management stated that additional attention would be given to this area. (Paragraph 5, Report Details)

- D. The increase in Unit 1 off-gas rate observed on March 29 was discussed. During a subsequent telephone conversation, the inspector informed the licensee that the occurrence would be reviewed further during a separate inspection. (Paragraph 9, Report Details)
- E. The inspector confirmed his understanding that followup reports for two Unit 2 diesel generator failures in June 1975 would be submitted by the end of the week of March 29. The inspector noted that these followup reports had been committed to in the licensee's initial reports and had been the subject of inquiry on a previous occasion.²⁷ Licensee representatives confirmed that the reports would be submitted as indicated.
- F. The inspector stated that equipment calibration, surveillance, and limiting safety system settings, safety limits, and limiting conditions for operation had been reviewed, with no noncompliance items identified. (Paragraphs 4, 12, and 13, Report Details)
- G. The inspector indicated that a review had been conducted of the licensee's methods to satisfy the commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.39 (Housekeeping Requirements). The inspector requested and received a commitment that (Paragraph 2, Report Details):
 - The licensee will consider a revision to the "Dresden Station Cleaning Assignment" to incorporate added instructions to the operating staff to investigate "low traffic" areas as to the need for trash removal. This would include such areas as pump rooms, the torus rooms and intermediate levels in the Unit 1 containment.

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 The licensee will increase efforts to have the staff pick up and return used protective clothing to appropriate locations, as well as other excess materials associated with any work activity.

- 5 -

2/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-237/75-26, Management Interview, Paragraph B.

- H. The inspector indicated that he had conducted a review of plant operations for the last quarter, and that no inadequacies were noted during this review. However, the inspector requested and received a commitment that the licensee will establish an appropriate retention period for jumper log records. (Paragraph 3.b., Report Details)
- I. The inspector noted that IE comments on the Quad-Cities 1 integrated leak rate that had been discussed separately by Mr. Kohler with Mr. Loberts and others involved in preparations for the Dresden 2 test. (Paragraph 11, Report Details)

- 6 -

REPORT DETAILS

Part I

Prepared by P. H. Johnson, R. D. Martin, and H. B. Kister

1. Persons Contacted

B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent A. Roberts, Assistant Superintendent J. Abel, Administrative Assistant D. Adam, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor E. Budzichowski, Unit 1 Operating Engineer V. Danese, Nuclear Station Operator J. Dolter, Leading Nuclear Engineer D. Dransfeldt, Nuclear Station Operator R. Jolley, Nuclear Station Operator C. Maney, Staff Assistant (Procedures) R. Nimmer, Surveillance Coordinator J. Pearson, Nuclear Station Operator J. Phelan, Engineer R. Ragan, Unit 3 Operating Engineer D. Reese, Shift Engineer G. Reimers, Engineer G. Romba, Engineer C. Sargent, Unit 3 Leading Engineer C. Schiavi, Engineering Assistant N. Scott, Unit 2 Operating Engineer T. Watts, Technical Staff Supervisor

- M. Wright, Engineer
- A. Zapatocky, Instrument Foreman

2. Facility Cleanliness (Dresden 1, 2, and 3)

The inspector reviewed the manner in which the licensee is implementing the commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.39, "Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."

The licensee utilizes a "Dresden Station Cleaning Assignment" which one of the operations engineers assigns to shift 4 (midnight shift) on a daily basis and which calls for cleanus of various areas. The licensee indicated that cleanup activities such as floor scrubbing are assigned on an as-needed basis based on observations by the operating engineers and/or on the recommendation of shift personnel.

- 7 -

Following a tour of the facility to evaluate the effectiveness of these controls, the inspectors requested and received the following commitments from the licensee:

- a. The licensee will consider a revision to the "Dresden Station Cleaning Assignment" to incorporate added instructions to the operating staff to investigate "low traffic" areas as to the need for trash removal. This would include such areas as pump rooms, the torus rooms and intermediate levels in the Unit 1 containment.
- b. The licensee will increase his efforts to have staff pickup and return used protective clothing to appropriate locations, as well as other excess materials associated with any work activity.
- 3. Review of Plant Operation (Dresden 1, 2, and 3)

The inspector reviewed records of facility operation during the past calendar quarter to evaluate if plant operations, operating records, and shift and control room manning were in accordance with administrative procedures, the licensee's quality assurance program, Technical Specifications, and other regulatory requirements. In general, no significant inadequacies were identified during this review.

- a. The inspector reviewed the following operating records:
 - (1) Unit 1 sphere auxiliary data, February 1976.
 - (2) Shift operating routines.
 - (a) Unit 2: Weeks of December 29, 1975, February 2, 1976, and March 8, 1976.
 - (b) Unit 3: Weeks of January 5, 1376, January 25, 1976, March 1, 1976, and March 7, 1976.
 - (3) Surveillance record sheets in control room during tour of facility.
 - (4) Shift engineer's log book.
 - (a) January 21-30, 1976.

- 8 -

- (b) February 5-11, 1976.
- (c) March 12-16, 1976.
- (5) Unit 1 logbook.
 - (a) January 28 February 3, 1976.
 - (b) February 10-15, 1976.
 - (c) March 11-16, 1976.
- (6) Unit 2 logbook
 - (a) February 5-9, 1976.
 - (b) February 29 March 12, 1976.
- (7) Unit 3 logbook.

February 5-15, 1976.

- (8) Jumper logbooks for all three units.
- b. In the review of the jumper logs, it was noted that a general updating of the logbooks had occurred resulting in all completed entries (jumper placed jumper removed) being removed from the logbook. The inspector was informed that these sheets were not retained after they were reviewed by the respective Operations Engineers and their disposal authorized. The inspector questioned the wisdom of disposing of these records, since they might prove valuable during future incident reviews. The inspector requested and received a commitment from the licensee that an appropriate retention period for these records would be established.
- c. The inspector conducted a tour of the facility to observe operations in progress. No inadequacies were observed during this inspection activity. However, during the tour, the inspector noted that the security door to a vital area did not work properly. Further investigation indicated that this malfunctioning door had been detected and reported by the security guard during his morning tour, and that repair work had been initiated. The inspector later verified that the lock had been repaired within five hours of being found defective. The inspector had no further questions on this matter.

- 9 -

4. <u>Review of Safety Limits, Limiting Satety System Settings, and</u> Limiting Conditions for Operation (Dresden 2 and 3)

The inspection included a review of plant operations for Units 2 and 3 from July 1975 to the present for compliance with safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation defined in the facility's Technical Specifications. The review included discussions with plant personnel, direct observation of operation, review of operating logs, instrument procedures, work requests, startup procedures, and selected recorder charts. No items of noncompliance were identified.

5. Procedures (Dresden 1)

The inspector reviewed selected operating, abnormal condition, maintenance, emergency, and administrative procedures against requirements governing procedure approval and issue, revision, technical content, and conformance with Technical Specifications requirements. No noncompliance items were identified. The following comments resulted from the review:

- a. Records indicated that temporary changes to procedures were being reviewed by the onsite review function, although in some cases as much as three months were noted to have elapsed after issue of a temporary change before onsite review was completed. The technical specifications do not provide a specific time limit for this review. This was discussed further during the management interview.
- b. During a previous inspection $\frac{3}{}$ it was noted that a method did not exist to assure that temporary procedure changes were incorporated into permanent procedure revisions where required. During the current inspection, licensee representatives presented a log which was being kept by the procedures coordinator to assure that permanent revisions would be provided. The licensee also stated that a future revision to administrative procedures would assign responsibility for this function to the procedures coordinator.

6. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (Dresden 1)

Selected design changes were reviewed for proper approval, conformance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements, updating of procedures and drawings, and completion in accordance with approved procedures.

3/ IE Inspection Rpts No. 050-010/75-22, No. 050-237/75-27, and No. 050-249/75-24.

- 10 -

No noncompliance items were identified. The inspector's only comment related to Design Change 72-6, which added a low temperature annunciator for the diesel generator. The related Annunciator Procedure 9P13 C-6 was noted to reflect the design change under appropriate procedure steps but not in the procedure heading. The change was also not reflected in as-built drawing 12-416, although several other related drawings were noted to have been revised. The licensee stated that these items would be corrected.

7. Review of Reportable Occurrences (Dresden 1, 2, and 3)

A review of reporting requirements, corrective action, licensee review and evaluation, and compliance with regulatory requirements was conducted for the following reportable occurrences:

	Event Title	Event Date	Report Date
Unit	1		
	75-16 & 16A - Overflowing of B Holdup Tank	12/11/75	1/6/76 2/5/76
	76-1 - Overflowing of B Holdup Tank	1/2/76	1/30/76
	76-2 - Failure of Unit 2/3 Screen Wash to Isolate	1/27/76	2/24/76
	76-3 - Inoperable Valves in Post-Incident System	1 2/10/76	3/4/76
Unit	2		
	75-52 - Rapid Closure of MSIV	11/16/75	11/20/75
	76–2 – Low Vacuum Scram Due to Isolated Pressure Switch	e 1/2/76	1/21/76
	76-3 - Failure of TIP Limit Switch	1/9/76	1/26/76
	76-4 - Drywell High Pressur Scram Switch Drift	2/7/76	2/17/76

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- 11 -

1975 Outage Local Leak Rate Testing Summary	4/16/75 thru 5/29/75	8/14/75
75-44 - Off-gas Increase	11/25/75	12/11/75
76-1 - Failure of Control Valve Scram Solenoid	1/4/76	2/2/76
76-3 - Failure of Control Valve Scram Solenoid	1/10/76	2/4/76
76-4 - Unavailability of Standby Gas Treatment System	3/3/76	3/11/76

The inspector's review including discussions of each event with licensee representatives as required, and examination of the report referenced above and documents related to the particular areas reviewed. The following comments resulted from the review:

- a. Unit 1, Events 75-16 and 76-1: The inspector had no questions based upon review of AIR 76-54 and instrumentation calibration records, although it was noted that the initial report received for Event No. 75-16 had not provided adequate description of the occurrence. A supplemental report was issued by the licensee.
- b. Unit 1, Event 76-2: This occurrence was related to failure of valve MO 2-3906 to isolate on low pressure in the Unit 2 fire protection system. This was a reportable occurrence because of the backup capability provided to the Unit 1 core spray system by the Unit 2 fire protection system. The initiating pressure switch was found to have a low setpoint and was recalibrated. The inspector noted that the licensee's report had not described the occurrence with sufficient clarity to permit an understanding of the problem during his initial review. This was discussed further during the management interview.
- c. Unit 1, Event 76-3: The inspector noted that this report also did not provide adequate description to permit understanding of the occurrence. Further examination showed the event to have been caused by leakage from a heating system solenoid valve which permitted water to flow

Unit 3

- 12 -

through the conduit attached to the solenoid to a point where it splashed on and leaked into panel DP-40. The Unit 1 reactor log showed DP-40 to have been deenergized for less than one hour while the breaker for the MO-512 operator was removed for repair. Post-incident injection valves were inoperable in the closed position during this period, as permitted by Technical Specifications. Corrective actions were noted to have included improved sealing of panel DP-40 to prevent in-leakage of water.

- Unit 2, Event 76-2: The effect of the isolated pressure d. switch was not an unconservative one with respect to nuclear safety, since it caused a scram to be initiated when one normally not have been required. The event did represent a weakness in the accomplishment of required surveillance, however, since a similar oversight in other areas could result in a loss of redundancy in protective functions. An instrument foreman stated that the person involved had checked the valve and thought it to be open due to tight valve packing which made the valve difficult to operate. The inspector stated that (1) valve position check techniques should be reviewed for possible improvement, and (2) the related calibration check sheet and two others selected at random were noted to have a sign-off for isolating the instrument but not unisolating it following the calibration. The licensee was informed that the occurrence represented noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.6.A in that the pressure switch was not unisolated following calibration as required by the approved procedure.
- e. Unit 2, Event 76-3: Review showed the event to have been as described in the licensee's report. The inspector noted that failure of the NSO to follow the TIP operati procedure represented noncompliance identified and corrected by the licensee. Radiation protection aspects of this occurrence were reviewed during a separate inspection.
- f. Unit 3, Event 75-44: This relates to a significant increase in air ejector off-gas observed for Unit 3 on November 25, 1975. The cause of the observed increase was still not known. The following is a summary of related information (in addition to that included in the licensee's report) known at the time of the inspection:

4/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-249/76-04.

- 13 -

- (1) Unit 3 has been operating at a reduced power of approximately 600 Mwe since early December to maintain air ejector off-gas below 300,000 uCi/sec. Air ejector off-gas has remained relatively st the slightly below that value since early December and was observed to drop further to approximately 250,000 uCi/sec following a control rod sequence change in February. Stack release rates have been maintained relatively low by the installed off-gas holdup system (a stack release rate of 694 uCi/sec before the increase was incorrectly reported as 0.694 curies/sec in the licensec's report).
- (2) The licensee's report discussed difficulties with the cleanup system prior to the off-gas increase. During discussions shortly after the event, some licensee representatives suspected this as a possible cause, possibly resulting in reintroduction of foreign matter which had settled out or been removed from the reactor systems. Inspections of irradiated fuel conducted by the licensee indicated the introduction of fuel particles into the coolant to have been possible, although the stable off-gas level seen during the months following the event seems to have discounted this possibility.

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- (3) The inspector inquired about the commitment to a followup letter expressed in the licensee's report. Licensee representatives stated that a followup letter would not be submitted until more definite indications of the cause are available, probably following the 1976 refueling outage.
- g. Unit 3, Events 76-1 and 76-3: Investigation showed that these occurrences were not related to nuclear safety, in that they represent malfunctions of the turbine control valve fast closure function (a turbine protection consideration). No malfunction of the fast closure scram feature was apparent. The inspector stated that more thorough examination of the occurrences by the onsite review function would likely have resulted in the conclusion that the events were not required by Technical Specification to be reported to the NRC.

5/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-249/75-24.

- 14 -

- h. Unit 3, Event 76-4: The inspector's review disclosed no new information from that contained in the licensee's report. The licensee was informed that removal of the Unit 3 diesel generator from service with the redundant standby gas treatment system inoperable represented a noncompliance item which had been identified and corrected by the licensee.
- Review of the deviation report file disclosed one additional noncompliance item which had been identified and corrected by the licensee. This involved failure to sample the Unit 1 "C" waste sample tank after filling on November 8, 1975, prior to transferring the tank contents for reprocessing.

8. Through-Wall Crack in HPCI Steam Line Safe End (Dresden 2)

On March 24, 1976, while removing piping insulation for nondestructive examination, licensee personnel observed a drop of water on the bottom of the HPCI steam line safe end. Further examination showed the drop of water to be from a through-wall crack in the heat-affected zone of the safe end at its outboard end. On April 6, 1976, the licensee also reported that an ultrasonic indication had been observed in the isolation condenser steam line sufe end while performing followup inspection resulting from the HPCI safe end leak. Both safe ends are sensitized stainless steel as are 23 other safe ends remaining on the Unit 2 vessel (2 sensitized core spray safe ends were replaced following the discovery of cracks in 1975). The HPCI and isolation condenser safe ends had been removed by April 11 for examination and replacement. Review of replacement activities will be the subject of separate inspection reports. The inspector's observations of March 25 related to the HPCI steam ling afe end crack were as follows:

- a. Upon visual examination, the through-wall crack was seen to be circumferential, approximately 3/8 inch in length. The crack was tight and not visible to the naked eye, but was apparent by the reappearance of water following wiping. Though not observed by the inspector, licensee representatives stated that the mirror insulation adjacent to the leak showed a rust spot likely resulting from the impingement of steam.
- b. Review of drywell floor drain volumes, drywell CAM levels, and the results of weekly manifold samples for the last week of operation prior to the current outage (the manifold permits samples to be drawn individually from 22 separate

- 15 -

locations within the drywell) showed no perceptible increase over a base level selected for the same measurements from December 1975. On February 11-12, 1976, Unit 2 was shut down to correct a packing leak associated with a recirculation pump discharge bypass valve. Drywell floor drain volumes increased from 0.35 gpm prior to the packing leak to 2.2 gpm (24-hour average) on February 12, and the drywell CAM increased by approximately 1½ decades. Results from drywell manifold samples increased more than 2 decades in a fairly uniform manner, indicating that the increased activity was well distributed throughout the drywell. These figures indicate that the HPCI steam line safe end must have shown very little or no leakage to the drywell prior to the March 14 shutdown, or some increase in drywell activity and/or floor drain volume would have been evident.

9. Off-gas Increase (Dresden 1)

The inspector was informed while at the station on March 29, 1976, that a significant increase had been observed in Unit 1 off-gas release rate earlier that day, apparently as a result of control rod exercising performed approximately 24 hours earlier. Preliminary review by the licensee showed that a procedure precaution had apparently not been observed by the NSO while performing the control rod exercising. The inspector stated that the occurrence would be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection.

REPORT DETAILS



10. Persons Contacted

- B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
- J. Abel, Administrative Assistant
- C. Sargent, Unit 3 Leading Engineer
- G. Riemers, Engineer
- H. Warlow, Instrument Technician
- R. Thomas, Instrument Foreman
- W. Hildy, Instrument Engineer
- A. Roberts, Assistant Station Superintendent
- R. Nimmer, Surveillance Coordinator
- D. Maxwell, Quality Control Inspector

11. Preparation for Dresden 2 Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT)

The inspector was requested by the Assistant Station Superintendent to discuss the significant aspects of the 1976 Quad-Cities 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test. The following items were discussed and all relate to the 1976 Dresden 2 ILRT.

- a. Shutdown Cooling: Shutdown cooling should be controlled during the entire test, both integrated and supplemental, in order to maintain the reactor vessel temperature as constant as possible.
- b. Drier: A drier in series with the compressor should be used to take the moisture out of the air during containment pressurization.
- c. Subvolumes: A ten subvolume containment model should be used to compute the average weighted containment temperature.
- d. Fans: Cr dideration should be given to the operation of drywell fans to circulate the air mass.

- 17 -

- e. TIP Ball Valves: The inspector stated that leakage from the TIP system had been a source of considerable undetected containment leakage at several other facilities during the ILRT. The licensee stated that the licensee should consider performing a local leak rate test on these nontestable penetrations prior to containment pressurization.
- f. Dewcells: The six Veekay Dewcells should be calibrated by the licensee prior to the ILRT.
- g. Data Reduction: A computer program has been written to reduce the raw leak rate data into a calculated measured leak rate. The inspector suggested that the licensee obtain data take. during the Quad-Cities ILRT in which the leak rate has been calculated, in order to compare and confirm the validity of the licensee's ILRT computer program. The licensee acknowledged this and plans to obtain the Quad-Cities test data.

12. Surveillance (Dresden 2 and 3)

The inspector selected surveillance tests chosen at random for review against the licensee's technical specifications. In all cases, the surveillance tests chosen for review were included in approved procedures that specified prerequisites, functional checks of instrumentation used to conduct the surveillance, acceptance criteria, and operational checks performed prior to returning equipment to service. All surveillance selected for review was in conformance with the licensee's technical specifications.

	Surveillance	Dresden 2	Dresden 3
а.	Reactor Coolant System High Water Level in Scram Discharge Tank (quarterly).	1975	1975
.	Reactivity and Power Control Full Core Scram Testing (refueling).		9/75
с.	Power Conversion and Auxiliar Systems. Standby Liquid Control System (monthly).	y 1975	

- d. Containment Systems Pressure Suppression Vacuum Breakers (refueling).
- e. ECCS Low Pressure Coolant Injection. Simulated Auto Actuation Test (refueling).
- f. ECCS High Pressure Coolant Injection Auto Actuation Test (refueling).
- g. Electrical Systems 1974/1975 Auto Simulation to Accept a Full Load.

13. Calibration (Dresden 2 and 3)

The inspector verified that technical specification calibration requirements relating to each of the following systems was covered by properly approved procedures. In each case the calibration procedure selected for review was chosen at random from the licensee's technical specifications requirements and was found to contain the proper approvals, acceptance criteria and detailed stepwise instructions.

1975

1975

1975

	Calibration	Dresden 2	Dresden 3
a.	Reactor Coolant System Safety and Relief Valves (each refueling outage).	3/76	12/75
ь.	Reactivity and Power Control High Flux Intermediate Range (every shutdown).	1-3/75	5-6/75
с.	Power Conversion and Auxiliary Systems, Main Steam Line High Radiation (quarterly).	y 1-6/75	5-10/75
d.	Containment Systems Pressure Suppression Vacuum Breaker Valves.	1975	

- Emergency Core Cooling Systems, 1-12/75
 Low Reactor Water Level (before each startup).
- f. Emergency Core Cooling System 1-12/75 1-12/75 High Drywell Pressure (quarterly).
- g. Electrical Turbine Control 1-12/75 1-9/75 Loss of Control Oil (quarterly).

The inspector discussed with the licensee the qualification of individuals performing the calibration on safety related equipment. The licensee described the union job classification for instrumentation work. The job classification dictates which individual will perform a particular instrumentation related job. Two safety related calibrations were selected in order to verify that the calibration was performed by the proper job classification. No deficiencies were found.

The measuring devices (listed below) used as primary standards in the calibration of the plant equipment were selected for review. In all cases the calibration frequency was met, the accuracy was traceable to the National Bureau of Standards or other independent testing organizations, and storage of the selected devices was proper.

		Certification
a.	Weights DZ2-8	NBS
b.	Heise Gauges 100-1000 psig	NBS
c.	Wallace Tiernan Pneumatic Calibration	NBS