U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-10/78-18; 50-237/78-16; 50-249/78-18

Docket No. 50-10; 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-2; DPR-'9; DPR-25

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, 2 and 3

Inspection At: Dresden Site, Morris, IL

Inspection Conducted: May 3, 4, 18, 19, 23 and 24, 1978

Inspectors: J. Barker 6/26/78

N. J. Chrissotimos 6/26/78

Approved By: R. C. Knop, Chief 6/27/78
Reactor Projects Section 1

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 3, 4, 18, 19, 23 and 24, 1978 (Reports No. 50-10/78-18; No. 50-237/78-16; No. 50-249/78-18)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of onsite review of LER's, organization and administration, review and audits, review of plant operations after refueling, Unit 3, reactor system decontamination, and review of plant operations, Units 1, 2 and 3. The inspection involved 63 hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent
*A. Roberts, Assistant Station Superintendent
*B. Shelton, Assistant to the Station Superintendent
*D. Farrar, Technical Staff Supervisor
*G. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Coordinator
*R. Kyrouac, Quality Control Engineer

The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and maintenance personnel.

*denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (Unit 2)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following licensee event report was reviewed to determine that reporting requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with the facility's Technical Specifications.

LER 78-009, Resin Intrusion Conductivity Exceeding Technical Specifications.

The inspector determined that an extensive investigation is underway to determine the cause and correct the recent occurrences of resin intrusion into the reactor. The licensee has replaced four of the seven post strainers on the demineralizer service units and has the remaining post strainers on order for replacement of all post strainers for Units 2 and 3 demineralizer service units. During recent excessive ΔP's across the condensate demineralizer beds, the licensee found that although resin beads were released from the resin bed, they were caught in the newly replaced post strainers. The licensee is also undergoing extensive chemical analysis of the resin material to better determine if shelf-lives and deterioration of the resin bead in the resin beds may be contributing factors to the loss of resin from the demineralizer beds. The Station Nuclear Engineering

Department is investigating the possible deficiencies involving the condensate booster pump minimum flow line to determine any contributing factors which may have caused the recent resin intrusion. Recommendations from SNED are not yet available. This item will be closed for record purposes but will remain as an outstanding item for further review by the inspector.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Organization and Administration

A review of the licensee's onsite organization structure was conducted to determine the personnel qualification levels are in conformance with the technical specifications, authorities and responsibilities are as delineated in the technical specifications, operating crew composition and the license personnel requirements are in compliance with the technical specifications, onsite and offsite review committee membership qualifications are satisfactory, and licensee organization and structure changes have been reported to the NRC.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Reviews and Audits

The inspector reviewed the records relating to onsite and offsite review committee meetings and determined requirements had been satisfied, proposed tests and experiments which affect nuclear safety whose performance may constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 were reviewed as required, violation of facility technical specifications were reviewed as required and proposed changes to the technical specifications were reviewed in accordance with the facility's technical specifications. A review of the records relating to all offsite audits conducted during the previous year verified that audits were conducted in accordance with written procedures and checklists by trained personnel not having direct responsibility in the area of being audited, audit results were documented and reviewed by site management and cooperative management, followup on action had been initiated, and audit frequency was in conformance with the technical specifications.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Review of Plant Operations after Refueling, Unit 3

The inspector verified that systems disturbed or tested during the refueling outage will be returned to an operating status prior to plant startup, the control rod withdrawal sequence and rod withdrawal authorizations were available and in effect prior to startup after refueling, and that surveillance tests were performed during the refueling outage as required by technical specifications. The inspector reviewed control room daily logs, reviewed the shift supervisor's log, reviewed 13 surveillances to insure completion within Technical Specification periodicity, and reviewed the complete startup package (including all startup checks, valve lineup checks, and outage checklists). The inspector reviewed in detail licensee procedures DGP 2-1, "Unit 2/3 Normal Unit Startup," DGP 1-S1, "Unit 2/3 Master Startup Checklist," DGP 1-S3, "Unit 2/3 Master Outage Checklist," and DOS 1600-10, "Pre-Startup Drywell Inspection Plan." The inspector determined through this detailed review of procedures and checklists that the refueling outage recently conducted was extremely well coordinated and well managed. There was considerable improvement over refueling outages completed during earlier dates.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Reactor System Decontamination

The inspector determined that the licensee has not performed any decontamination of reactor coolant pressure boundary components for Units 1, 2, or 3. A complete primary system decontamination is planned for Unit 1 following the October, 1978, shutdown. This decontamination plan will have and has undergone extensive review by the NRC prior to commence of the Unit 1 decontamination. No other decontamination of reactor coolant pressure boundary components is planned by the licensee until results from the Unit 1 primary system decontamination have been received and reviewed.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Review of Plant Operations (Units 1, 2 and 3)

The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examination of control room log books, routine patrol sheets, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the period of April 26,

1978 through May 24, 1978. The inspector also made visual observations of routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during this period. This review was conducted to confirm that facility operations were in conformance with requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for this period was conducted to confirm that no violations of the licensee's Technical Specifications were made. The inspector also conducted a tour of the Units 1, 2 and 3 reactor buildings and turbine buildings throughout the month of May, and noted that monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation control was properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic restraint oil levles appeared adequate, and equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 24, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The inspector agreed that the completion date of the modification to allow blowdown of the diesel air start systems could be extended from May 31, 1978 to June 30, 1978 without any effect on the health and safety of the public.