



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

APR 6 1979

NOTE TO: Attached List

FROM: S. H. Hanauer, Assistant Director for Plant Systems, DSS

SUBJECT: 1. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION
2. INSTRUMENTATION TO FOLLOW THE COURSE OF AN ACCIDENT

I believe that as a result of the TMI accident, we have to rethink:


1. Environmental Qualification envelope
2. Things which have to be qualified
3. RG 1.97 implementation
4. Backfitting

Changes in my thinking include:

1. Core damage is credible
2. Long-term plant operation is essential; initiation isn't enough
3. LOCA and SLB may not give an envelope that includes the TMI experience
4. We are relying heavily on things not defined as "safety-related" (Browns Ferry was like that, also)

I believe that we will be required, justifiably, to hasten the pace of review and backfitting decisions. We can't be definitely quantitative until we have better data than now available (for example, dose rates), but we can start thinking in principle.

Please start thinking about this problem. I will set a due date for your ideas as soon as we get off the night shift.


S. H. Hanauer, Assistant Director
for Plant Systems
Division of Systems Safety

cc: G. Arlotto
R. Boyd
R. DeYoung
R. Mattson
D. Ross
J. Sniezek
V. Stello

8009250453