



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

LPR

SEP - 8 1980

Docket No. 50-440
Docket No. 50-441

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company
ATTN: Dalwyn R. Davidson
Vice President - System
Engineering and Construction
Post Office Box 5000
Cleveland, OH 44101

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your final report dated August 26, 1980, pursuant to
10 CFR 50.55(e) regarding Post-LOCA H₂ Analyzers. We will complete
our review of this matter during a future inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

G. Fiorelli, Chief
Reactor Construction and
Engineering Support Branch

cc: Director, RCI/II
Director, AEOD
Chief, OEB/MPA
IE Files

cc w/ltr dtd 8/26/80:
Central Files
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
Harold W. Kohn, Power
Siting Commission
Mr. Daniel D. Wilt, Attorney
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

8009240 229

Forelli



Dalwyn R. Davidson
VICE PRESIDENT
SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION

August 26, 1980

Mr. James G. Keppler
Director Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

50-440/441

Re: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Final Report on
Post-LOCA H₂ Analyzers

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is the final report on the deficiency concerning Post-LOCA H₂ Analyzers required by 10CFR50.55(e). This problem was first identified to Mr. Jack Hughes of the NRC Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on April 22, 1980, by Mr. M. R. Edelman of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. Additionally, an interim report dated May 22, 1980, was sent to you documenting the problem and the course of action to be taken.

Description of Deficiency

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company awarded a contract to Comsip Incorporated for the design, fabrication, assembly, testing, inspection and delivery of the hydrogen analyzer systems for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant-Units 1 and 2. During a functional testing of one of the units, a pump failed because one of the panel outlet valves was closed when the pump was started. This design did not consider that excessive outlet pressure of the sample pump could cause mechanical separation of the connecting rod and crank shaft, which in turn, could rupture the pump diaphragm.

Analysis of Safety Implication

In our interim report, dated May 22, 1980, we identified two (2) potential safety hazards:

1. Up to one (1) liter of containment gas could be released into the outside atmosphere, should the failure as defined above occur; and/or
2. If the input/outlet valve is closed while the pump is in operation or if the containment isolation valve inside the containment is closed, there is a risk in damaging the system, thereby rendering the system inoperable.

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

Entire document previously entered into system under:

ANO 8009020067
No. of pages: 4

AUG 25 1980