UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TERA

September 4, 1980

Docket No. 50-309

Ms. Katheryn Kearney
12 1/2 Shawmut Street
Lewiston, Maine 04240

Dear Ms. Kearney:

This is in response to your letter of July 3, 1980 in which you requested lists of required improvements already made and a list of required improvements that will be made "to assure that every reactor in the United States is sufficiently safe to protect the public."

Let me assure you that every reactor in the United States is operated with the concept of providing only a minimal risk to the health and safety of the public. Should we have sufficient reason to believe this were not the case, the NRC would order the reactor shut down.

Changes required at nuclear power plants to improve safety are already contained in public documents. NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations, contains Category A items to be implemented by January 1, 1980 and Category B items to be implemented by January 1, 1981. A copy of NUREG-0578 is enclosed for your information. Five additional TMI-2 items were issued to all operating licensees by USNRC letter dated May 7, 1980. A copy of the May 7 letter and its Enclosure 1, Implementation Schedule 2 Summary, is enclosed for your information. Note in the applicability column of Enclosure 1 that many items do not apply to Maine Yankee. The items not applicable to Maine Yankee are identified by: BWRs, W, PWRs and Big Rock Point.

The remaining items are contained in NUREG-0649, Task Action Plans For Unresolved Safety Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants.

NUREG-0649, "Task Action Plans for Unresolved Safety Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants", provides details of each task action and provides a basis for continued plant operation and licensing pending completion of the task. A copy of NUREG-0649 is enclosed for your information.

"Unresolved Safety Issues" that may be applicable to the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant and a brief status of each are enclosed as draft status sheets (marked-up) for week ending 7/25/80. A status sheet provides the estimated completion date for each TAP. Please note that the completion of each task results in the issuance of an NRC report (NUREG). The NUREG, after a period for public comment and ACRS discussions, is issued to each applicable licensee,

who in turn must respond to the criterion contained therein. The response may be recommendations for a change in procedures, Technical Specifications, issuance of a report, hardware modifications or justification as to why no action is required. Because of interaction between the licensee and NRC during the TAP resolution process, the licensee may elect to take actions prior to the completion of the TAP. Several examples are included below.

The NUREG for TAP A-1, Water Hammer, has not yet been issued; however, Maine Yankee has responded to this task in part by addressing water hammer in the feedwater lines of steam generators.

Although the NUREG for TAP A-2, Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant Systems, has not yet been issued, Maine Yankee was the first operating Combustion Engineering plant in the U. S. to implement hardware modifications consisting of retrofit pipe rupture restraints. We are presently reviewing and evaluating the licensee's final report regarding TAP A-2.

Although TAP A-4, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, is not currently complete, Maine Yankee, during their Summer 1978 refueling outage, made extensive modifications to SG tubes as well as tube support plates. Additional impacts of this TAP on the Maine Yankee plant will not be determined until the completion of TAP A-4 and issuance of its NUREG.

TAP A-36, Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, has been completed with its NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, recently issued. Maine Yankee has responded to this TAP by responding to the TAP group questions and regulatory positions. Maine Yankee made minor modifications to their yard area crane. Maine Yankee's existing Technical Specification 3.13, Refueling Operations, together with implementing procedures and safety interlocks assure that heavy loads (other than a fuel assembly) are not carried over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

In addition to the above, the NRC is in the process of developing and implementing an action plan that integrates many of the actions described above and identifies additional actions that may be required. While the Commission has not approved all of the proposed actions, I am enclosing "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident" NUREG-0660 to provide further information on the safety improvements being considered by the NRC for implementation by nuclear power plant licensees.

The licensees of nuclear power plants required to implement the above mentioned items may engage the services of different engineering firms, procure equipment from various manufacturers and have equipment installed

by various contractors. Thus, cost estimates for the above mentioned items represents a combination of many different variables that are not routinely available to the NRC. Consequently, it is not possible for us to provide you cost estimates of meaningful value.

I trust that these comments, together with the enclosed information, answer the questions contained in your letter with the exception of cost estimates.

Sincerely,

T. M. Novak

Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Licensing, NRR

Enclosures:
As stated