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6-10-75

BBS Ltr. #342-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R. R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 June 5, 1975

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
 Directorate of Licensing
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20555

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SUBJECT: REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE PER SECTION 6.6.A OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
CORE SPRAY-REACTOR PRESSURE PERMISSIVE SWITCH FAILURE

- References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A
 2) Notification of Region III of U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Telephone: P. Johnson, 1750 hours on May 29, 1975
 Telegram: J. Keppler, 1412 hours on May 29, 1975

Report Number: 50-10/1975-9

Report Date: June 5, 1975

Occurrence Date: May 28, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

The reactor pressure to core spray permissive switch (dPS-CS126B) failed to operate.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence Unit-1 was in a steady-state condition at 573 MWt and 180 MWe. There were no other surveillance tests in progress at that time.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At 1400 hours on May 28, 1975 as the Instrument Mechanics were routinely calibrating the reactor pressure to core spray header pressure permissive switch (dPS-CS126B), the switch failed to operate. After the operating

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engineer was notified, the switch was jumpered closed to render the system operable.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Component Failure)

The cause of the occurrence was component failure. The bellows seal of the switch had ruptured.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of dPS-CS126B negated only one side of a parallel-wired subsystem on reactor protection system channel "B". The health and safety of plant personnel and the public were not jeopardized by this incident since channel "B" remained operable through the parallel switch.


After jumpering the switch closed, channel "B" was positively operable, ensuring core spray system capability even in the event of a similar failure of the parallel switch.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to jumper the contacts closed. The switch was replaced at 1900 hours on June 3, 1975.

FAILURE DATA

There has been no previous failure of this type of component. The switch is a Barton 288-A switch.


B. B. Stephenson
Superintendent

BBS:smp
File/NRC