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Regulatory

File Cy.

BBS Ltr. #473-75

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
 R. R. #1  
 Morris, Illinois 60450  
 August 7, 1975



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director  
 Directorate of Regulatory Operation-Region III  
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 799 Roosevelt Road  
 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: REPORT OF UNUSUAL EVENT PER SECTION 6.6.C OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
 FAILURE OF CORE SPRAY VALVE MO-CS33 TO OPERATE

References: 1) Regulatory Guide 1.16 Rev. 1 Appendix A  
 2) Drawing Number M-595

Report Number: 50-10/75-11

Report Date: August 7, 1975

Occurrence Date: July 23, 1975

Facility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois



IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Core spray valve MO-CS33 failed to open during the monthly core spray valve operability surveillance.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Unit-1 was at a steady-state power level of 475 MWt and 136 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

At 0530 hours on July 23, 1975, while performing the core spray valve operability surveillance, MO-CS33 failed to operate from the control room. Valve MO-CS32, the redundant valve, was immediately verified to be operable.

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DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (Crud Accumulation)

An operator was sent to investigate the problem. It was discovered that an "open" signal from the control room would automatically open the valve when the operating lever was engaged. The operator then opened the valve manually. There was no indication of binding.

An inspection of the valve revealed an accumulation of crud on the valve stem section traversed by the driving nut. The crud was lodged in the threads, causing the stem to bind.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of valve MO-CS33 had no safety implications since the redundant valve MO-CS32 was operable at all times. The health and safety of the public were not jeopardized by this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Immediate corrective action was to inspect and clean MO-CS33. Further action will be to inspect and, if necessary, clean MO-CS32. Protective covers have been installed on both valve stems to help prevent a recurrence of this problem.

FAILURE DATA

A failure of this nature has never occurred before at Dresden.

*Arthur M. Roberts*  
for B. B. Stephenson  
Superintendent

BBS:GJH:smp

File/NRC