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PRESIDENT	1'S	00:0123	SSION	ON	THE	
						*
ACCIDENT	AT	THREE	MILE	ISI	LAND	*
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DEPOSITION of SAUL LEVINE, taken before

Judith McGovern Williams, a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room 24-102, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on Saturday, September 15, 1979, commencing at 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT:

Samuel Jensch, Esq., and Robert Burns on behalf of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.


ALSO PRESENT:

Norman C. Rasmussen




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ROBERT H. LANGE ASSOCIATES CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS SO CONGRESS STREET BOSTON, MASS. 05109 TEL 523-1674



THE SERIES

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1		PROCEEDINGS
2		SAUL LEVINE, having been duly sworn,
3		testified in answer to direct interrogatories by
4		MR. JENSCH:
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6	٩	Dr. Levine, you have previously been deposed, and I
7		have read your deposition. I also read the
8		deposition of your associate, Mr. Budnitz. I think
9		I have in mind some of the considerations of your
10		division, which is entitled Regulatory Research, is
i1		that correct?
12	A	The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
13	Q	You are the director of that office?
14	A	Yes, I am.
15	2	You have previously in your other depositions set
16		forth your biographical sketch of your academic and
17		experience background, have you not?
18	A	Yes, I have.
19	Q	Have you been in this business a long time with the
20		Atomic Energy Commision and the Nuclear Regulatory
21		Commission?
22	A	Yes, I recall some of our previous meetings,
23		Mr. Jensch.
:4	٩	You also appear as witnesses in some of the cases?

A Yes, I have.

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	100 C 17 - 20	
2	Q	I don't know whether you have had an opportunity in
3		the last say ten years to follow some of the
4		procedures that we have had, but let me ask you this.
5		Have you ever heard of subjects being examined in
6		the course of a hearing and the suggestion was made,
7		well, that's a generic issue, whereupon silence
8		prevailed in the hearings, as if the subject became
9		sacrosanct, and shouldn't be covered further at the
10		hearing, have you heard about that?
11	A	Yes, I have heard about that.
12	٩	Does your department develop or research generic
13		issues?
14	A	Yes and no. The generic
15	Q	That sounds like the general approach we've had in
16		the hearings about generic hearings. Will you
17		proceed, please?
18	A	Yes. The generic issues arise out of a process, the
19		licensing process. Now the history of where they
20		came from is very simple. There were starting, 15
21		years ago; there were reactors being licensed,
22		given construction permits or operating licenses,
23		with some issues not being fully resolved, and
24		these began to collect. The basis for letting

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PENGAD CO., BATONNE, M.J. 07002 . FORM IL 248

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1		particular issues slide on a particular case was
2	-	that it will be caught on a caught up and taken
3		care of in a succeeding reactor; and that really
4		never happened very effectively, so there was this
5		collection which came to be called unresolved safety
6		issues, and then I thin: something else, and finally
7		generic issues.
8	q	Other descriptions that we won't mention here, but
9		go ahead.
10	A	There may be others.
11	-	I know that they are not generated per se,
12	-	but some definition; if there is some definition, I
13	-	haven't heard one. I think I have given my
14	-	intellectual definition is the test definition I know.
15		Now there was at one time a list published
16		by the A. C. R. S. of several hundred, 350 or maybe
17		400, and in those days there was a strong effort
18		going on to try to catch up with these, and finally
19		after some years they were reduced to 133.
20	a .	By what process, if you know?
21	A	Yes. There were in fact letters written, reports
22		issued by the Regulatory staff of the A. C. R. S.,
23		which said here is what we have gone through . Take
24		care of this issue.

PENGRO CO., BAYONNE, M.J. 01601 - TONN IL 245

1		Now I reviewed at one point briefly each
2		of a long list of several hundred items. It was
3	-	shortly after I became the director of research; and
4		I wanted to see if there were issues there that
5		required research, so that I could start programs
6	-	to help resolve issues; and what became apparent to
7		me, almost immediately, was that those issues were
8		not real issues in terms of being important to
9		safety, that having worked with Norman, done
10		WASH-1400, I had a perception already of their
11		relative importance to risk, just by reading a brief
12	-	description of them, and that I felt that we could,
13		by the use of WASH-1400 techniques, demonstrate that
14		about half of those issues were not significant
15		contributors to reactor accident risk.
16		I approached some people in N. R. R.
17	Q	Which is what?
18	A	Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. With a
19		proposition I would put up two of my best people,
20		if they would put up two people, which we would put
21		together, getting information, and getting our WASH 1400
22		techniques to handle these issues. That proposal
23		was never accepted.
24		The the meantime, by work of others, this

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... . 4088 100 FORME. 1 3 PENGAD list got reduced to 133.

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2	Then about, well, sometime last year, the
3	chairman, Hereld Jenton asked the chairman of the
4	N. R. C. and Harold Denton asked me to work on
5	- generic issues; could I take the complete list of
6	133 issues, and could I, not me personally, but could
7	my office, by the use of WASH-1400 techniques
8	characterize them as to relative importance as to
9	- safety, or to risk, and we did that work in about
10	- two months, and we found out of 133 items, there
11	- were many cithen that had nothing to do with safety.
12	They had to do with environmental matters, and that
13	_ is fine, but they didn't belong on a safety list, and
14	- There were procedural matters on this list also.
15	There were items like update chapter so and so of the
16	state of review plan. That didn't have any safety
17	significance especially; it was not an issue. Maybe
18	it needed an update, but it was not an issue. It
19	was a procedure.
20	In any event, we went through the whole
21	list, and we found about either, I can't remember
::	the exact number, either 17 or 19, stood out as
23	issues that could contribute significantly to

reactor accident risk, and we found there was a

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1	sharp sleavage at that point, the rest were rather
2	- small, would not affect reactor safety significantly,
3	- and now we have - N. R. R. accepted that work after
4	some review and minor modifications, and there is
5	now a program in place to work on those issues.
6	- They are called task action plan items, and we are-
7	- in fact in the Office of Research have assumed
8	responsibility for several of those because of the
9	shortage of resources in N. R. R., so we are
10	assisting them in working out these.
11	They also have a temporary organization
12	that Harold Denton established after Three Mile
13	Island. There is one special task force, called the
14	Generic Issues Task Force, which Dr. Hanauer is the
15	head of, so there is a unified effort to get this
16	going.
17	Q Let me just go back if I may. You said some of the
18	generic issues developed cut of proceedings and I
19	suppose experience at various plants, even I
20	suppose throughout the world. It is in that matter
21	that generally the generic issues are identified,
22	is that correct?
23	A Tes, yes.
24	Q And the extent to which you participated in resolving

286.45 CO., 2410586, M.J. 01002 10.74 N. 248

1		those may vary from case to case, for instance, is
2		that correct?
3	A	Generally we have not participated at all in the
4		resolution of these issues. Now occasionally my
5		people get consulted on, without my even being aware,
6		on many technical matters, and we may have given
7		advice here and there, but the basic issues are
8		settled in N. R. R. with the A. C. R. S.
9	٩	Are you a statutory officer under this energy
10		reorganization plan?
11	A	Yes, I am.
12	Q	That led to the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory
13		Commission January of 1975?
14	A	175.
15	Q	Is the N. R. R. a statutory organization?
16	A	Yes, it is.
17	Ģ	And the statute would define the function of each
18		of the two offices?
19	A	Yes, it does.
20	Q	Perhaps you could tell us in a practical way why
21		there isn't a closer interrelationship between the
22		two offices as the status has developed, for
23		instance.
24	A	Well, it is hard to be precise about it. I can

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PENGAB CO., BATONNE, N.J. 07642 - 1084 1. 248

give you some speculation and feelings on my part, and there are a number of factors that are different, but let me go through the factors. There is not a coherent picture.

- Cne factor is before the N. R. C. was establishe, what was the basic core organization in the A. E. C. was on the general manager's side of the house, not on the regulatory side of the house, the division of reactor safety and research, which is now part of my office.

Mhen the N. R. C. was created, we were the only portion of the general manager side of the house that was transferred to the regulatory program, to the N. R. C. There are many people in the N. R. C. who do not want us to come. Now I know that Manning Muntzing, who is the director of regulations under the A. E. C., had talked to Herb Kouts, who was my predecessor, and asked him explicitly to come with this resource to the N. R. C. as opposed to staying on the general manager's side of the house with Erda, and I thought that was very wise. Kouts and I had long discussions about this, and while it wasn't completely clear where we should go, we ended up in balance the best place to go was in the

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N. R. C. However, in spite of our views, and in spite of Manning's view, there were many people on the staff who did not want us to come. They wanted research responsibility, all right, but they didn't want an organization to come in to perform that function. They wanted to perform it themselves, and so there was a source of difficulty.

There is another source of difficulty, which pertains to the general attitude in N. R. R.; and T'm fairly -- it's wrong, but I am fairly sympathetic to it, because I understand it. In all the years in which the people in N. R. R. have been licensing reactors, even when they were in the A. E. C., they were given very little help from anyone. In general, until Kouts's division was established in the A. E. C., the A. E. C.'s research organization was not responsive to the needs of the licensing people, and so they had nowhere to turn for technical inp.t. They had no resources, they had no money from Congress to spend on hiring people, consultants or laboratories to do work for them, and they had to do the best they could.

So they became clannish. They became - Interlooking, interlooking, interlooking - inward looking and

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1		not outward locking, and they treated everyone who
2		was outside their organization with equal contempt,
3	-	although contempt is the wrong word; That is used
4	-	facetiously, and Some of this attitude persists.
5	-	They have a noninventive attitude: We have an
6	-	attitute, we can do this better than anyone; you attile
7		never helped us before and probably aren't going to
8		help us now. No matter how good your intentions are
9		to help them, they're probably not going to accept
10		it. That is a big part of it. I guess another
11		part of it I have to say is partly our fault. We
12		were created, at least the reactor safety portion
13		of our work, was created with the idea that you
14		know Appendix K of Part 50, the emergency core
15		cooling criteria, was conservative, and we're going
16	-	to research to prove where reality was, which was a
17	-	noble objective. We're going to study reality, and
18		show that Appendix K model was overly conservative.
19		So this creates a natural tension between the two
20		groups, and we have done that by the way, a lot of
21		our research is showing just that, and this may be
:2		resented by some people. I don't know, but there is
23		some of that.
24	ą	Well, the reason

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1	A	Now I should add one other thing. Since Harold
2		Denton has become the director of that office,
3		things have become very much better. They're still
4		a long way from where they ought to be, but Harold
5		Denton has come in with a different attitude. His
6		attitude is, gee, let's get together and let's
7		solve the problems, I need all the help I can get,
8		and certainly research is a great thing and I am
9		going to use it, so certainly things are starting to
10		change in a better direction.
11	Q	The reason for my asking all this it doesn't have
12		any relevancy to the Three Mile Island and let me
13		start with a specific incident of Davis-Besse.
14		Would that have come, the incident at Davis-Besse,
15		come to you for your review by your office or by
16		what is now Denton's office?
17	A	It would go to two places principally. To
18		Denton's office and to I & E, Inspection and
19		Enforcement. It would come to us through the
20		licensee event reports and our probabilistic staff,
21		where we would the not look at safety significance;
22		but we are trying to collect data on plant failures
23		and system failures so that we can do better risk
24		assessments in the future.

PERGAD CO. BATORNE. N.J. 07002 . FORM H. 248

		Now I proposed three years ago that we set
		up a better system. I proposed this to N. R. R.,
2		
3		and it was rejected. I then was talking to McDonald,
4		who is head of our management and program analysis
5		office, which collects data. It does the L. E. R.
6		collection, and I said L. E. R. collection is fine,
7		but someone has to analyze it to see what it means,
8		and I have people in my probabilistic group who have
9		the capability to write computer models that will
10		take the L. E. R. data, and give you analyzed data,
11		digested data, which can then be used.
12	Q	You're talking about some newer developments, are
13		you now?
14	A	I am talking about three years ago, something I
15		wanted to do, and I'll update that as I go along,
16		and I suggested that we talk to all the people in the
17		N. R. R. and I and he and all the other offices, and
18		find out what their needs were, and then we could
19		write the programs to get the information and so
20		forth. This was rejected, and so nothing came of it.
21		More recently since T. M. I. I recommended
22		to the Commission we establish an operation
23		evaluation function.
24	٩	In your office?

I didn't say where it should be established. I just said the agency needs it desperately, and almost immediately a task force was reported, and a task force report was written, that recommended it be established, and it has now been approved by the Commission, and they are now seeking a director for that office.

The way it's going to be set up is that there will be a central office of about 15 people 'that will report to the executive director for operations, which I think is a mistake, and there would then be satellite offices in all the major offices of a few people, and they would work together.

I think it's wonderful that this function is finally being established. It's charter will be to do all kinds of data analysis, including studies of the safety significance of failures, which must be done.

Q Well, as I understand, there has been some suggestion we only need one person to make an evaluation of failures. It has been charged that if you had a man in each utility operating a plant, that he would be able to assess, for instance, the significance of the Davis-Besse situation as applicable or pertinent

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to Three Mile Island, and so the thought that you're 1 going to, something is going to be set up in the 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission might be somewhat 3 duplicative, if I understand the suggestion about 4 having a well qualified nuclear engineer at each 1 operating plant, but I think one of the problems 6 that many people have about Three Mile Island is you 7 had the Michaelson report, and the Davis-Besse 8 incident, and something at Ocone, and it might have 9 been put in the round file as far as any reaction 10 11 that we have been able or I have been able to 12 discover from the N. R. C. about those three things. 13 so that either these, whatever they call these, 14 licensee ----15 A Licensee event reports. 16 0 --- get distributed around in the industry enough 17 to be of help ---18 They are distributed widely. A 10 When was this started? 2 20 Quite a few years ago. A 21 Can you put a date on it? 2 23 A Three years ago, maybe more. 23 Was it enough to include the Michaelson report, 0 24 Davis-Besse and Doone in the L. E. R.?

480 CO., 8170MML, M.J. 07001 . FORM IL 248

1	A	I read the L. E. R. on Davis-Besse, and you could
:		not tell from that L. E. R. that it was a matter of
3		great significance. Just a minute.
4	Q	That may be the real core of the problem.
5	A	Just a minute. The way it was written, you couldn't
6		tell, but the Davis-Besse people made an analysis of
7		that in great depth with their vendor and so forth,
8		and issued a report about a half inch thick, which
9		spelled the whole thing out, the whole sequence, and
10		from that you could see the safety significance,
11		and that was submitted to the N.R.C.
12	q	Where did that go? Was that filed with the
13		Michaelson report?
14	A	There was some 40 copies filed with the Office of
15		Inspection and Enforcement I know. I don't know
16		where they all went. I never heard of it until
17		after Three Mile Island.
18	Q	Well
19	A	So the industry, at least the utility and its
20		contractors in my view did an excellent job of
21		analyzing that. Now where that information was
22		propagated, how far, apparently no one tried to
23		determine very well the safety significance.
24	q	Well, I think the Ocone situation may be in that

PENGAD 40. BATONNE, N.S. 01003 . FORM IL 238

same category. As I understand it, the utility 1 there, and its designer, got together and worked 2 that problem out, and they made a report to the 3 N. R. C. _I guess that, either the A. E. C. or-4 N. R. C. But what happened to those data I guess 5 they're still searching? 6 I would like to comment on that, if I may. A 7 9 Please proceed. 8 One, I am not familiar with the Ocone situation that A 9 you're talking about, but that's not the point. 10 The point I would like to make is that we had a 11 situation in the N. R. R. where there was no one 12 group directly responsible for reviewing L. E. R.'s 13 14 for their safety significance. 15 2 Why shouldn't your department do that? A I'll answer that in a moment, if I may. It was 16 scattered diversely through N. R. R. and I & E. 17 It was just a scattered thing where individual 18 19 viewers did whatever they wanted about it, and this 20 matter has been shown in many places, many different kinds of technology, is the kind of thing, an 21 22 operations evaluation function is a kind of thing 23 that has to be separated from and apart from the 24 licensing offices, the line offices. Now when I.

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recommended the evaluations function, and the discussions with E. D. O. and so forth, I recommended it to be located in one of two places, the Office of Standards or the Office of Research. I felt it could not be in an office that was either licensing or inspecting reactors, whereas they have a vested interest, whereas the other two do not. I felt especially strongly it should not be under the E. D. O., because the E. D. O. has so many other things to do it could not give ---E. D. C. 1s? Q Executive Director of Operations, for Operations, A could not give appropriate technical guidance to whoever is the director of that office, and I don't care what office you are in, you always need someone above you, to talk about your technical difficulties, and to exchange ideas, and set directions, so I think the E. D. O. is the wrong place for this

office to report.

Rave you observed, or can you tell us the extent to which the divisions in N. R. C. have utilized the analytical process reflected by WASH-1400?
A They produced for the Commission, after the Lewis report came out, and at the request of the

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Commission, a list of all the examples of where they 1 had used the technique, and it's a long list, and 2 it's -- they made the point clearly every time they 3 said they used it, but they really didn't rely on it. 4 They just locked at it to see what it would do. 5 That's beside the point. 6 It's a fun activity. 0 7 The point is most people didn't know how to use it. A 8 It appears simple on the surface. 9 Your office did not appear or participate ----Q 10 A They didn't ask us what we did. 11 9 Well, you or your office ---12 They wanted to know how it was used in the licensing 13 A process. 14 They didn't ask you to review to see the extent to 15 9 which the licensing groups used the WASH-1400 16 analysis? 17 No. No, they did not. 18 A Did any of the people say in N. R. R. participate 19 2 in the development of WASH-1400? 20 21 Yes, some of them did. A 22 Were those persons involved in the utilization of 9 23 the WASH-1400 process in N. R. R., do you know? 24 I don't know. A

PERSAD CO. BATONNE, N.J. BRODE . FORM H 248

1	٩	Well, continue. You were saying it's a subtle and
2		complex analytical process.
3	A	Yes, and you have to know a lot of different
4		disciplines to do it well. You have to be a very
5		good reactor engineer, who understands system
6	-	reliability well; but he also has to, you also have
7		to understand the relationship that occurs between
8		physical processes and system failures. When a
9		system fails, what physical process occurs, and how
10		does that physical process affect the operability of
11		other systems, and that's a very sophisticated kind
12		of mind already. You have to understand statistics
13		pretty well to be sure you don't go astray on
14		simple assumptions that turn out wrong answers, and
15		we have seen lots of examples of people using these
16		techniques incorrectly.
17		I have maintained, for several years now
18		at least, that we should have a strong training
19		program, nourses followed by cn-the-job training,
20		and develop an even enlarged group of people
21		that can do this work, and it has been so far
22		opposed in N. R. R., even though the Commission
23		supported it.

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Q It must be an interesting situation. For whom is

FENGAD CO., BATONNE, M.I. 01002 - FOSM IL 248

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the N. R. R. working, the Commission or some other 1 organization? 2 A They're working for the Commission, obviously. 3 Q Obviously. And the Commission can't get the N. R. R. 4 to do their requests, is that ----5 That is essentially what happened, in my view. Now A 6 I must say I have just raised this issue again with 7 Harold Denton, and I am sure he will consider it 8 carefully and with an open mind. 9 Well, I have heard that in many of these cases, too. 2 10 You also look to see ... at they're going to accomplish, 11 what they -- how long has Harold Denton been at that 12 105? 13 A Somewhat less than a year, I believe. Maybe a year. 14 9 Well, from all I have reviewed and read, the 15 WASH-1400 analysis is, I don't know if this is a 16 correct term, been sorely neglected in the N. R. C., 17 and to hear a report that they have analyzed, but 18 paid no attention to it, and didn't rely on it or 19 some such, would indicate it wasn't really analyzed 20 as carefully as 1400 demands. 21 I would like to comment on that. A 22 2 Proceed. 23 A But I would also like to go back. I think you made 24

1		a rather disparaging comment about Harold Denton,
2		and I would like to at least present my view.
3	q	What respect?
4	A	You said how long has he been on the job, implying
5		maybe he was just a part of the old gang.
6	a	What I mean, he hasn't had an opportunity to do
7	A	He hasn' had an opportunity, but I must say even
8		before he got the job he was one of the few people
9		in N. R. R., who exhibited great interest in the
10		application of these techniques, and has consistently
11		supported 1t.
12	q	I think that is good to get on the record.
13	A	I just wanted to
14	Q	What I meant he had 't had an opportunity to apply
15		some of these directions to the N. R. R. group, and
16		perhaps as time permits, he will be able to do that.
17	A	I think he will.
18	٩	Because I think really, if I sense some of the
19		comments about Three Mile Island, the activity
20		before at the N. R. C., things like the Davis-Besse
21		situation and the Michaelson report are appalling
22		situations of neglect, and I think there is also a
23		feeling, from all I have read, that the WASH-1400
24		analysis, as I think Professor Lewis said, is the

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1		first rational approach to risk assessment of nuclear
2		power, and so I think people are looking for not only
3		a change that will utilize information from incidents
4		like Davis-Besse and the Michaelson report, but kind
5		of a change in attitude by dealing with innovations
6		that might improve the process, and I wonder how you
7		feel about the trend in that regard.
8	А	I feel that's just right. Let me correct one little
9		thing you said. Lewis did not say these techniques
10		were the only rational
11	۹	Ch, no.
12	А	or the first rational. He said they could be
13		used to make the study of reactor safety more
14		rational.
15	Q	I see.
16	А	Which is very important. That is the safety of, the
17		study of reactor safety now is not irrational. It's
18	64.	very rational. It's more qualitative than
19		quanitative, and the use of these quantitative
20		techniques can make it more rational.
21		I met recently with Harol. Donton, and
:2		assistant directors, heads of his task force and so
23		forth, and I proposed to them a program for the
24		considerably expanded use of these techniques in the
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licensing process, and it's a fairly long story about how I came to this, but it has come to me since T. M. I. as a result of the accident and as a result of the auxiliary feed water study that we did, which has been discussed earlier here, that there are outliers to the risk perception that we had, that we had a certain perception of reactor accident risks for the engineering studies we did in WASH-1400, and we now found in T. M. I. there is an accident sequence that was much higher in probability than anything we saw in WASH-1400, and we see in the study of auxiliary feed water systems across plants that there is a wide variation in their probability of failure, and that the Surry plant that we happen to have picked and studied in WASE-1400 was among the most reliable auxiliary feed water systems, but there are other systems that are a factor of one hundred more likely to fail than that system, and they have to be fixed.

So it occurred to me: now how can we sit here as an agency, knowing that there are outliers from our perception in WASE-1400, and not do anything about it. We have to look for more outliers, and so I have suggested that we start a program which will

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accomplish a number of things at once. We will draw event trees on all operating reactors, except where they are very similar, and we will draw simplified land event trees, not the very large ones from WASH-1400, but simpler ones todaw, to identify those systems and failure possibilities that appear obviously not to be in the ensemble of WASH-1400 risks and find out what to do about those. I would also use this program as a way of training people on how to draw event trees, which is the biggest single thing you have to do to understand risk. And I told Harold he would have to put up somewhere between eight and twalve people of his very best people, and have to bleed over it. I told the chairman this, and he is backing it. Harold is backing it. And we are planning new to pick one plant to do it as an exercise, and then get organized to go through the whole rigmarcle with plants. Let me go back to the generic situation. You said Q.

you resolved it down to about 17 or 19 issues. Who is going to resolve all those?

A N. R. R. has the primary responsibility, and they have programs organized to work on them, because of their lack of resources at the moment we have taken

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1		over some of that work. Some of those task action
2		plans have been assigned to research, and we have
3		people and contractors working on those.
4	a	Can you give us an enumeration, some degree of what
5		those
6	A	There is one called station blackout, which means
7		what happens if you lose all AC power. There is one
8		on the emergency sump in the containment. When you
9		have to use emergency core cooling system in a
10		recirculation more. There is questions about the
11		vortexing of water and so forth and so forth. I
12		think we have the one on water hammer, and two or
13		three others. I think we have about five or six.
14	Q	That is in your department?
15	A	My department.
16	Q	What are those over in N. R. R.?
17	Å	I don't recall, I could make a list available to you.
18	٩	Would you do that?
19	А	Yes, I would be happy to.
20	۹.	And I guess send it in to Chairman Kmeny at the
21		President's Commission.
:2	A	Yes.
23	Q	Room 714, 2100 M Street Northwest, 20037, I think.
24	À	714.
		그는 것 같은 것 같

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PENGAD CO., BATONNE, M.J. OTOUR . FORM IL 248

1	٩	2100 M Street.
2	A	Room 714.
3	q	Right. In your opinion, how serious are these
4		outstanding generic issues?
5	A	I think there are one or two that we ought to work
6		right away. That is my recollections.
-	Q	Could you tell
8	A	I don't recall what they are.
9	٩	Would you put asterisks on the ones you are going
10		to send in?
11	A	Yes, yes.
12	٩	As you know, as you have indicated, this question of
13		generic issues has been pending a long, long time.
14		A. C. R. S., the Advisory Committee on Reactor
15		Safeguards, enumerated this long list to which you
16		referred, and then there have been some adjustments,
17		and so forth. Perhaps your analysis of those issues
18		has aided in the reduction of the number, either
19		that they weren't significant safety issues or they
20		were environmental issues or procedural issues or
21		that sort of thing, but cutside of that I think
::		people are still looking for a resolution made on
:3		these issues.
24	A	Yes.

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1	٩	And it's like the proplamations in favor of
2		brotherhood, everybody is for getting these things
3		solved, but nobody does anything about them, and it
4		doesn't seem to affect the licensing proceeding.
5		Are those issues of such substance that the licensing
6		provision should be altered in some way to get a
7		resolution?
8	A	I haven't thought about it, but I don't think so. I
9		haven't thought about it carefully.
0	q	Why not? If they're serious enough to have been
11		pending for something like ten years and nothing
12		done, isn't it about time to get some finality in
3		here someplace?
14	A	I'm not sure they have been pending for ten years.
15		Don't forget there was once a list of 350 to 400
16		items. Many of those have been resolved. Some have
17		been added. Some have been eliminated as being not
18		important. So it's not been a standstill situation.
19	ą	Oh, no. I appreciate that.
20	A ·	There has been a process working on them.
21	a	They have made adjustments?
:2	A	They have solved many of them, a large number of them.
:3	٩	I see.
:4	A	I think in fact if you take the view that there were

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1		400, and there are now 20, that's been a large mark,
2		a mark of large progress over the years.
3	Q	The question really is how many were actually
4		resolved or just removed from the list under the
5		analysis you made.
6	A	Oh, no, no. Many of them are resolved. I have
7		read reports. There are lists of, there are reports
8		on this issue and that issue, and what was done to
9		resolve it. Yes.
10	٩	'I think as I say it is interesting to know how many
11		were resolved in the process, the last of which you
12		just
	A	That could be provided.
14	Q	and how many are really
15	A	Would you like me to furnish that?
16	Q	If you can without a lot of research.
17	Å	I den't know how much work it is for me.
18	٩	Don't belabor the subject.
19	A	I can tell you there were a significant number that
20		were solved. They weren't just eliminated.
21	Q	Take one you can remember.
22	A	I can't remember one. I just remember that I have
23		read reports where they have resolved issues.
24	Q	Let me see if I can recall one. Well, I can't

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. BATCHNE, N.S. 07045 - COMM IL R.S.

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offhand, but at the time of its listing, there was enough, as I recall it, to have everybody in the nuclear industry quite exorcised about it.

A Yes.

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And that characterization is correct, it would seem of such substance to warrantsome sort of adjustment in the licensing provision other than saying don't mentic the subject again in this proceeding. It's in the hands of the gods, or excuse me, it's in the hands of somebody who is going to be doing something about it. And I think that has led to a great deal of criticism about the proceedings, if I may say a lack of credibility in the results, and I think in aid of trying to assist the, if not the establishment, the enhancement of credibility, that some firmer progrumning of generic issues might well be in order. Do you not agree?

A I agree with you completely.

Well, let's get over to Three Mile Island a bit. Do you know of any generic issues

developing from that incident?

A Tes.

G What are they?

A Well, one -- there are two major issues that come

from T. M. I. that are generic. One is our understanding of accidents. It's clear to me, and one was described, I'll state it in my own words, that there are accidents that can lead to severe core damage but not to fuel melting that have never been looked at with the care that is needed. It's more difficult even to look at those than the accidents we looked at that involved core melting.

There are issues that have been raised of locas that happen and don't happen. That is you have an intermittent loca. When the relief and block valves were open, you had loca, and then they closed it, you don't have a loca, and then they opened it, you had loca, you had accidents appearing and disappearing. You had emergency core cooling systems turn on and off, you had reactor coolant pumps on and off, you had the auxiliary feed water system being turned on and off, and this makes a very complex menage in of things to examine. We're going to have to do that.

Now how are we going to do that? We're going to have to study the machines, the reactor machine in much greater detail than we ever have before. The reactor safety philosophy has been sort

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of to establish an envelope of design basis accidents, that everything that was within that would be all right, because this envelope protected you, and certainly that has not been violated. The T. M. I. accident in fact, as regrettable as it was, showed the wisdom of that, and that with these enormous amounts of radioactivity released to the contairment, very little got outside the containment, so that safety design philosophy is intact, but a little crinkly around the edges. We should certainly not have accidents like happened at T. M. I. happen very frequently, as frequently as this is predicted to happen.

We have already issued bulletins and orders which have made the likelihood of such a specific accident much less likely. What are we going to do? We're going to write computer codes. We're going to do experiments, and we're going to study the machine, we have to develop fast running codes that can analyze an accident in ten minutes to an hour.

We now have computer codes where the emphasis has been on precision, and they run in very long times, 10 to 20 to 40 hours. We still have to

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continue developing those codes for the precision that is needed -- by precision I don't mean in the answer, I mean in the handling of the physical processes. We can develop fast running codes that treat the physical processes with less precision, and use these more precision codes as bench marks to make sure that the shortcuts we will take in the fast running codes will be adequate, and then we have to study the machine very carefully and from that will come the greater enhancement of understanding and perhaps more changes in reactors. Well, I think one of the questions that people

Q would like to see answered is why should not some of these matters be resolved before they go forward with further operations. Can you help in that? Yes, I can. I think the most immediate things that A have had to be done have been done. Cne, the accident sequence that we knew was, now know is a bad one, has been fixed. It has been made much lower in probability.

Two, the lesson we learned about where the operators were deficient in dealing with that, basically in understanding the steam tables, if you will, the relationship between pressure and

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temperature, has been fixed because all the operators have been trained now to get a better understanding of that. And what we're talking about from now in is making further improvements to make things even more less likely. We want operators to have better instrumentation, better displays of the instrumentation, better diagnostics, we want better simulators to train them better, and we're going to do all this. It will take time, but what it will do is achieve a better level of safety, or at least in my view. That is our objective.

Now the overall risk to the society from reactors changes as the number of reactors are operating, so there is a real reason to say if you are at a particular level of risk with 100 reactors, and you go to 200, you would like a better level of risk. You would like the overall risk to society not to change. We're working on how to improve the safety of reactors, we have a program called Improved Reactor Safety.

Q That is a new one.

A It was sponsored by Congress in their 1978 Authorization Act for our budget.

Q Just in sime. It hasn't had a chance to get in

PANGAD CO. BATONNE, M.L. Q.001 - FURN IL 244

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1		operation, I take it?
2	A	No. We didn't get any money until the very end of
3	-	'79, fiscal and of '79.
4	٩	Are you planning, as one of the changes, to limit
5		the number of people in the control room when you
6		have an incident like you had at Three Mile Island?
7		I understand you almost had to have tickets, you
8		couldn't get in it was so crowded.
9	A	One of the lessons learned is to establish an
10		'emergency center on site but away from the control
11		room, and that's where the people can go to try to
12		help.
13	٩	My understanding that industry at the time of Three
14		Mile Island, particularly William Lee of Power, very
15		effective in assistance in the analytical work that
16		was being done on Three Mile Island. Are you
17		planning to have some continued close collaboration
18		with industry committees in case of incidents of
19		this kind?
20	A ·	That is a question that I can't answer. You would
21		have to talk to Denton or someone.
::	٩	You recognize the value of industry?
23	A	Of course. The industry knows a great deal about
:1		their machines, and have very competent designers,

and certainly they should be available. In fact one 1 of the things we are thinking about is what I call a 2 data link, where just as the operator needs this 3 better display and better diagnostic equipment to 4 help him, a data link can be established to send 5 that information to the reactor vendor and to the 6 N. R. C.. And we're exploring how to do that now, or 7 we have money in our fiscal '80 supplement budget 8 request to start plans in that regard. 9 At the time of Three Mile Island, I understand there Q 10 was some information or advice even coming from 11 Lynchburg? 12 Yes, on the telephone, I believe, or something. A 13 Is there any way of connecting computers of the type Q 14 to which Dr. Rasmussen referred to some sort of 15 instrumentation now at the manufacturer so that he 16 can have accurate information in case he is going to 17 be contributing advice in time of incidence, he will 18 have some not current information but recorded . 19 information about the performance of the plant? 20 Can that be done? 21 That is just what I spoke abor :. A data link to A 22 transmit all the information the operator has. 23 You mentioned transmission. I was wondering if 24 2

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1		ther. was something that that computer could provide.
2	A	Whatever the operator "is, will be transmitted by
3		radio, or a telephone line, immediately, in real
4		time as it is happening.
5	Q	You say telephone line, that means
6	A	By transmit, I do not mean mail. I mean
7	Q	Or horseback?
8	A	Or horaback. I mean in real time.
9	٩	Well, some of this I think would have been probably
10		more accurate if it had gone by horseback, as I
11		understand it, but how can you get useful inf mation
12		if they don't have the accurate information, and
13		immediately transmit it now you say we're going
14		to work out a data link to transmit information.
15		My question is how can the computer in the control
16		room be somehow connected with some recording
17		device at the manufacturer?
18	A	By a data link. It's a routine procedure done all
19		the time.
20	Q İ	I am trying to eliminate telephone wires now.
21	A	I am talking about wires, people speaking, that the
22		actual data that goes into the conjuter and out of
23		the computer could be transmitted by a
24		radiotelemetry data link directly to the manufacturer.

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1	٩	Well, I wouldn't want to denigrate the effort by
2		Babcock & Wilcox in any respect, because I don't
3		know anything about their capabilities or their
4		programs and so forth, but at the same time I don't
5		want to advertise any other reactor manufacturer,
6		but I have had the impression that let us say two
7		other reactor steam manufacturers have very large
8		staffs and laboratories and the equipment which in
9		totality permit them to not only actually receive
10		information but correctly analyze it, and I didn't
11		know whether Babcock & Wilcox had the capability
12		from such facilities and personnel as that to
13		receive and analyze data as let me say these two
14		other manufacturers. Do you know anything about that?
15	A	I'm not able to comment.
16	Q	Is this, by the way, just let me ask, is this
17		acceptance of the Class 9 accident for licensing
18		proceeding considerations going to involve multiple
19		failures, do you believe, analyses?
20	A ·	I have to give you a long answer, and it goes like
21	-	this. We have an establishment design basis,
:2		accident safety envelope, which has worked very well
23		to date, and even worked well in Three Mile Island.
24	q	As to which there may be some dispute, but go ahead.
		2. 이 방법 전에 있는 것이 같이 있는 것이 같이 있는 것이 있는 것이 같이 있는 것이 같이 많이 많이 없다. 것이 같이 많이 많이 없는 것이 없다. 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없다. 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없다. 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없다. 것이 없는 것이 없다. 것이 없는 것이 없 않는 것이 없는 것이 없 않는 것이 없는 것이 않는 것 않는 것

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A In m" judgment.

Q Your judgment.

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line We now, as I have said .- had to study accidents that A 2 are less severe than design basis accidents and more 4 severe than design basis accidents better than we 5 have so far. With that will come a lot of knowledge. 6 It's not clear that design basis accident envelope has to be changed, although it may be or could be. 8 It's not clear to me that Class 9 accidents have to 9 become a part of the licensing process. The 10 A. C. R. S. in a very recent letter addressed this 11 subject, and they called for accident analyses of 12 the kind I described, and they specifically said it 13 is not necessary that the design basis accident 14 should be changed and probably it would be better 15 that it not be changed, and I have taken the liberty 16 of interpreting that to mean what you would change 17 is the ensemble of engineer safety features, but not 18 necessarily the design basis accidents, or certainly 19 not eliminate ----20 The result would be the same, wouldn't it? Q 21 --- or not eliminate the concept of the design basis 22 A

accident. The result would be the same intellectually,

but very different, and very importantly different,

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FERCAD CO., BAYONNE, M.J.

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in terms of how you run large process involving thousands and thousands of people and communicating to one another. You can't simply say to them I throw out the design basis accident, and review reactors for safety. What do you do? How do people come to work tomorrow and do their jobs? They wouldn't know how to.

It would take them a day or two perhaps? 2 No. It would take them longer than that. You have A to have some intellectual basis in which they work. And I am not defending the design basis accident as not changeable, but I am just saying you have to inno evolve into a process, a requisite analysis and what one has to do about it. First you have to have understanding, and then the process will even accormodate whatever enhancements in safety are needed with this greater understanding. I would be very cautious about saying throw out the design basis accident, and bring on Class 99 you would have mass confusion. No one would know what to do. What do you think about not Three Mile Island but 0 mass confusion?

A That's a different matter. I have been in submarines that nearly have disasters and some

FERNING LOD. MANNAUL, M. B. BINNY ... ANNI 19. 248

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
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



IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART



		같은 것
1		people get confused, and others don't. And sometimes
2		you save yourself, and other times you don't save
3		yourself.
4	Q	This is the human element?
5	A	Yes, of course.
6	3	Is it true that really the analysis of safety at the
7		A. E. C. and the N. R. C. has been directed to an
8		analysis of the adequacy and sufficiency of machines,
9		and not sufficiently of the competency of personnel?
10	A	That is exactly correct, and in fact that's the
11		second thing we learned from Three Mile Island.
12	Q	How do you think you could handle the personnel
13		problem?
14	A	The same codes I talked about. We have to develop
15		to better understand the reactor being used to help
16		simulators better handle these accident situations.
17	ç	Well now
18	A	We could quickly for instance today take the accident
19		sequences in WASH-1400, for instance, and put them
20		into a computer and train operators to cope with such
21	-	accidents; that's not realistic, When in today's
12		times when a pilot is trained on a simulator, and he
23		moves a control, there are equations in that
24		simulator that make that control and his sensations

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identical to those as if he was sitting on the seat 1 of an airplane, and we can hopefully say get our 2 equations good enough to do just that, but that's a 3 long way off, and we can take interim measures and 4 with that as a goal, work toward them. 5 Why is it a long way off? This stuff has been going 2 6 on for some time. 7 It's a long way off to ---8 A I have learned enough data from these years of 2 9 operations -- Dr. Rasmussen raised kind of a, if 10 I use the situation, the Russian Pavlov response, 11 that the lights flash, if you get one red light 12 among some green lights, or the button is a red 13 light among some blue lights, you'll get a different 14 reaction than if the buttons were all the same and 15 the lights were all the same, and is that kind of 16 an adjustment so difficult to make in your analysis 17 18 of personnel competency? No. I think you misunderstood me. I understand 19 A what you're saying now, and let me address what you 20 21 fust said. 22 What kind of things you're talking about 23 can be done fairly soon, but not fully completely, 24 we are already ordering equipment for the loft

		法 부탁하면 그렇는 그 그런 것은 것 같아요. 것 같아요. 집에 가지 않는 것 같아요. 가지 않는 것 같아.
1		reactor, the kind that I mentioned was being built
2	—	at Holden, that
3	۹	Is the Loft thing still going? .
4	A	Yes.
5	٩	It's 20 years or so?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	You're still working on it?
8	A	We ran two large tests this year, and predicted in
9	-	advance very well in the way in which the fuel
10		would behave.
11	Q	The predictions as the experiment went on, so finally
12		when it was completed it met the predictions?
13	A	No, sir.
14	Q	I see.
15	A	These were pre-predictions, and came out very close.
16	q	Pre-predictions, but lowered at all from the original
17		prediction do you know?
18	- A	We made the prediction before the trespass run
19	Q	Yes.
20	A '	and we ran the test, and compared the prediction
21		and the data.
:2	٩	How many predictions were befare the one that you
23		analyzed with the test?
24	A	Well, we did use two codes, the relap code, under

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development for many years, has had many adjustments. The track code, our newer and best code, has had no adjustments. Q Good. That sounds pretty good.

A Let me continue.

Q Yes.

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This is a fairly complex subject, and I would like to get the record fairly clear on it. You can do a lot of things quickly, but not completely, you could get display hardware quickly, and put it in reactors, to enhance the operator's capability to see more information. You could get a better data logging computer quickly. The diagnostic capability, that is to build a computer that would take the various pieces of data, and diagnose for the operator what is going on in the accident is much more complicated, and will take a while, take a couple of years. Okay.

That's why I am recommending the need for a superior kind of person, we call him a safety engineer, but as far as I am concerned, he doesn't have to be an engineer. He has to meet the requirements that Norman spoke about earlier. You need a person of that type in the

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control room to aid the operator for situations he can't understand. So that gets you through until you have better diagnostics. When you have better diagnostics, you may not even need this other person. But certainly you have time to wait for the better diagnostics, and it's going to take time.

You also now have a certain kind of simulator capability. Those simulators could be easily fixed to handle a large number of accident sequences that we now understand, that go beyond design basis accidents, they're all in WASH-1400, they could be easily programmed into a computer, and the operator could be trained on a simulator to do those. What I was saying would take a long time would be the kind of capability the pilots have. The first simulators that pilots had did not behave like the real airplane. They were only an approximation. It takes time to get that close to reality in computer programming, so that final objective that the pilots now have after how many years? 30 years of aviation, 40 years of aviation? Is ---

You have got 30 years of nuclear operation from the Manhattan project and so forth.

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1	A	We only have about 15 years of real commercial
2		power plast experience.
3		Commercial research or what, it is nuclear power
4		operation.
5	A	I am just telling you it is going to take time from
6		here to get to there. Maybe we should have started
7		earlier, but we didn't.
8	Q	I have never heard of a nuclear research project
9		that wasn't accompanied with a description of we
10		heed more time and more money. When we're going to
11		get someplace, we'll work that cut later, but do
12		give us time.
13	A	I an sorry, I
14	Q	Could you tell me
15	A	I am sorry. I told you there was a number of
16		interim steps that we can take quickly that will be
17	-	cf quite utility, but a much better step takes
18		somewhat longer.
19	ą	Will you tell us, please, why is it that the control
20		room board, bearing in mind you're interested in
21		safety and you're interested in analysis of safety
22		and the safety precuations that can be taken at the
23		time of an accident, that the board doesn't reflect
24		particularly the situation at the time of an

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accident?

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2	A	Well, I have not designed boards.
3	Q	I understand you haven't.
4	٨	But I can speculate. Every day the reactor has,
5		the operator has to run the reactor, and every day
6		it's not having an accident, so he needs before him
7		the displays of the process parameters that he
s		needs to run the reactor.
9	-	Now they're not just styles, by the way.
10		They record data with a pen and ink and so you can
11		have a backward look as well a now look. You can't
12		get all those dials on the panel. Some of them are
13		behind the panel.
14	۹	Put those
15	A	Just a minute.
16	q	He had to run around at Three Mile Island.
17	A	If he didn't have the dials and recorders he needed
18		to run the plant every day, he would have more
19		accidents. He really woold.
20	ą	Give him a board to look at this side, and then a
21		board on this side.
22	A	I am suggesting if you have a TV screen, he can call
23	4	up whatever he wants to, just like that, and he
24		would have it.

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		그는 것이 같은 것은 것을 해야 할 수 있는 것은 것이 가지 않는 것을 것을 했다.
1	٩	That would take care of the daily operations?
2	A	Take care of everything.
3	٩	At least give him one for daily operations, and one
4		for accident situations?
5	A	Some of these he has before him cover accidents, too.
6	۹	Have you ever heard of a description of such chaos
7		as to what must have been at the Three Mile Island
8		in the Three Mile Island control room with lights
9		flashing, bells ringing, something sounding, you
10		would want to escape to maintain sanity, lat alone
11		operate anything?
12	A	I have felt for 15 or 20 years that some day we
13		would have that situation, and it would be impossible
14		for the operator
15	2	So your prediction has come true?
16	A	for the operator to know what to do when 150 cr
17		100 alorm lights go off at the same time.
18	Q	Did you ever write a recommendation to change that?
19	A	I have felt for a long time we needed diagnostic
20		capability for the operator for many years. I don't
21		recall if I have ever written anything about it.
22		MR. JENSCH: Let's take a little recess.
23		(A short recess was then taken.)
24		MR. JENSCH: If we may resume.

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1	Q	(By Mr. Jensch) What is the practical difference
2		in the safety analytical work done by your group
3		and the N. R. R. group? This is really what my
4		question involves. Why should there be the
5		appearance at least of a difference in the quality
6		of the level of the safety work done at N. R. C.
7		and that done by your group and that done by the
8		N. R. E. group? Why should the licensing proceedings
9		affect the character of the research? That is
10		generally my thought. Can you address that subject?
11	A	Well, it is a very difficult question. I can just
12		start to talk about it. I wouldn't say that their
13		work is of lower quality. When you're doing, they're
14		doing licensing reviews in an established framework
15		against established regulations where models exist
16		to cover what they do. Let me take a specific
17		example.
		They evolupta the affastivaness of

They evaluate the effectiveness of emergency cooling systems in accordance with a Appendix X of Part 50. They use an evaluation model, which is not very precise, but it is constructed to be extremely conservative, and it got that way because in the days when they were making decisions, I mentioned earlier they had no help from anyone,

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they developed conservative approaches to compensate for their lack of knowledge about the reality of physical processes.

Now our job in research is to get the data and make the models that predict that reality very much better. That's hard to do. You need highly competent people to do that. And we talk, in general, of a more scientific view than the regulators, but we're not more competent than they are, if that's what you're trying to ---

Q I am not talking about competency, I am talking about result. Their result is in the regulatory framework.

A Our results are in a scientific framework, and science is a very exacting thing, and regulation a less exacting thing.

Q That's exactly why people are concerned.

A Yes, but it has to be. Science is unforgiving. Science is the reality of science, and you have to go find it. It is unforgiving, and you have to be very careful about it. A regulatory process can make conservatisms to overcome lack of knowledge, and you can try to ask questions about why aren't you doing this and that, when the fellows in research

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1		are doing this and that, and the answer is I don't
2		have to, because I have accommodated it with a
3		conservative bound.
4	Q	Well, assuming his assumptions are valid of course
5		it is a conservative bound.
6	A	There was an A. E. C. hearing for two years, there
7		was a review. The Commission approved it, and
8		that's what he has to go on.
9	Q	Many of these reactors have not been able to meet
10		the heat levels, or exceeded the heat levels, so we
11		get special exceptions?
12	A	They drop the power level, and scmetimes make an
13		exception to the rule. In the cases where we may
14		have some data to show that, say, you have been too
15		conservative in this area, if you make a little
16		exception it's all right.
17	ą	Or if you don't have data, they may do it on their
18		own, where the research department
19	Å	I hope not. I don't know what they do.
20	q	I don't think many people know about it. And I think
21		there was some source of confusion as to whether
22		your research may be the more precise and should be
23		generally applied.
24	A	Naybe there is an excuse for it or explanation or

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something.

2	Q	That there was something you were going to give us.
3	Α	I am going to give you a list of task action plans,
4		generic issues, which are being worked on by M. R. R.,
5		and being worked on by N. R. C. Maybe there is
6		some other assigned to another list, and then you
7		said maybe I could list what are the high priority
8		items.
9	- q	You said you had something about Rogivin.
10	A	Yes. I can give that to you now. Rogivin
11		circulated a questionnaire
12	Q	This is, if I may just while he is searching for
13		his paper, Rogivin, R-o-g-1-v-i-n, is an attorney
14		appointed by the Regulatory Commission, I believe,
15		of the Three Mile Island situation, so is one going
16		on by Congressman Udall, the President's Commission
17		is going on, having one. I think EPRI, E-P-R-I, is
18		undertaking an investigation, and then I think some
19		people say that the fox is going to examine the
20		safety of the chickens in the coop, the Rogivin
21		Committee will analyze the performance of the
		N. R. C. regarding the Three Mile Island, and this
23		is the response by Dr. Levine to Mr. Rogivin's
24		endeavor. Which

		귀엽 정말 전쟁을 다 걸려 가지 않는 것이 가지 않는 것이 가지 않는 것이 같다.
1	A	I am embarrassed. I had that on my kitchen table
2		this morning, and I forgot to put it in my briefcase,
3		but I will furnish it to you.
· 4	Q	If you could just generally tell us, are you in favor
5		of the general actions taken at Three Mile Island,
6		or what do you think should be done?
7	A	Well, I talked about a number of issues. One issue
8		I talked about was the need to change the perceptions
9		in N. R. R. They have to be more open-minded.
10	ą	Row do you do that?
11	A	Well, there are ways to do that. First of all they
12		can be encouraged by a large number of people, such
13		as your investigation. There can be organizational
14		changes made. For instance, when Rusche,
15		R-u-s-c-h-e, who was the director prior to Denton,
16		was reorganizing N. R. R., I suggested to him that
17		he needed a group of several teams of people who
18		would take a broad lock at the reactor safety issues
19		and reactor situations. He saw fit not to do that.
20		I think the licensing process has become,
21		imposed too much of narrow technical specialists,
22		and no one looking across the vista of reactor
23		safety, and I suggest that a group be established
24		whose job description is such that they are, the

FENGAG CU., BATOPNE, N.J. 02042 - 1084 1. 148

employees are required as part of doing their day-to-day work to develop such a vista, and that doesn't exist in the N. R. R. in my opinion now, and I know Denton shares my concern, because we have talked about it, and if he can ever get the Three Mile Island over with, he'll get back to reorganizing his organization on that.

I think the Commission in fact operates at too detailed a level. I think the Commission doesn't quite understand that it's a policy body, and not an operating body, and it's operating at such a detail level that it interferes with the management of the agency.

I have suggested that they have a management study made to tell them how to do their jobs better.

Well, you wouldn't exclude the fact, do you think 9 the entire Regulatory Commission should begin actually deciding the cases? 19

A I would not exclude anything. All I am saying now the current situation is intolerable, because they are enmeshed at such a level of detail, that they are not concentrating on giving the staff the right kind of policy guidance.

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1	Q	You wouldn't have them compute the hydrogen level at
2		Three Mile Island during the accident up there?
3	A	That's right.
4	٩	You would let that be done by people more familiar
5		or regularly doing that analysis?
6	A	I am thinking not of the emergency. I have other
7		views about the emergency.
8	Q	Well, deal with the emergency. I think that is
9		going to be a great concern with us.
10	A	I'll say a few words. I am talking about the
11		day-to-day operations of the Commission.
12	a	All right. All right.
13	A	They're operating at too detailed a level, and makes
14		the policy suffer and keeps the staff from doing its
15		job better.
16		As far as the emergency is concerned, I
17		think five people can't run an emergency. They
18		should have designated one of their number to be in
19		charge of it, and to keep them informed. They
20		didn't do that. I think that was a mistake.
21		By the same token, if they didn't have a $\eta$
22		exceedingly competent person to be in charge of
23		it, that would be wrong, too. You have to have
24		somewhere in the agency some one person who is put
	1	

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in charge of emergencies, who has the requisite kind of competence to deal with it and make the decisions.

That can be established in the Commission organization or in an administrator. You don't need an administrator to have that capability, and by the way, I have thought about whether we need an administrator or a Commission, and I favor a Commission. I think you need the kind of balance, at least this day and age and this stage of the development of nuclear, you need a spectrum of viewpoints, and you can't count on one administrator to give you the right balance.

I also have serious reservations about the way our E. D. O. office performs, and the way we manage the agency as a general rule. There has never been a meeting of the E. D. O. and the five major office directors to discuss a whole series of major policy issues, even though it has been recommended that he have such meetings.

The Commission and the staff and the E. D. O. cannot communicate together in private about management problems. This is a falacy in the Sunshine Eule, Sunshine Act. We needed the kind of a Commission where the major office directors and the

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E. D. O. and the commissioners can sit down around a table and talk in private about where they are and where they ought to be going and why, and in a completely candid and open way, which you cannot do in public meetings. I have been a manager for 34 years in the Submarine Service and Polaris and under Rickover, and I don't see how I could ever have done anything I have done in my lifetime under the Sunshine Act. That's a strong statement. I want it to be strong. It's just utter nonsense, there has to be a separation between how you manage a place and how you convey information to the public. Excuse me if I can interrupt just a moment, and not Q to take issue with what you have said ---Yes. A --- but perhaps by way of explanation of where we are 9 in many of the governmental operations as I see it at least, I think there has been a general decline in the credibility of many governmental bureaus and agencies. I agree with that. A And people perhaps have let the pendulum swing too 3 far, but the Sunshine Act I think was proposed and

enacted with the idea that there wouldn't be too

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much undertaken in reference to the operation by an agency that people didn't know about. Now there may be an answer to that problem other than the Sunshine Act, but this is the best they could come up with st the moment.

Now it may be that if there were open publication of actions taken, and full and complete transmission of those data to the public generally in some way, that might suffice, but right now I just think the attitude of the public is that they have lost faith, and I think the; have lost faith in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and you're talking about research which may be one aspect of it. No. I am talking about the whole agency. A And there may be aspects about the licensing 9 proceedings, and the decisional arrangement made at the N. R. C. where people have lost faith, and I think it's something that may be insurmountable for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

A If I can comment, if I can comment on that. I have no quarrel with the basic premise of the Sunshine Act. I believe in it, and I accept it. I am only talking about one aspect of it, that in the way it's implemented that we have no exemption where we can

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have management discussions together, only the 1 decisions of which need to be recorded, but not the 2 discussion. 3 0 I think that should be a good solution. 4 Yes. Yes, so I am suggesting that. A 5 We would have to get legislation, I expect. Q 6 I don't know whether it's an exemption or legislation A 7 or whatever, but I think it is needed desperately. 8 There is another matter, perhaps the most 9 important matter. It's not clear to me that a civil 10 service organization can develop and maintain the 11 required kind of scientific objectivity and competence 12 for long periods of time that are needed to regulate 13 nuclear power, and I am making a recommendation that 14 we change the way we do business. We cut the staff 15 by a very large factor, maintain the very best 16 people we have on the staff, and we get a private 17 captive company, a private, not for profit, captive 18 company, that can hire and fire people to do the 19 technical work for the N. R. C., do the technical 20 safety reviews. 21 It's my belief that we'll get more 22 :3

competent safety reviews that way, that are better scientifically definable than the way we do it now.

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I don't know if this is going to fly politically. There are a lot of people that will object to that, but I think it's a way we can do a very much better job.

Q Well, I think that all those things would be very helpful to the Presidential Commission in its considerations of what they may prepare. Do you have arything other than that?

Those are the major issues, there may be one or two A 9 other things, but I don't remember what they are. 10 Well, I think that's the kind of thing that the Q 11 Commission is locking for. Let me just ask you 12 about one statement you made about you thought the 13 N. R. R. should be more open-minded. What did you 14 mean by that? 15

A Well, I talked about it before. They treat everyone who is not in their group as an outsider, and with suspicion, and not with an open-minded way. If an idea comes in to them that is not originated there, it's not a good idea.

> Q I think that explains the action taken with the Michaelson report. It didn't come from them, and it probably was submerged. It's unfortunate. If that's the attitude of the N. R. R., then I think that the

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1		whole unit should be substantially changed.
2	A	Well, I suggested a way to do that. I suggested
3		this new organization, entity be added to N. R. R.
4		that would have that function.
5	2	To correct something, to add something? Why don't
6		you correct the situation that is creating the need
7		for this?
8	A	I woul' be glad to correct it in some other way if
9		you could give me a suggestion. In fact, my note to
10	236 A.S.	Emeny says be careful about any suggestion that
11		anyone makes, and be very careful to make a
12		correction.
13	Q	You refer to Rogivin?
14	A	To Rogivin, which I will give to you.
15	٩	Well, if either of you gentlemen have anything
16		further that you can add. I really think that what
:7		the, and I shouldn't, it must be made clear, I
18		certainly am not speaking for certainly the
19		President s Commission on the accident at Three Mile
20		Island, but I think what the Commission is looking
21		for will be suggestions to nuclear power in a
:2		different light than it is today, and I think it is
23		unfortunate. I think it's a lot of historical, as
24		you, Dr. Levine, have indicated this morning a lot of

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the problems in research may be historical in 1 character, and I think a lot of the procedures 2 generally have been developed over a period of time 3. where they have just become enmeshed in ritual and 4 chaos. I think it's too bad. I think it is too 5 bad, and some changes have to be made, but I think 6 this perhaps to be a good time to see what could be 7 devised. 8 IR. JENSCH: Bob, do you have anything 9 further you think we haven't covered? 10 DR. BURNS: No. 11 Could I say a word or two about the executive summary? A 12 "es, please do. 2 13 I agree with everything Norman said about the A 14 executive summary, except I would like to say a few 15 things a little more precise, that I think he'll 16 agree with. 17 One, by rewriting the executive summary, 18 I think that's an intolerable suggestion. The 19 executive summary was written to communicate with 20 laymen. It's been criticized by critics because it 21 communicated too effectively with laymen. It's 22 been ----23 Well, may I interrupt there? 2 24

1	4	Yes.
2	â	Let de disagree wit you.
3	À	Yes.
4	୍	Dr. Rasmussen indicated it was written with the
5		objective being received by a laymen group, and to
6		answer certain thoughts that that laymen group may
7		have. I think the question really is, and the
8		critics who have expressed their views publicly, was
9		that the executive summary did not fairly present
10		the main body of WASH-1400, that is that the
11		executive summary indicated unacceptability of
12		nuclear power, and that may not be the view of the
13		main body of 1400.
14	А	There is
15	Q	I think the 1400 analysis, if I understand it
16		correctly, indicated a lower risk, and as a
17		corollary, a greater safety to nuclear power than the
18		executive summary portrayed.
19	A	No.
20		DR. RASMUSSEN: I don't think that is
21		right. The basic issue, if I may
::		MR. JENSCH: Please do. We're talking
23		about

DR. RASHUSSEN: The basic issue in the

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executive summary is that it concludes that the risk of the nuclear power is small compared to the risks that we accept in society today, and is totally substantiated by the main report.

DR. LEVINE: In fact is in the main report DR. RASMUSSEN: And is in the main report, but what is a criticism that I accept as correct is that our display of certain of the risks is more dramatic, and hence focused people's attention on it. Namely the early risks, the early fatalities. And although we included in the executive summary a discussion of the latent risks as well they weren't equally well portrayed because there weren't nice figures to show them, and they weren't as effectively communicated, so many people didn't understand or didn't comprehend the delayed consequences as well as perhaps they should have. I do not believe there is any inaccuracies in the executive summary about what the report says.

DR. LEVINZ: That's just the point I wanted to make.

MR. JENSCH: Oh, no. I don't mean the executive summary distorted the main body.

DR. RASMUSSEN: All right.

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MR. JENSCH: But it didn't emphasize what 1 really was the main body report, that nuclear power had greater safety than had generally been understood 3 previously. Now let me say this. I think first of 4 all ---5 DR. RASMUSSEN: Greater safety or greater 6 . . k? 7 MR. JENSCH: Greater safety to nuclear 8 power than had generally understood to be. 9 DR. LLVINE: That's all said in the main 10 report, just those words. 11 MR. JENSCH: It is. But the executive 12 summary by the description you have just given, 13 Dr. Rasmussen, you didn't equally deal with the 14 latent situation as well as you emphasized the 15 dramatic. 15 DR. RASMUISEN: That I think is a fair 17 cornent. 18 MR. JENSCH: I think that unequal treatment 19 gave the wrong impression to the main body of 20 WASH-1400. For instance, as I recall, Lewis said 21 something like this. To say that because there are 22 50,000 deaths in automobile accidents every year, 23 therefore nuclear power is safe, is in a sense : 24

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non sequitur. Now the comparison may or may not be an interesting one, but what people are really wanting to know is nuclear power in and of itself at a lower risk than had generally been understood by the audience to who you were directing your executive summary.

DR. RASMUSSEN: Well, I think -- it depends what audience you're talking about. Our estimate came out at a lower risk than some of the critics had said, but substantially higher than the industry had thought. The industry generally claimed that the chance of core melt was one in a million or less. We found it to be one in 20,000. That was a factor of 50 higher than much of the industry had thought. It depends which audience you're talking about, whether it is more safe or less safe than they had imagined.

> DR. LEVINE: Let me just make the one point I wanted to make. What Lewis really said about the executive summary was that it was not a technical executive summary of WASH-1400. It was a lay document.

> > MR. JENSCH: Right.

DR. LEVINE: And therefore it should not

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1	have been bound in with the main report.
2	MR. JENSCH: Right.
3	DR. LEVINE: Or identified with. It should
4	have been a separate document. I'll accept that
5	criticiom, but very little else.
6	MR. JENSCH: Well, I think this unequal
7	treatment is giving a lot of people a problem.
8	DP. LEVINE: Well, for those of us who
9	have read the main report carefully and those of us
10	who have read the executive summary carefully, I
11	find it hard to say in my own mind that there is
12	very much difference in treatment.
13	MR. JENSCH: Well, you may not feel so,
14	but I think that's where people, the critics, have
15	concentrated upon is your executive summary, and
16	they haven't read, they may not have read or
17	understood the main body. I think the main body of
18	the WASH-1400 just does a much, much better job in
19	presenting your view than the executive summary does.
20	DR. RASHUSSEN: Cf course.
21	DR. LEVINE: Sure it does.
22	MR. JENSCH: Whether you talk about equal
:3	treatment, unequal treatment or whatever it is, but
24	the executive surmary was an absolute disaster for

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the amount of work you had undertaken and the report 1 you had prepared as many people feel. DR. RASMUSSEN: You're entitled to your 3 opinion. 4 MR. JENSCH: You're right, and I think 5 that's where Lewis and these people feel the same 6 way, if I understand their view. 7 Well, do you have anything further for 8 Rogivin or things for the President's Commission? 9 DR. LEVINE: No. 10 JR. JENSCH: Lr. Rasmussen, do you have 11 something that you could add? 12 DR. RASMUSSEN: Well, the point came up 13 that I didn't comment on that I have a strong opinion 14 on and it was raised by Mr. Levine, and that is 15 that having to have available in an emergency a 16 central control command post with one man in charge, 17 something that is just essential in these kinds of 18 emergencies I think. Certainly the military has 19 learned that over centuries of experience. If you 20 have an unusual, tough situation to deal with, you'll 21 be much more successful with one good man in charge 22 than to try to depend on a committee, and not many 23 battles are won with a committee of generals. It's 24

one leader takes it on. So I think it is essential that the M. R. C. designate a structure for dealing with emergencies that has one person in charge, and the resource lines laid out so he knows who to call on and who is to participate with him in the Commission. I think the things I heard were secondhand, the situation came up where they wanted to do something, and somebody said no, you can't do that. It's in violation of technical specs. Well, you know, at that point the guy in command ought to be able to say technical specs don't apply today. We have an emergency situation, and my judgment it is better to ignore that technical spec because this is more for today. Whether or not that occurred in T. M. I., it could surely have, and I suspect it may well have, from what I am told. So I think it is essential to have a man in authority, in control, and have the power to make decisions.

MR. JENSCH: Do you think that man should be somebody from N. R. C. or from the utility or what?

DR. LEVINE: Well, I guess I don't care where he comes from, but since the N. R. C. is the government agency responsible, they should have someone in charge, and -- at N. R. C. The problem is

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the utilities always set up with a man in charge, but the N. R. C. is set up with five men in charge, and that's why it is a particular problem for the N. R. C.

Now who should be in charge at the site, I think takes some thought. I wouldn't offhand say, but generally the man who has been running the machine day in, day out, is the man that ought to be in charge, and if he requires N. R. C. approval, then there ought to be one man at the N. R. C. who has the authority to say yes, go ahead, we decided that's all right.

MR. JENSCH: Yes. I think there has been greater support for the idea that somebody from the operation of the nuclear facility be the one man who would really be the 1 + man, and his word would control. As I understand it, for instance on this hydrogen calculation, industry made a calculation at about the time that subject came up which indicated that there was not enough oxygen to get a detonation. DR. LEVINE: That's correct.

DR. RASMUSSEN: Absolutely correct.

MR. JENSON: But that information did not get through somewhere to quell or quash the runor

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that a hydrogen explosion was a real possibility, and an evacuation should be taken. Then came the report, as I understand it, that they were considering calling out the National Guard because of the likely evacuation situation, and the director of the National Guard said, ladies and gentlemen of Pennsylvania, you may be sure that your husbands and brothers and relatives and friends will never be sent into the area where there is lethal levels of radioactivity, which some people thought was where they could do the most good, so with the hydrogen calculations being inaccurate, as I understand it, it would seem to support the desirability of one man being in charge, so I think that most of the comments I have heard is that somebody from the operation should be, because he knows his own machine.

DR. RASMUSSEN: Exactly.

DR. LEVINE: Yes, it should be.

MR. JENSCH: I do think there is another problem in this whole thing, aside from what happened at T. M. I., but I think Harold Denton said something like this. Industry has come to rely upon the N. R. C. so much for analysis of safety that they do very little of their own, and won't initiate

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endeavors or adopt designs and develop components to be of greater safety significance, and if the N. R. C. doesn't suggest it, why nothing is forthcoming. If that is the situation, maybe that is why EPRI, E-P-R-I, EPRI, has been developed to counter that situation, and it may be that industry will be more responsive to the need for greater safety than they have exhibited. I don't know. Well, is there anything further? I might say, Miss Reporter, that for the record, both gentlemen nodded their heads. It looks like exhaustion. It looks like a negative response. If there is nothing further, the depositions of these two gentlemen is concluded. Thank you very much. (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Deposition adjour .ed.)

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## CERTIFICATE

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2	I, SAUL LEVINE, do hereby certify that I have read
3	the foregoing transcript of my testimony taken on
4	September 15, 1979, and further certify that said
5	transcript is a true and accurate record of my testimony.
6	In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this
7	day of, 1979.
8	
9	. Saul Levine
10	
11	Sworn and subscribed to before me this day of
12	, 1979.
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15	Notary Public
16	
17	My Commission expires:
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COLMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, SS.

I, Judith McGovern Williams, a Motary Public duly commissioned and qualified within and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, do hereby certify that there came before me on the 15th day of September, 1979, at 10:30 a.m., the person hereinbefore named, who was sworn by me to testify to the truth and nothing but the truth of his knowledge touching and concerning the matters in controversy in this cause: that he was thereupon carefully examined upon his oath and his examination reduced to typewriting under my direction; and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness.

I further certify that I am neither attorney or counsel for, nor related to or employed by, any of the parties to the action in which this deposition is taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto or financially interested in the action.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this _____ day of September 1979.

My commission expires Marca 13, 1981.

Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public

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