PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

CONTINUED DEPOSITION of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY by EDWARD R. FREDERICK, held at Three Mile Island Nuclear Generation Station, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the 24th day of July 1979, commencing at 8:30 a.m., before Stanley Rudbarg, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New York.

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1 315 2 APPEARANCES: 3 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY: 4 SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, ESQS. 5 Attorneys for Metropolitan Edison Company 1800 M Street, NW 6 Washington, D.C. 7 BY: ALAN R. YUSPEH, ESQ. of Counsel 8 9 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND: 10 WINTHROP ROCKWELL, ESQ. Associate Chief Counsel 11 JOAN GOLDFRANK, ESQ. 12 Associate Counsel 13 14 ALSO PRESENT: 15 CLAUDIA A. VELLETRI 16 17 18 000 19 20 EDWARD R. FREDERICK, having been 21 previously sworn, resumed and testified further, 22 as follows: 23 MR. ROCKWELL: The record should reflect 24 that we are continuing, once again, the deposition 25 of Mr. Frederick.

1	Frederick 316
2	DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
3	BY MR. ROCKWELL:
4	Q Mr. Frederick, you brought in with you
5	today two documents that we referred to in your previous
6	testimony. One, if I identify it correctly, is a
7	memorandum dated May 10, 1978, from J. R. Floyd to a
8	variety of personnel here on-site, and the second is
9	a memorandum dated June 8, 1978, from Floyd to shift
10	supervisors. Why don't we mark these now as exhibits.
11	(Above-described documents were marked
12	Frederick Deposition Exhibits 14 and 15 for
13	identification, respectively.)
14	Q With reference to what we have now marked
15	as Exhibit 14, this appears to be, and am I correct
16	in quickly summarizing it, as being a note requiring
17	the various operating and supervisory personnel to
18	review a revision to Emergency Procedure 2202-1.3, to
19	be sure they are familiar with it?
20	A Yes. It also outlines the actions that personnel
21	have to a designated small break LOCA response.
22	Q Could you explain to me what the relevance
23	of the second page is to the first page. I am not
24	clear.
25	A On the operating memo book, each memo that is
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1	Frederick 317
2	circulated has as an attachment a list of all the
3	previous memos. That should be in the book.
4	Q Document control procedure?
5	A Well, it is actually just automatically updating
6	the index of the book. The latest one has a list of
7	everything that should be there.
8	Q I may have asked you this, but do you
9	know whether there is a historical file of the memo
10	books in the control room; once a book is filled up
11	and it is moved and put in an historical file and a
12	new bock is started, do you know?
13	A No. I know all the memos back in 1978 are still
14	up there.
15	Q In more than one book?
16	A It is all in one book.
17	Q Have you ever had occasion when you
18	wanted to go back and say, "Well, I think I remember
19	something in the spring of '77," and go back and hunt
20	for it in some sort of historical file?
21	A No.
22	Q Moving on to Deposition Exhibit No. 15,
23	why don't you explain this. You know it better than I.
24	A This is a drill procedure and signoff sheet.
25	Every month, Floyd mails this to the supervisor on

2 duty on the shift, and I guess they pick at random to 3 try not to get the same shift each month.

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He is supposed to run the drill on small break LOCA response, so that first he conducts a briefing of all the personnel that are going to be involved, and he lists the names of the people that he briefed.

8 Then he runs the drill by using the designated 9 people in accordance with this little summary right 10 here, and they actually walk through the procedure 11 and go to the equipment and simulate operating it and 12 trying to stay within the time guidelines that are 13 listed here.

14 If they can complete all the tasks within the 15 required time, then they sign off as successfully 16 completed.

If they don't complete it quickly enough, they
have another briefing and run the drill again, trying
to speed it up until they can meet all the requirements
of the drill.

When they finally meet it, they sign it and send it down, and it is filed in a drawer as being a successful drill for that month.

Q Do you know of any other documents which relate to this change or this addition to the small

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4 procedures?

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5 We have covered an initial memorandum from 6 Floyd requiring people to review or revise the emer-7 gency procedure. We have covered the revised emergency 8 procedure itself. I have covered this drill.

9 Is there anything else you are aware of that 10 refers to that change?

11 A Only the document that we used to record who 12 these people are each day. That is about it.

13 Q Nothing else substantively, in terms of 14 explaining the reasons behind this concern about a 15 very narrowly defined small break LOCA; nothing like 16 that you are aware of?

17 A No.

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18 Q Did you ever feel in your training that 19 a problem might potentially arise where you 20 had no procedure, you just had no procedure to apply to 21 a set of facts that you were presented with? Was that 22 ever a matter discussed in your training; what do you 23 do when everything goes wrong and you don't have a 24 procedure?

A The only time that I can specifically remember is

during my certification at the B&W simulator, when they instituted a casualty that was not covered by the emergency procedures down there, and I had to respond to it and try to keep the plant in safe condition until I identified what the problem was and get to normal cooldown.

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8 Q What did you do in that kind of situation?
9 What did you do that time?

10 A It was a loss of circulating water pumps to the 11 system, and the result was gradual loss of condenser 12 vacuum, which degrades the turbine efficiency, and 13 you begin to lose electrical output. The power output 14 of the reactor stays the same or increases slightly. 15 The power output of the turbine begins to decrease 16 because of the efficiency mismatch. Those are the 17 symptoms that I saw.

18 But there is no procedure for loss of vacuum or 19 degraded output of electricity or anything like that. 20 So what I had to do was identify the problem. What 21 they wanted me to do was analyze the effect of the 22 circulating water system being degraded, trace it through 23 the circuit and determine how it was affecting it. Once 24 I solved that problem, then they permitted me to restart 25 the circulating water pumps and to recover the plant.

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But it was, like I say, an emergency that wasn't covered by the procedure. It was imposed on me to see how I would reason through a problem not covered by the procedures.

6 Was there much attention or any attention 0 given to that in the training generally, in the sense 7 8 that as a control room operator, you may run into a 9 situation where you don't have an emergency procedure, 10 and you will not be able to follow a procedure? Yes. That is the underlying reason for the 11 A 12 detailed study of all the systems. If you just had to 13 memorize procedures and use them to react to symptoms, 14 then there wouldn't be any need to understand how 15 the system worked, other than how to present it on the 16 control panel.

17 The whole idea is to have a sufficiently detailed 18 knowledge so in the event something occurs that is 19 completely foreign, you can use your knowledge of 20 the intricacy of the system to figure out what is 21 going on.

Q How would that be done in training specifically? How would that issue of dealing with a situation not covered by procedures be addressed in the training program?

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A I don't know that that is specifically addressed. I am just saying that the basic concept is to know as much as you can in case you get in a situation where you don't know exactly what is going on.

6 Q So what you are saying is that the general 7 study, the general familiarization, the general effort 8 to understand how the systems work is designed, in your 9 view, to equip you for that eventuality?

10 A Yes.

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11 Q But there is no specific discussion in 12 terms of what you do in a situation where you have no 13 procedure?

14 A No, because I think that would be difficult if 15 not close to impossible to try and envision, or to list 16 the number of situations for which there are no pro-17 cedures, and try to tell an oper tor, "This is one time 18 when you won't have a procedure, and you should get 19 ready for that."

If we identify a situation like that, we should write a procedure. The concept is that we have to do the safety analysis and what ever studies they put in the design of the plant, they have tried to come up with a set of circumstances that they consider would be likely emergencies, and they write procedures in

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1	Frederick 323
2	accordance with that, and they give you enough training
3	to equip you to react to anything that might be abnormal.
4	Q Did anyone in your training, or in the
5	day-to-day work with your supervisors, ever tell you,
6	"Look, some day you will have a transient. You are
7	going to have an emergency which isn't accounted for";
8	in other words, was there ever a time when they fold you
9	to accept that possibility?
10	A I believe so.
11	(Continued on Page 324.)
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	had been and a state and a state and a state and a state and and a state and

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	1	Frederick 324
2.1	2	Q In what way; how was it made known?
sr/cw	3	A Like I say, I don't specifically remember anyone
~	4	ever telling me, although I do remember having a feeling
6	5	that it was possible to be in a situation that wasn't
	6	covered by a procedure. It didn't really occur to me
	7	that we would be in a situation that wasn't covered by
	8	the safety analysis, in other words, a situation that
	9	included so many failures and abnormal readings that
	10	it was not covered by the basic safety analysis instruc-
	11	tion.
	12	Q Did anyone ever take you through the safety
	13	analysis and explain to you how it had been arrived
	14	at in the sense of saying, "Look, the safety analysis
	15	makes certain assumptions"?
	16	A Yes.
	17	Q And if those assumptions are correct, then
	18	our safety analysis will serve you well?
	19	A Yes.
	20	Q If those assumptions are incorrect, someday
0	21	we may find ourselves in a situation where it doesn't
\cup	22	serve us, and you as control room operators may someday
	23	be faced with the situation that no of us had
	24	predicted; was that kind of discussio. ever raised?
	25	A No. The third part of that was not discussed.
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2 The safety analysis was discussed as having so many 3 conservatisms installed in it and so many conservative 4 assumptions made that it was considered impossible to 5 go out of the bounds of those basic ground rules.

6 Q Did anyone ever challenge that assumption, 7 namely the assumption that the safety analysis was the 8 be-all and end-all, in terms of defining the potential 9 emergencies and potential accidents?

10 Well, it is difficult for operators to challenge A 11 the computer programmers and engineers that are 12 throwing stuff down on you. You can ask as many ques-13 tions as you want, and they always seem to have an 14 answer. But I know the safety analysis group. That 15 is their job. They are questioning the analysis and 16 revising their programs all the time. You see the 17 results of that, but it is going to be difficult to get 18 on top of a situation like that.

19 Q Let me ask you this. Did any engineer or 20 anybody of the management hierarchy here ever stand up 21 and say, "Look, you know, we have got a lot of engineers 22 out there doing a lot of work, and they work hard it it, 23 but they are all human, and they probably missed some-24 thing, and there is probably something in there that 25 will happen someday that isn't accounted for"; did

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2 anybody give you that appreciation that it was not a 3 bible?

4 A Not that I recall. I don't remember any discussion 5 of that.

6 0 We were talking a moment ago, and you said 7 that there had been no discussion of what specifically 8 you do in a particular situation not covered by a 9 procedure. In fact, you went on to add if you found 10 a situation that wasn't covered by a procedure, there 11 were particular things you should do, and you would 12 write a procedure. Is that a fair statement? 13 A Yes.

14 Q That is what happened in the case of the 15 small break LOCA?

16 A Yes.

17 Was there ever any discussion about what 0 18 analytical process, setting aside specific steps, what 19 analytical process your control operator would use 20 in a situation where you didn't have a procedure? 21 In other words, how do you approach the question of 22 solving the problem, not that you do specifically, but 23 how do you approach it in an analytical sense? 24 A I don't remember being taught basic thought 25 process or analytical process in arriving at a solution

1	Frederick 327
2	to a problem.
3	What they do is they basically throw you in the
4	water and see if you can swim. They give you a casualty
5	several times until you identify it. They give you just
6	a certain number of unknowns, and you have to keep
7	asking questions or looking for more information until
8	you figure it out. You have to develop the quickest you
9	know how to do it.
10	Q Did they ever test you by throwing in
11	casualties that weren't accounte for in the SAR?
12	A In what?
13.	Q In the SAR, Safety Analysis Report, FSAR?
14	A I don't think so.
15	Q For instance, did they ever throw in a
16	total loss of feed water?
17	A No.
18	Q And do you personally or do other operators
19	operators belief that that never could happen ever;
20	would that be the atmosphere?
21	A When you started talking about "never could
22	happen" and "possible," everyone would always qualify it
23	as saying, "The probabilities are so low that we can
24	assume that it isn't possible, but there is always that
25	last little inch that you wouldn't have, as far as

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2 declaring it impossible."

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3 However, when it came to analyzing it at best, 4 you would spend more time on something that was more 5 probable and gives more significant consequences than 6 something that was nearly impossible.

You would cite a few consequences that perhaps you would try and turn it around, but you didn't spend as much time discussing it because you figured it was impossible or near impossible.

11 0 Did you ever have situations where you 12 thought, "Okay, we spend all our time usually on the 13 things that are probable because we want you to be 14 equipped for things that are more likely to happen, but 15 today we are going to throw all of the improbable things 16 at you and then start giving you casualties that have nothing to do with anything you have been trained on, 17 nothing to do with anything that is in safety analysis, 18 19 multiple failures," did they ever do that?

20 A No. It would be hard to say that training like 21 that is valid.

Q It would be hard to say it is not valid too? A Now, today, yes. But a year ago you couldn't have a man in a simulator with so many thousands of hours a day in cost and try to train him to operate a nuclear

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power plant based on the things that are not in accordance with the safety analysis and not based on approved procedures. That is not exactly valid training.

5 For one thing, the NRC requires that you respond 6 to anything with valid operating procedures or emergency 7 procedures, or within the bounds of the technical 8 specifications.

9 If you start throwing those rules away, you are 10 not giving an operator the type of training you are 11 supposed to get.

For one thing, in a basic course like that, where an operator, this may be the first time on a control panel, you can't start confusing him with things that most people consider impossible.

16 You first have to get him through a basic response 17 to a reactor trip, which may take a half day in itself. 18 You know, you have a limited time to get a working 19 knowledge of the plant, and then throw him back in the 20 real world and then some more on-the-job training, and 21 then come back and do it again.

It may take a year to get an operator up to where he feels comfortable on the panel. It is a rather intimidating room. You have to feel confident in that atmosphere.

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2 So I don't believe that would have been valid 3 training, what you are suggesting.

Right now it is only valid for operators that I consider have a good year of experience and seniority because they must be able to understand all the rules that are changing because they have a working knowledge of the basic rules.

9 Q When you use the word "valid" in that context, I take it you draw its meaning from essen-10 tially your definitions rated down in the technical 11 specifications in the FSAR. In other words, when you 12 13 say "valid training," valid training relates to those kinds of things that are accounted for and anticipated? 14 15 A Yes.

16 Q In the underlying particular analysis?
17 A Yes. The operator has to be able to respond to
18 expected casualties before he can be taught to respond
19 to something that is unexpected.

20 Q But even before the accident, I appreciate 21 your point that you can teach somebody who is totally 22 raw the most sophisticated casualties; that might be 23 difficult.

24 A Yes.

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Q But, even before the accident, you said they

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2 could have taught more senior operators or operators 3 with more experience, with the confidence that you 4 described, more sophisticated reviews, drills that 5 weren't accounted for in the underlying particular 6 analysis, right?

7 A If the training materials you have are developed 8 to the point where you can do that, yes. Before the 9 accident, they were not.

10 Q I mean conceptually -- let us set aside
11 whether you have it written down in the training guide;
12 conceptually you do have?

13 A Yes. In other words, there were discussions about 14 what would you do if, going all kinds of ways, but there 15 was no way of verifying whether your answer was correct. 16 Even now, if someone had postulated the TMI 2 accident, 17 it is unlikely they would come up with the same end 18 point that we had because of the number of variables. 19 You have to assume, you know, quite a few things that 20 follow the same path that we did.

If you were sitting in a classroom with three or four senior operators and you postulated an accident like that and tried to talk through it, since it is not covered in the analysis anywhere and there are no procedures to follow, it is unlikely that you would

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2	come up with	an end poi	nt that coul	d be verifiabl	e.
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2 Q What do you mean by that? 3 A Well, if you are discussing it on the basis 4 of trying to come up with what do you do if this 5 happened to you, then you are going to have some kind 6 of guideline or feedback from an authoritative source 7 to tell you whether or not you are right or wrong in 8 your decisions.

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9 Q Let us take an example. Before March 28, 10 a loss of main and auxiliary feed was not accounted 11 for, right'

12 A Right.

13 Q Let us say that three or four experienced 14 control room operators were having a session, and someone 15 said, "Look, it never happened, and we don't think it 16 will ever happen, but let us assume for an exercise 17 that the main feed goes out and the auxiliary feed does 18 not come on-line for whatever reason. What are you 19 going to do? What would your analysis be?"

20 A I think the main part of this conversation would 21 probably be tied up with calculating the amount of heat 22 buildup in the reactor coolant system, the result of 23 relief valves opening, and whether or not the heat 24 generated in the core is greater or less than the 25 relief capability of the valves; what effect high

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2 pressure injection has on increasing the pressure in 3 they system, that sort of thing.

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We can probably be tied up with a lot of calcu-4 lations that may or may not be within the capability 5 of the operators to come up with a valid answer. 6 Do you think if that question had been 7 0 tossed out among a number of senior operators, they 8 would have come up with substantially different answers 9 before the 28th, before everyone was focusing on the 10 issue? 11

12 A Like I say, most of them would have, and I am 13 speaking for myself, I probably would have focused in 14 on the high pressure transient in the reactor coolant 15 system and how it would be terminated.

16 Q If you lost all feed, what is the fundamental 17 problem you are faced with?

18 A There is no heat sink, no removal of heat from 19 the reactor coolant system.

20 Q So what do you have?

A Heat causes increased pressure in the reactor
 coolant system and would start lifting relief valves.
 I had never before the accident considered the

24 relief valve as a heat sink, which it is now being 25 considered as being used for.

1 I would have only considered it as a decrease in 2 pressure. I would still have to assume the heat was 3 going to be retained in the system. I would be faced 4 5 with trying to figure out when the core damage would 6 occur due to increased pressure and high temperature. 7 You have to assume you will not get your heat sink 8 back. I guess you will not get feedwater back in the 9 line for some time. 10 Obviously there are a variety of different 0 11 scenarios you can postulate. 12 Yes. But again, the fact that the relief valve A 13 sticks open changes the scenario because you change 14 from a high pressure problem to a low pressure problem. 15 That is where you start getting core damage. 16 Q Have you done any of that kind of analytical 17 game playing, if you will, or postulating, since the 18 accident, taking accidents which are not really 19 anticipated and putting people through the mental 20 exercise of thinking through at least what implications 21 proceed to flow from the postulated circumstances? 22 A Most of the game playing we would do was with 23 emergencies that were not readily identifiable, but 24 they were a lasis for an emergency procedure. 25 Q Are you talking about since the accident?

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No, before the accident. If we were discussing, . 2 Α saying, doing an emergency procedure review, one of 3 us might pose a set of symptoms on the other operator, 4 and there would be a few from the emergency procedure 5 that should key into the procedure. There were a few 6 7 of the symptoms that really didn't mean very much but probably would be present at the same time, and we 8 9 would have to go through the thought process of picking out whatever procedure you were working on. That is 10 11 about the extent of the type of game playing we would do.

12 0 Since the accident, have you done game 13 playing, in the sense that we are using that term, beyond the limits of the tech spec or FSAR, to try to go into 14 15 uncharted areas, to see how people respond analytically? 16 I haven't had much time to do much since the A 17 accident. I spend a lot of time in rooms like this. As a matter of fact, I haven't been on shift very 18 19 much.

20 Q Would it be fair to assume that the safety 21 analysis of the tech specs don't take into account human 22 error in the course of handling a particular situation? 23 A Mostly safety analysis assumes no operator action 24 at all. It assumes that the plant survives the casualty 25 with no operator action or that operator action is delayed

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1 Frederick 336 2 for a long time. 3 0 It just assumes the plant is going along 4 with whatever automatic systems are there? 5 Yes, it assumes failure of single trains, high-A 6 pressure injection or feedwater, but usually those 7 assumptions are made in the beginning. Like I showed 8 you in the safety analysis, as a general consideration 9 from the beginning of the safety analysis, they tell 10 you how many failures they might assume. It is always 11 half of the redundant system. That is why we have 12 two of each or four of each or three of each or 13 whatever. They assume so many failures, and you 14 still have one left. They never assume a complete 15 failure of an emergency system. 16 Did you ever hear anyone ask them why they 0 17 didn't make that last assumption, which would really 18 put them in trouble? 19 A Well, I am not sure that the analysis, way back 20 wherever it started, didn't make that assumption, then 21 see that that was so undesirable that they had to work 22 to do everything they could to separate the two systems 23 so they were completely unrelated, to really decrease 24 the probability that they could fail exactly at the 25 same time, which is what they do: They physically

2 separate the electrical power sources. All the cables 3 are separate. The piping is physically removed from 4 the other systems. Everything is as identical by 5 manufacture, with the same specifications, so you 6 have two mirror systems but which are completely 7 separated from each other.

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8 I think that is a good concept if you are trying 9 to build in reliability.

10 0 Did you ever hear anybody raise the ques-11 tion, either instructors or engineers or trainees, 12 anybody, "Yo. know, we go down the road, and you tell 13 us how you would counter this failure or the failure 14 or another train, until you have one left, but you 15 never bring us down the road to where we have none 16 left"? Did you ever hear anybody challenge that and 17 say, "What is the logic behind that?"

18 A Well, I just explained the logic behind that.
19 That is how we arrived at an understanding of that
20 logic, in other words, the separation criteria for
21 emergency systems is the basis for being able to make
22 that assumption. You always will have one left.
23 (Continued on Page 338.)
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Q Have you noticed, since the accident, any change in the way people approach the safety analysis report and the technical specifications, do you notice, for instance, that people are more willing to say, "Well, obviously the safety analysis report is a pretty careful document but that may be a definite account for everything"?

9 A I don't remember anyone saying that, yet, like I 10 say, I haven't been exposed to many deckshifts where 11 you can sit back and talk about that sort of thing 12 since March.

13 Q Have you noticed any general change in the 14 attitude with respect to what is possible and what is 15 not possible?

16 A Yes. In the training that I just took down at 17 Lynchburg, it is quite a bit different from what they 18 were doing, yes. There are many more conservatisms, 19 and the basic approach to each emergency has changed.

20 Q Is that a pervasive change in approach or 21 is the change just with respect to the particular inci-22 dent that occurred here?

²³ A The changes that have been made in actions that ²⁴ an operator is allowed to take, just a change in how ²⁵ you can react to a simple emergency like a small steam

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2 leak or an inadvertent reactor trip, you have the same 3 new actions to take as you did on a huge LOCA. In 4 other words, there are new prerequisites for bypassing 5 high pressure injection which has to be considered 6 before you can bypass HPI, whereas before, even during 7 an inadvertent reactor trip, you might bypass 8 high pressure injection. 9 So you have new procedures there? Q 10 Yes. You have new procedures and new concepts A 11 that have to be examined before you can take action. 12 They have new setpoints on the equipment, like the 13 setpoint on the electromatic relief valve has been 14 raised above the code safeties now, so that now, during 15 even something as simple as a runback is going to trip 16 a reactor whereas before you would never have a runback 17 that would trip a reactor. 18 Are those changes embodied in the emergency 0 19 procedure? 20 Yes. They are working on it. They even changed 21 the format of the procedure to include a paragraph 22 entitled "Objectives of Emergency Procedure," so that 23 when you are in the procedure you have right in front 24 of you what it is that you are trying to prevent 25 happening.

1	Frederick 340
2	Q What do you mean exactly?
3	A A concept I have only seen two of them, I
4	really couldn't remember what they said.
5	The idea is to alert the operator to what limiting
6	conditions for operation or safety limit is that you are
7	trying to avoid by taking these actions.
8	Q You said you had only seen a couple. Do you
9	remember which two you saw?
10	A I didn't mean to imply there are only two; there
11	are several dozen. I don't remember what they said.
12	I haven't had an opportunity to study them. I have read
13	them. I don't remember what they said.
14	Q But the rewriting relates primarily to the
15	statement of the underlying objective?
16	A That is one of the significant changes you notice
17	right away, but many of the procedural steps have been
18	changed too.
19	Q Do you know who is doing that rewriting,
20	what organization? Is it Met Ed or B&W?
21	A I am sure Met Ed is involved in it, probably PORC,
22	but I don't know who all the consultants are.
23	MR. ROCKWELL: Allen, could we have a set of
24	those procedures which have been rewritten to
25	include a statement of the underlying objective?

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		1	Frederick 341
. 4		2	Now it may be that there has been quite a few
		3	and we will not need all of them, but maybe you
		4	can pull together a list and we can go over it
6		5	quickly and indicate the ones which we would like
		6	to have.
		7	MR. YUSPEH: Sure.
		8	MR. ROCKWELL: Thank you.
		9	Q You gave some testimony before the Udall
		10	Committee which I am sure you recollect, and you indi-
		11	cated that if you want to look at this as we are
	,	12	attacking that, feel free to ask. I am just trying to
		13	recapitulate where you were in the discussion with them.
		14	You indicated that there was a high sump level, off
		15	scale high.
		16	A Yes.
		17	Q And you indicated that that was unusual
		18	the fact that the sump pump was running was not unusual
		19	but the fact that the sump level was off scale high was
		20	unusual. Does that sound accurate to you?
0		21	A Yes.
\sim		22	Q And then you indicated that, "Gee; I told
		23	him to turn off," meaning the sump pump, "because the
		24	source of the water was now obviously not sweat in the
		25	walls. We were getting water out of the drain tank.
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2 So rather than transfer that water out of the building, 3 I told him to stop it." And then the discussion goes on 4 and you indicate that, I think the reasoning behind your 5 stopping it was the concern about possible radiation in 6 the water and the water being pulled out of the building. 7 Does that sound accurate to you?

8 A That is probably the underlying reason. I believe 9 I stated somewhere in one of these testimonies that I 10 was more concerned with overflowing the tanks in the 11 auxilliary building which were already indicating high 12 level prior to the accident.

13 Q High water levels?
14 A High water levels. The radiation would be a
15 problem, but I was probably more concerned with over16 flowing in the auxilliary building.
17 Q Do you remember when that sump pump was

18 turned off, where in the sequence?

19 A It was when the operator called me from the 20 auxilliary building. I don't remember what time it was. 21 Q Would 38 minutes sound roughly accurate to 22 you?

23 A I guess. Really, I still have no concept of how 24 much time was going by. When I was first asked that 25 question, I believe I said it was an hour

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2 to an hour and a half. First when they asked me how long 3 it was to ES actuation, I said 20 minutes. 4 It appears, looking at the basic sequence of 0 5 events, that it was done around 38 minutes. 6 A Okay. 7 When you realized that you were getting 0 8 water, that you were getting level in your sump tank 9 that was off scale high and you indicated in your Udall 10 testimony you realized that it must have been coming 11 from the drain tank to achieve those levels, did your 12 mind turn at that point to the reasons for why you were 13 getting water in the drain tank and what that suggested 14 about the general condition of the plant?

15 I don't recall what I was thinking. All I can say A 16 is somewhere around that time I did go back and looked 17 the drain tank indicators, like I said. Through the 18 recorders, I saw there was low pressure in it. I don't 19 remember whether the pump was running or not, but when 20 I saw the low pressure, I wasn't really sure what it was 21 indicating to me. Bill Zewe and I discussed it, but I 22 don't remember what conclusion we came to at that time. 23 0 Once the rupture disc goes, will the tank 24 still stay full of water? Is the rupture disc on top 25 so that there would be an overflow?

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	1	Frederick 344
	2	A I believe it is on the top, yes.
	3	Q So the water indication in the quench tank
	4	or drain tank would remain high even after the rupture
	5	disc blows, even though the pressure would be low?
	6	A I guess the water level was high. I don't
	7	remember what it was reading.
	8	Q Did either you or Bill Zewe trace the fact
	9	that you had an unusually high or off scale high level
	10	in the sump back to the fact that it must have been
	11	coming through the drain tank back to the point of
110	12	where that was coming from and is it a break?
	13	A Obviously not.
	14	(Continued on following page.)
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	19	내 것이 같은 것이 같은 것이 있는 것이 잘 들었다. 것이 같은 것이 같은 것이 같은 것이 없는 것이 없 않이 않는 것이 없는 것이 없 않이
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2 Q When you throttled the high-pressure 3 injection, you have indicated repeatedly in other 4 testimony that you have given that the reason that 5 you did that was because of your concern about the 6 pressurizer level, your concern about going solid; is 7 that correct?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And that continued to be your analysis, 10 correct?

11 A As to why I throttled, yes.

Q When you throttled it back, that is, the high-pressure injection, I take it that you indicated that you had been looking at and you had considered in the action that you took, not only pressurizer level, but reactor coolant pressure and temperature that you were aware of all three indication: at the time you made the decision to throttle?

19 A I don't specifically remember looking up tempera-20 cure, though I may have.

 Q
 But you were aware of pressure?

 22
 A

 Yes.

Q And pressure was enough to tell you that you
 had very dramatically conflicting indicators?
 A Yes. As the pressurizer approached solid

2 conditions, I realized that the pressure was not 3 reacting as I expected it to. What I was afraid of 4 is after it went off-scale high, it may suddenly 5 increase very rapidly.

6 0 What I wanted to ask you was this: When 7 you essentially were there looking at those two factors, 8 pressurizer level and reactor coolant pressure, and saw 9 they were in conflict and then made the decision to 10 essentially rely on and believe your pressurizer level 11 indication, what factors went into that decision? 12 Did you entertain as a possibility at that point the 13 fact that you should ignore pressurizer level and focus 14 on the reactor system pressure?

15 A No, I did not.

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Q Can you explain to me what you brought into Can you explain to me what you brought into that control room that day, in terms of your training and thinking, that led you so surely to acting on the basis of pressurizer level?

A All I can say is I didn't make the assumption that there was a steam void somewhere else, one, because I didn't know that the emergency steam system wasn't operating, and we had no heat sink, and two, because I had never considered the possibility of a steam void before forcing the pressurizer level to

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 347
2	go solid.
3	Q What did the low reaccor coolant pressure
4	suggest to you at the time, or did it suggest anything
5	to you? Obviously high pressurizer level was sug-
6	gesting something fairly specific to you, namely,
7	that you might be approaching solid conditions. That
8	is on the one hand. On the other hand, you had low
9	reactor coolant pressure. Was that suggesting anything
10	else to you at that time?
11	A No.
12	Q It was just an anomaly that didn't fit
13	the pattern that you expected?
14	A Yes.
15	Q But it did not suggest, based on your
16	training and experience and understanding, any condi-
17	tions or any particular consequences down the road,
18	at least as you stood there in the heat of the
19	emergency?
20	A No. It was confusing. We had pressurizer
21	level going off-scale high. That was one initial
22	while the pressure remained low. That was a confusing
23	piece of information. Several minutes later, we dis-
24	covered we had no emergency feedwater. That became
25	confusing because the reactor coolant system pressure

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2 was low. If we had no heat sink, why was the pressure 3 low, and if we had no pressure, why was the pressurizer 4 level high?

5 I mean those are 3 or 4 confusing indications 6 that don't dictate any particular action.

Q So in terms of your own thought processes that morning, you were basically focusing, and the action you ultimately took based on pressurizer level was an action which was the only clear action that you saw that you could take; is that a fair way of putting it? Yes.

13 Q It did not appear to you that there was 14 any clear action you could take based on your reading 15 of reactor coolant pressure?

16 A Right. We were trying to find, through the 17 basic searches, reasons for the failure or the initiating 18 event that is causing all these indications. That was 19 our basic mistake. We were looking for the problem, 20 and we should have looked for the combination of failures.

At this time, we were just geared to the wrong
type of detective work.

23 Q Did anyone ever suggest in the first 24 several hours that you were dealing with a multiple 25 rather than a single failure; did that possibility

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 349
2	come out in the discussion?
3	A I don't recall whether someone said, "This may
4	be a whole package." That would be kind of a dumb
5	thing to say anyway. It doesn't help.
6	Q We talked yesterday about your concern
7	and the basis for your concern about going solid, and
8	you indicated that your concern was essentially a
9	high-pressure transient, a stressing of the system up
10	to the level of 2750 pounds; is that correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q That concern, I take it, necessarily
13	involves a concern that the three valves at the top of
14	the pressurizer may not open when they are needed?
15	A Another phase of our training, besides trying
16	to stay away from safety limits, kind of doesn't allow
17	you to rely on safety systems. In other words, you
18	don't rely on the reactor protection system to trip
19	the reactor; you don't rely on the emergency safeguard
20	system to initiate at 1600 pounds, and you don't rely
21	on the relief valves to lift at their setpoint, okay?
22	You always watch to see that they are going to fail; you
23	assume you may have to take some action. So in antici-
24	pating a rise in pressure, I naturally assumed that
25	the relief valves may not work, and that is assuming

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1 Frederick 350 2 an awful lot of conservatism, but it is just that is 3 what was in my head at the time, if they don't open, 4 I am in trouble, so what do I do. 5 Q Is that kind of conservatism, that kind of 6 analytical approach to the problem reflected specifically 7 in your training? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Can you tell me, in other words, where would 10 I go to find that kind of an analytical approach in the 11 training? Would I go, for instance, and talk to Norm 12 Elliott down at B&W or John Flint? 13 A I am sure he would express that same conservatism. 14 Q Would it be within, do you know, some of 15 the materials they used in your training? 16 A I don't know. A lot of our training is oral 17 examinations and memory work, you know. Much of what 18 we receive is not written down, though it may be that 19 concept is written in some kind of general objectives 20 document. I don't know. Someone else might have it. 21 I know that I have been exposed to that concept fre-22 quently; even back in the Navy, we had that same 23 concept. 24 O Do you know specifically whether you have 25 been exposed to that concept at B&W?

1	Frederick 351
2	A Yes.
3	Q Specifically?
4	A Yes.
5	Q When?
6	A All during the simulator training.
7	Q That eight week course?
8	A Yes, and whatever courses I was down there for.
9	Q Who was your primary instructor for the
10	eight-week course in the summer, I believe, of 1976?
11	A We had three or four.
12	Q Do you remember any of their names?
13	A Carl Gossen, Gene Alden, Joe Klimek, Bill Street,
14	Ibelieve John Lind was a newcomer at that time.
15	Q Was it basically two teaching?
16	A You mean were there usually two instructors at
17	the same time?
18	Q Yes.
19	A No, it was usually instructor in the simulator
20	and one instructor in the classroom, but not always
21	the same instructor.
22	Q Do you know whether any materials that
23	you might have received from that course you might
24	still have in this batch of materials you have made
25	available to us?

	1	Frederick 352
	2	A I don't know that I could identify them as coming
	3	from that course.
	4	Q And you weren't given any particular
	5	course book which was discrete of materials applicable
	6	to that simulator training; is that it?
	7	A We were given course materials that applied to
	8	that course. One was a set of procedures for the
	9	simulator, a set of tech specs and limits and precautions,
	10	but I haven't retained them because they are out of date.
	11	Let's go back through the materials you were
1	12	given. You were given a set of procedures for the
	13	simulator?
	14	A Yes. Well, it was kind of an intermingling of
	15	whatever procedures we had that we could use and the
	16	procedures from TMI and the procedures for the simulator.
	17	Q Are those essentially the procedure books
	18	that you had used when you were training on the
	19	simulator; is that correct?
	20	A Yes.
	21	Q And then you indicated you were given a
	22	set of limits and precautions?
	23	A Yes.
	24	Q Do you remember Frederick Exhibit No. 2?
	25	A I remember it. It would be the same document, yes.
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	1	Frederick 353
	2	같은 것은 것 같아요. 그는 것 같은 것 같
	3	were given during the training have been a complete set
	4	of limits and precautions, as far as you know?
	5	A Yes.
	6	Q Could you tell me specifically whether
	7	they would have included the limits and precautions
	8	set out at Pages 17, 18 and 19 of Frederick Exhibit 2
	9	relating to pressurizer, do you remember?
	10	A Do I remember that those pages were included?
	11	Q Yes.
•	12	A I would imagine that they were, yes. I may be
	13	able to come up with that. I just remembered I have
	14	an old box full of things in my basement.
	15	Q I would appreciate it if you would check.
	16	A I imagined you would.
	17	Q Thank you.
	18	Were the limits and precautions basically in final
	19	form that you remember at that time in the summer of
	20	1976?
	21	A I believe everything we received was stamped
	22	"draft" or "for information only" or "for training
	23	purposes," that sort of thing, because we were told
	24	that our procedures were still being written and still
	25	had to be polished up, and basically the form of the
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

	1	Frederick 354
	2	thing would be in, but we could expect to see some
	3	revisions and changes in the future.
	4	Q Did it seem to be relatively complete in
	5	terms of its breadth of coverage? Do you think there
	6	are very many subjects covered in the current limits
	7	of the courses that hadn't begun to be addressed back
	8	in the summer of 1976?
	9	A No. I am fairly certain it is probably the same
	10	document that I had, probably word for word.
	11	Q That was two sets of material we have
ł.	12	covered now, the procedures for the simulator, the
	13	limits and precautions. You say there were other
	14	materials that you were given at that time?
	15	A Yes. We were given a set of technical specifi-
	16	cations to read.
	17	Q A complete set of tech specs, 12 volumes?
	18	A No, no, just the tech specs, not the FSAR.
	19	Q The FSAR was the longer one, right.
	20	Were you given your own set of tech specs?
	21	A Yes.
	22	Q That you could keep and take home with you?
	23	A Yes. We had a lot of study to do out of the class,
	24	so they gave us those to read. We had to memorize them.
	25	Q The tech specs, then, you brought home with

1 Frederick 355 2 you after the course was over and kept as a personal 3 reference? 4 A Yes. For some cime I kept it up to date and 5 revised it as all the amendments came in, but then 6 as they became harder and harder to keep up with, I 7 began to use the control copy that was in the control 8 room instead. 9 Q And that was the TMI 2 tech spec, is that 10 right, that they gave you, or was it --A Yes, I think so. They are standardized tech 11 12 specs. They are in a form -- this was supposed to be 13 adapted by all the nuclear power plants eventually, 14 all the B&W plants, so that although they are TMI 2 15 tech specs, I believe the only difference between ours 16 and somebody else's are the actual numerical values 17 that are in the specifications. I don't know for sure. 18 That is the impression I got. 19 Q So the tech spec that you got was a standard 20 tech spec? 21 A I am saying it may not correspond, number for 22 number, with the control copy that exists now. I am 23 sure the numbers have changed. 24 Q What about at the time, was it the same 25 tech spec in the summer of 1976 as existed in the

1	Frederick 356
2	control room here?
3	A I think so.
4	Q Was that given to you before you went down
5	to B&W or after you got down there?
6	A I think we got it the first day we got down there.
7	Q Were there any other materials that you
8	were given during that training?
9	A Besides the pencil and blank paper?
10	Q Yes.
11	A We were given an integrated control system logic
12	diagram. I think I have a set of them over here. I
13	am not sure those are the same ones.
14	Q So the record is clear, when you say "over
15	here, you were referring to the table where the
16	materials you brought in yesterday are sitting, right?
17	A Yes, sir.
18	I don't remember anything else right now.
19	(A brief recess was held.)
20	MR. YUSPEH: Ed, with regard to your
21	earlier comment about the safety systems and
22	the relief valve and the pressurizer and your
23	indication that your training and your teaching,
24	in that you should not necessarily rely on the
25	safety system to operate properly, do you think

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	1	Frederick 357
	2	that that kind of training is conventional and
	3	appropriate in terms of operating a system of
	4	this kind?
	5	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	6	Q You made some comment about that being
	7	some kind of an unwritten law from Day One.
	8	A Yes. See, you had asked me what I thought the
	9	source of that concept was. I am trying to explain
	10	that when I was an operator in the Navy and we had gone
	11	through years of training there and it always seemed
•	12	to be reiterated throughout your training, but I don't
	13	ever remember seeing it written down. That is the
	14	only part I don't know, where to reference it to.
	15	Q While you are mentioning the Navy, so I
	16	don't forget it, would you be willing to permit the
	17	Commission to obtain your Navy personnel record? It
	18	will require you to sign an authorization form per-
	19	mitting or allowing us to request your records. If we
	20	did that, we would make an extra set and forward you
	21	a complete set of them. But we asked Mr. Faust, and
	22	obviously the Commission's concern is to be able to
	23	have a complete picture of the training of the people
	24	involved in order to help analyze, in a sense, the
	25	adequacy of the training of the people who were there
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1	Frederick 358
2	dealing with the crisis at the time it occurred.
3	Would you be willing to do that?
4	A Yes, if I can get a copy of what you are looking
5	at. I am not sure the service record jacket includes
6	a description of the training.
7	Q I don't know either.
8	A The copy that I have doesn't, but if you receive
9	records, I would like to see what you are looking at,
10	yes.
11	Q We would make a definite commitment that
12	whatever we obtained from you in response to the form
13	that we would submit would be duplicated in its entirety,
14	and a full copy would be sent to you immediately.
15	A Yes.
16	Q I am going back to pick up a subject that
17	we have discussed before, the changes that were imple-
18	mented in Emergency Procedure 2202-1.3 in connection
19	with a loss of reactor coolant and the changes that
20	were made in the spring of 1978 in terms of drilling
21	for the small break LOCA and the creation of a small
22	break LOCA operator.
23	Apparently that came about as a result of
24	somebody's analysis that there was a small break that
25	had not been fully analyzed, correct? Is that your

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	1	Frederick 359
	2	understanding?
	3	A Yes.
	4	Q Have you ever heard the name "Michelson"
	5	associated with that analysis, Tom Michelson, I believe,
	6	is his name?
	7	A Since the accident I have, yes.
	8	Q No, before the accident.
	9	A No.
	10	Q Had you heard anyone's name associated with
	11	that analysis?
1	12	A No.
	13	Q Since the accident, have you become aware
	14	that someone here had received a copy of that Michelson
	15	analysis which triggered the changes that were made
	16	in the spring of 1978?
	17	A No. I don't know what the source of the
	18	information was.
	19	Q Today, do you have any understanding of
	20	what was behind the changes that Mr. Floyd was imple-
	21	menting in the two memoranda that we have marked as
	22	Exhibits 14 and 15?
	23	A Well, today I know of the existence of the
	24	Michelson report and a letter from Mr. Knox, and that
	25	sort of thing, but I have not studied them .
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1	Frederick 360
2	One intent there was not to clutter up my mind
3	with what I have learned since then because people
4	keep asking me what I knew before the accident, so I
5	am having a great deal of difficulty sorting what I
6	used to know and what I know now. I am trying to remain
7	objective.
8	Q You referred to a letter from Mr. Knox.
9	A I am not sure that is the right name.
10	Q That was a letter from what organization
11	to what organization?
12	A I saw a drawing of the pressurizer having some
13	manometer effect of the pressurizer. I don't know who
14	did that.
15	Q I am showing you a drawing which has
16	previously been marked and attached to the Dunn
17	Deposition as Exhibit 38. Is that the drawing?
18	A Yes, that is the drawing.
19	Q Let me advise you that that drawing is
20	attached to a memorandum written by a Mr. Thomas Novak
21	in January of 1978. Had you heard reference to the
22	Novak memorandum before today?
23	A Yes. That is what I was just referring to. I
24	got the man's name wrong.
25	Q Had you heard reference to the Novak

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2 memorandum and his analysis of the loop seal manometer 3 effect before the 28th?

4 A No.

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5 Q Have you learned since the 28th that anyone here was aware of that analysis before the 28th? 6 7 A No. The first time I heard that was in Washington 8 during the President's Commission hearings in Washington. 9 Q And I think I covered this, but let me just make sure. Did you say that you, as of today, you know 10 11 of no one here who knew about the Michelson analysis 12 before the 28th?

13 A That's right.

14 Q Have you ever tied Mr. Floyd's memoranda, 15 which we have marked as Deposition Exhibits 14 and 15, 16 even since the accident up to today, to any source of 17 information?

18 A No.

19 Q Do you know anybody who has, other than
20 Mr. Floyd himself -- in other words, anybody who knows
21 where Mr. Floyd got the information that led him to
22 write these two memoranda, Nos. 14 and 15?
23 A No.
24 O Have you ever heard of a man named Creswell

24 Q Have you ever heard of a man named Creswell 25 up to the 28th?

1		Frederick 362	
2	A	Not before the 28th, no.	
3		Q You have heard of him since?	
4	A	I met him during an investigation with the NRC,	
5	yes.		
6		Q What do you understand his connection with	n
7	all o	f this is?	
8	A	He is an investigator.	
9		Q Did he interview you?	
10	A	Yes.	
11		Q He did?	
12	A .	Yes.	
13		Q One of the I&E interviews?	
14	A	Yes.	
15		Q Have you ever heard his name in conjunction	on
16	with	any analysis of pressurizer level going high and	
17	RC pr	essure going low before the 28th?	
18	A	No.	
19		Q And you had never heard of a Mr. Dunn	
20	befor	e the 28th, is that correct, Bert Dunn, an	
21	engin	eer at Babcock & Wilcox?	
22	A	No. I don't think it would be unusual that I	
23	would	in't have heard these people's names in conjuncti	on
24	with	an analysis or something. People don't usually	
25	sign	these things.	

	1	Frederick 363
	2	Q There is no suggestion that you should know
	3	about them. The question is simply did you, and I take
	4	it the answer is no, in each case?
	5	A Yes.
	6	Q When did you first realize on the 28th, you
	7	personally, that you were in a situation where you
	8	might or probably did have core uncovery?
	9	A When did I realize that?
1	10	Q Yes, the first time.
1	11	A I don't know.
1	2	Q Was it in the morning?
1	13	A I don't know when I realized that. As I said,
1	4	I have a great deal of problem recalling thought pro-
1	5	cesses and things during the day, let alone times. It
J	6	was just too confusing.
1	17	Q Let me try to take this time frame up with
1	18	you. Were you aware at the time the block valves were
1	9	closed that the PORV I should use the singular, the
2	20	block valve were you aware that it was being closed
1	21	when it was closed, or did you only discover that
2	22	afterward?
2	23	A I think I was aware of it.
1	24	Q You are not sure?
2	25	A I seem to remember, but it could be just an
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 364
2	assumption through all these testimonies. I may have,
3	I may not have been. I don't know.
4	Q Is it possible to separate the time from
5	the beginning of the transient up to the closing of
6	the block valve, and then ask the question did anyone
7	seem to be aware during that period of the possibility
8	that the core was uncovered?
9	A I don't remember it being expressed.
10	expressed.
	Q Have you ever had any training with
11	respect to how long it would take radiation alarms
12	in the containment to respond to water radiation from
13	water being released into the containment by way of
14	a small break? I don't mean a small break in the narrow
15	sense which is defined in Emergency Procedure 2202; I
16	just mean a small leak.
17	A During the training on radiation monitors, we
18	do discuss response time of the monitor, but not the
19	migration of radiation from its source to the monitor,
20	so total response time is not something we discuss.
21	Q Did you have any sense in your own mind,
22	any impression of what amount of time would be in-
23	volved, say, from the time you ruptured a disc, for
24	instance, on your quench tank and started spilling
25	your primary coolant into the containment, how long

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1	Frederick 365
2	it would be from the time that occurred until the
3	time you got a radiation alarm?
4	A I don't remember thinking about it or trying
5	to figure it out.
6	Q Do you have an impression how long it
7	would be?
8	A No.
9	Q Who is the keeper of the memo book that
10	you have referred to in the control room? Under whose
11	control is that book, Mr. Floyd's?
12	A By control, you mean?
13	Q Sorebody has, ultimately, responsibility for
14	seeing that the appropriate things are put in the book,
15	to see it is kept up to date, to see it doesn't
16	disappear, that sort of thing. Whose responsibility
17	is that?
18	A I don't know. I would imagine it is Mr. Floyd's
19	responsibility to write the memos, and the Operations
20	Department secretary to put them in the book, but I
21	don't know who audits it or even if it is audited. I
22	don't know. I believe there are several copies of it,
23	though, at least two.
24	Q Is there more than one copy in the control
25	room?

	1	Frederick 366
	2	A No.
	3	Q Where is the other copy?
	4	A According to this distribution list, there is
	5	one in the control room; there is another operations
	6	memo book somewhere; and there is a copy kept by
	7	Penny Shofield, whoever she is.
	8	Q You don't know who she is?
	9	A She is one of the clerical people.
	10	Q You remember you referred yesterday to
	11	the fact that the steam generator was showing 10, 11,
'	12	12 inches of water, when in fact you learned later it
	13	was dry?
	14	A Yes.
	15	Q That was one of the conflicting symptoms
	16	we talked about?
	17	A Conflicting when you look back on it. To us
	18	it indicated that there was water in the generator.
	19	Q It wasn't conflicting at the time?
	20	A It was not a conflicting indication, it was an
	21	erroneous indication.
	22	Q Do you know what the hot leg temperature
	23	was at that point?
	24	A No, I don't.
	25	Q Do you remember whether you went to see

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1	Frederick 367
2	what the hot leg temperature was at that point?
3	A No, I don't.
4	Q How about the cold leg temperature?
5	A No. I was, since I don't know what time you are
6	talking about, you are probably talking about 11 minutes,
7	somewhere in there.
8	Q 11 inches of water.
9	A I was engaged in trying to find out whether the
10	emergency actuation system was operating for part of
11	the time, and part of the time I was responding to the
12	increase in pressurizer level, and I suppose I was
13	monitoring other things at the same time, trying to
14	read the alarms, et cetera. Fred Scheimann somewhere
15	along the line took the corner of the panel where
16	pressurizer level, pressurizer temperature, RC tempera-
17	tures are, and it was his job to call out those
18	parameters so that we each wouldn't have to go over
19	and look at it.
20	Again, there was a lot of communications involved
21	here for any given drill.
22	Craig was trying to inform us what he was doing
23 24	with feedwater. I was informing everybody what I was
24	doing with high-pressure injection, and we were feeding
20	back and forth to each other the parameters that were

1	Frederick 368
2	involved, what we ware doing. I don't know that I
3	looked at the temperatures personally or I just listened
4	to Fred saying, "It is coming down or going up," whatavar
5	it was.
6	Q If at that point you had an opportunity to
7	look at the hot leg and cold leg temperatures and you
8	had seen that they were identical, what would that
9	have meant to you?
10	A You are saying they were identical at that 8 or
11	ll-minute point, somewhere in there? It would mean
12	that there was no heat transfer through the steam
13	generators.
14	Q What would that mean, no heat transfer?
15	A There is no removal of heat from the primary
16	system to the secondary system.
17	Q If you were at the control panel where you
18 19	are working with HPI, manipulating HPI, can you see
	the reactor coolant temperature indications?
20 21	A It is only a few steps away. I would be per-
22	fectly willing to take you up and give you a 15-minute
23	briefing on the control room. You might be able to
23	see a lot more of this.
25	MR. ROCKWELL: Is that something that can
20	be worked out on that short notice?
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 369
2	MR. YUSPEH: We can do it right now.
3	(Discussion held off the record.)
4	Q I asked you, I think, but I think we went
5	over the records this morning, had you ever heard
6	of a transient that occurred on September 24, 1977
7	at Davis Besse 1 in Toledo, Ohio, before the accident
8	at Three Mile Island?
9	A Well, I can't recall that specific incident.
10	Q Had you ever heard of a transient which
11	involved a failed open PORV I am describing that
12	transient now, the one on the 24th a failed open
13	PORV, temporary loss of all feedwater, and a departure,
14	a situation where pressurizer level went high and
15	reactor coolant pressure went low, and a termination
16	of the high-pressure injection?
17	A No, I don't remember that discussion or having
18	read that report or anything like that.
19	Q Do you remember having heard reference to
20	any incident like that, whether or not you knew it was
21	at Davis-Besse?
22	A No, I don't remember.
23	Q You indicated that in the memo book, there
24	are certain LERs or all LERs?
25	A I said I thought there were some LERs or comments

1 Frederick 370 2 about LER's in there, but I don't know for sure that 3 there are. 4 Q So that in some cases -- I know that this 5 is to the best of your recollection -- but in some cases 6 it might be an actual LER, and in other cases, it might 7 be someone's analysis of an LER or an analysis of a 8 particular transient? 9 A Maybe not included in the memo book. You may 10 receive instruction to read a given LER or attend a 11 training session where they are going to discuss them 12 or during a training week, you may be directed to read 13 20 or 30 of them, just to familiarize yourself with 14 other problems, but if I said they were in the operating 15 memo book, I was probably wrong because I had an 16 opportunity to look through it this morning. I didn't 17 see any there. 18 0 Is there a place where all LERs for plants 19 with a B&W nuclear steam system are maintained? 20 I don't know. A 21 Q Are you familiar with the difference between 22 an LER and an LER summary? 23 A No. 24 Q To the best of your knowledge, when you 25 see one, what do you see, a summary, or do you see the

371 2 full LER, or would you be able to tell? 3 I wouldn't be able to tell. I don't know the A 4 difference. Sometimes the instructor in training will 5 spend some time in studying them, and then he summarizes 6 them for you, whichever ones he thinks are important. 7 Q Had B&W gone through the procedure that 8 we reviewed yesterday for identifying a failed open 9 PORV during training at B&W? 10 A I don't know. I don't remember. 11 0 To the best of your recollection, you 12 don't remember any word ever coming from B&W that 13 they have had a failure history, failure with respect 14 to failing open, of the PORV, and that that was some-15 thing that operators should be particularly alert to? 16 A Like I said, it is hard to remember whether I 17 knew that before or after the accident. It has been 18 hammered pretty hard since the accident. I don't 19 know whether I knew it before the accident. 20 Q You don't remember anything being brought 21 to your attention about the PORV having some history 22 of unreliability? 23 I don't remember specifically that, no. A 24 Q We have spent considerable time discussing 25 the question of going solid and your understanding of

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2 the implications of going solid, and your understanding 3 of why you took the actions you took.

4 A Yes.

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Q In focusing on pressurizer level.
Can you guide me to any materials from B&W which
reflect those concerns, or is most of it the product of
oral discussion?

9 The problems with going solid were kind of A brushed over in the simulator that I can remember be-10 11 cause several times we would go solid by making 12 mistakes with operating the integrated control system 13 manually, but the simulation breaks down whenever the 14 pressurizer goes solid, so whenever that happened, we 15 would have to start over again because there was no 16 way for the computer to understand what was happening. 17 I suppose it wasn't programmed that way. So I suppose 18 there should have been a conclusion made there that the 19 plant can go solid, why aren't we analyzing this; but 20 normally they wouldn't carry that any further. Normally 21 I never did.

Q Did you get guidance at the B&W training program about why you should not go solid? A That is what I am saying. It was brushed over, and it was emphasized that you shouldn't, but I am not

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sure -- well, I really can't recall ever having been instructed on the results of going solid and how it would affect the pressurizer relief values and how it would affect all of your operator indications. I don't think we ever discussed that. I do remember it being emphasized that you shouldn't go solid.

8 0 Just in the course of general training, 9 it would be the statement that you should not go solid? 10 A Well, specifically in the transient that we would 11 most of the times impose on ourselves where we did 12 accidentally cause the pressurizer to go solid, we would 13 be, like I say, the training would just break down at 14 that point, and the emphasis was, "Don't do that." 15 The operators, I mean the trainers, would 16 be saying -- "You are going solid. You are going solid. 17 Turn it around." And you would go solid, and that would

18 be the end of it.

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19 Q Did they tell you why they were concerned 20 in that informal exchange that you had in the simulator? 21 A Because the simulator couldn't simulate that 22 condition.

Q I mean in the real world.
24 . That is how it sums out.

A That is how it came out.

Q Did they tell you why in the real world

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 374
2	they weren't concerned about going solid?
3	A No. Like I say, I don't remember that was being
4	discussed.
5	Q The reasons that you had for not wanting
6	to go solid were pulled out from the "Bases" in the
7	tech specs. Do you ever remember them addressing the
8	issues spelled out in the "Bases" and discussing them
9	relating to the question of going solid?
10	A No, not really, no.
11	Q Setting aside the question of their not
12	wanting you to go solid because it fouled up the simu-
13	lation, do you remember any other discussion about going
14	solid at Babcock & Wilcox?
15	A No.
16	Q Any other context?
17	A No.
18	Q Reaching way back to the first day of
19	your deposition, I think we were on a line of inquiry
20	in which you had pulled the steam table out of the
21	drawer. Remember you were telling me that you had
22	pulled the steam table out of the drawer because there .
23	happened to be one in the control room?
24	A Yes.
25	Q And you pulled it for reference?
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 375	
2	A Yes.	
3	Q Let's go back and pick up that line of	
4	inquiry. Why was it that you pulled the steam table	
5	out?	
6	A I don't remember.	
7	Q Why was it being referred to at that point	?
8	A I think it was because we were approaching the	
9	net positive suction head limit for the reactor coolan	t
10	pumps. We were trying to evaluate whether or not	
11	cavitation was taking place, and that is why we	
12	were getting the high vibration readings and the flow	
13	degradation.	
14	Q So you were concerned that you were going	
15	to saturation and seeing some steam voids?	
16	A At the suction pump, yes.	
17	Q And you were referring to that table to	
18	see whether the data on your control board in compariso	n
19	to the steam table would show that you were in	
20	saturation condition?	
21	A Yes.	
22	Q And what did you discover?	
23	A We discovered that there was	
24	a possibility that that was causing the alarm condition	ns
25	on the pumps. I believe that entered into our decision	n

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1	Frederick 376
2	to secure the reactor coolant pump.
3	Q So you found that you were either extremely
4	close, or you were in fact in saturation?
5	A Yes. We were not discussing saturation
6	conditions. We were discussing net positive suction,
7	which, in effect, was the same thing.
8	Q Would that have been done before the first
9	RC pump was secured?
10	A I don't know for sure whether it was while we
11	were securing the first two and waiting for the second
12	two or before the first; I don't know.
13	Q Well, assuming that the first securing was
14	done at 73 minutes and the second was at 100 minutes,
15	the discussion would have been somewhere along in
16	that time frame?
17	A Yes, I think so.
18	Q Did anyone ever tie together the possi-
19	bility that you were in saturation conditions or
20	the fact that you were in saturation or near saturation
21	and the observed level of pressurizer, connect those
22	two?
23	A In what manner?
24	Q Well, in the manner that they ultimately
25	worked, namely, that saturation conditions in the core
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 377
2	were the cause of the observed pressurizer level?
3	A No, I don't think so.
4	Q You referred on the first day to, I believe,
5	some sort of a log or chart that you maintained for
6	training that you were required to do for startups.
7	I am losing my terminology.
8	A On the job training?
9	Q Yes.
10	A Yes.
11	Q Are your refresher courses which you take
12	every six weeks recorded in that same record? Is
13	there some, in other words, some record from your
14	refresher courses of what you have done, what topics
15	you have covered?
16	A The operators don't make any; the Training
17	Department does.
18	Q Is there a pretty complete record in the
19	Training Department of what you have covered?
20	A Yes.
21	Q When the transient initiated at around
22	four o'clock on the 28th, you and Faust and Scheimann
23	were in the control room, correct?
24	A No, Fred was not in the control room. Fred was
25	in the turbine building basement.

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1	Frederick 378
	Frederick 378
2	Q Zewe was in the office in the back of
3	the control room?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And Zewe comes out pretty quickly as the
6	transient initiates, correct?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Zewe retains control in terms of giving
9	direction until when? I am not so much interested in
10	time, but in terms of who took over from him.
11	Maybe I should pose the question differently.
12	Was it ever your perception that the decision-making
13	authority changed from Zewe to someone else?
14	A Yes, later on in the day.
15	Q And give e just your best estimate as to
16	when and to whom the authority passed.
17	A Well, for a brief time when Bill had to leave
18	the room, Fred Schelmann, the foreman, was in charge,
19	and I believe Bill came back and stayed the rest of the
20	time. When all the senior company personnel started
21	arriving and B&W ergineers and all that, I believe that
22	caucus of engineers and supervisory personnel began
23	making decisions, and Bill bacame he was still the
24	supervisor, but he was reacting to the best analysis
25	that was available through the engineers that were

Frederick

2 caucusing.

In other words, we were basing our actions on the instructions we received from Bill, and Bill was basing his instructions on the analysis that he receives from that caucus. The instruction came from the supervisory people back in the office.

8 O To your knowledge, before the 28th, had 9 there been any established procedure for decisionmaking in the case of an emergency of this type -- of 10 11 course nobody anticipated an emergency of this type? 12 A Yes, there is an emergency plan for structure of decision-making and who is in charge, depending on 13 who is present. That is called the Three Mile Island 14 15 Emergency Plan. You have a copy of it.

16 Q Did it appear to you that there was a 17 single person who had ultimate responsibility in that 18 control room after people started coming in for the 19 decisions being made, and if so, who was that? 20 A You mean ultimate authority for both radiation 21 emergency and the operation of the plant? 22 Q No, I am talking about the operation of the plant.

A I believe Gary Miller, after he had established
 his group in the back room there, did control the
 emergency in the plant and the radiation emergency.

Although he didn't perform all the jobs, he was to be informed of every major development in both emergencies. So I would have to say that he was the on-site person who was ultimately responsible in both emergencies.
Q Up to the time that he came, was someone taking ultimate personal responsibility for decisions

8 that were being made, one person?

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9 A I can only say that the only person I was taking
10 instructions from was Bill Zewe.

11 Q Was the responsibility essentially assumed 12 by a committee acting as a committee, or did it continue 13 to be exercised by one individual consulting with a 14 committee?

A I don't know. I didn't really analyze the chain of command that was present. I only responded to what Bill told me to do. We made a point of limiting our interface only to Bill so that we wouldn't have conflicting instructions or too many operations going on at the same time.

I believe Bill instructed us in that direction.
He said, "Take orders from me, and that is it. Take
orders from me, and that is it."

Q During the early hours of the transient, did you ever disagree with any instructions that you

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were being given in terms of operating the plant? 2 Well, there were several instructions or con-3 A clusions from these caucuses that I didn't agree with 4 or couldn't justify in my own mind, but I wasn't in a 5 position that I had an alternate solution that I 6 considered would be better. In other words, if they 7 say "Secure reactor coolant pump," and I say, "I don't 8 9 think that is a good idea," but I don't have an alternative solution, I can't not do what they tell me to do. 10 Although I felt uncomfortable with stopping the pumps, 11 12 I saw no alternative at that time.

13 Q So you were uncomfortable about securing 14 the reactor coolant pumps?

15 Yes. There was at least one occasion where I A wanted to manually initiate high-pressure injection 16 17 and just let it blow into the system because I felt 18 that we were not maintaining system pressure-temperature 19 relationships properly, and we had actually limited 20 control over the system, that we should put it back in automatic and let the design considerations put it 21 22 back on a stable course.

At one time we did manually initiate highto pressure injection without the instructions from the caucus because information wasn't coming out fast

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Frederick

2 enough, and we decided -- by "we," I mean Bill Zewe,
3 Craig and myself -- decided to initiate high-pressure
4 injection.

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5 Now, during the course of things, it was secured 6 again later on, so I really don't remember all the 7 decision-making processes, but I remember trying to 8 do some thinking on my own, and several times it would 9 come up in conflict with what they were going to do, 10 but like I say, not having the objectivity that they 11 had, I felt I couldn't countermand their orders unless 12 I had some positive action to take that was different 13 from theirs. Since I didn't know what to do, I had 14 to rely on the engineers and senior people to come up 15 with ideas that I didn't have.

Q What if you run into a situation where you, as an NRC-licensed operator in the control room; someone senior to you in terms of management from Met Ed comes in who does not have a license, and instructs you to do something which you disagree with -- let's take it out of the context, for the moment, of the 28th. What happens at that point?

A It happens fairly frequently that you will have
 a chemistry supervisor or a maintenance person that
 wants you to change one of the primaries or secure a

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 system or start up a system so they can have it tested 3 or so they can falfill whatever job they have to do 4 for that day, and if you see there is no problem doing 5 that, you can go ahead and do it. If you don't want to 6 do it, you just tell them that you are not going to do 7 it, and generally the authority of the control room 8 is pretty well respected by the company personnel. 9 There have been arguments that for instance a super-10 visor may come in and say, "We would like to secure 11 this particular unit so we can draw a sample on it," 12 or something like that, and you would say, "Well, the 13 plant conditions don't warrant us doing that at this 14 time," and they might go and get all irate and yell 15 at the supervisor, but that is a thing that you try 16 to get them away and let the plant supervisor determine 17 whether we are going to alter plant conditions to do 18 that job, and my decision to do it can be altered by 19 the shift supervisor if he decided he wanted to do it. 20 I would respect the orders of the shift supervisor to 21 change a system condition, so long as I thought it was 22 st! 1 within the safe boundaries of operation.

I have never been asked to do anything that was contrary to technical specifications by any member of supervision.

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1 Frederick 384 2 Q Did you ever have any kind of a conflict 3 of that sort on the 28th, refusing to do something 4 because you felt it was inappropriate? 5 A Like I said, the discussions that we had at 6 the time, of securing the reactor coolant pumps and 7 when I wanted to initiate high-pressure injection, 8 there were arguments, and there were obvious disagree-9 ments at those points, but you don't argue and then 10 become stubborn on the point that you are rying to 11 maintain; you have to remain open to whatever information 12 there is and go with what seems to be right, rather 13 than what you want to do. 14 0 When you say there was an argument with 15 respect to initiation of high-pressure injection, who 16 was involved in that discussion or argument? 17 A I don't know. 18 Q Were you one of the people involved in 19 the discussion? 20 A I don't even remember what time of the day it 21 was or what the plant conditions were at the time. I 22 remember that the four of us on the panel had not 23 received information from the engineering group for 24 some time, and we were not sure that the plant was 25 in safe condition, and it was our group opinion that

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1	Frederick 385
2	we should initiate high-pressure injection, and just
3	from what we could see on the panel, okay, so we
4	wanted to get that proposal into the engineering
5	group there, and it seemed too long before the answer
6	came back, so we initiated it on our own. That consti-
7	tuted a disagreement, I guess, what you are talking
8	about. We hadn't received instructions to do it, but
9	we did it anyway because we felt it was moving in a
10	safe direction, but later on they convinced either us
11	or Bill, the argument came back; it seemed logical to
12	secure it again, so we did.
13	Q You say there were four of you on the panel?
14	A I believe so. There were at least four of us.
15	Q Who?
16	A Craig Faust, myself, Fred Scheimann and Bill Zawe.
17	Q When was the shift finally changed that
18	day on the 28th?
19	The shift was augmented by extra people fairly
20	poon, I think somewhere around 5:20 or 6:00.
21	Q Were you formally relieved at some point?
22	A In the afternoon, around 3.30 or 4:00, I was
23	formally relieved, yes, but I had given up responsi-
24	bilities for certain panels to other licensed operators
25	during the Cay.

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We had six or seven operators on the panel. We had six or seven operators on the panel. When new operators arrived that day, other than the four of you that had been there at the time of the transient, what was done when they arrived? Normally there would be a shift change, which has a formal procedure.

8 A Yes. We didn't do that. We assigned the incoming 9 operators with specific duties or parameters to monitor, 10 and they were to ensure that the systems were in full 11 operating condition and monitor any changes, and relay 12 them back to myself and Fred and the foreman, so 13 that we could keep a closer watch on all the systems 14 than just one or two people could do.

We had one man assigned to beeping a log, and that was his only duty. So we have as people came in, we would assign them specific responsibilities rather than turn over the shift as we normally do.

19 Q Were you involved in briefing people as 20 they came in as to the current conditions of the plant 21 as of the time of their arrival?

22 A No.

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23 Q Who would have done that, or did anyone 24 do that?

25 A I don't know that any individual was assigned

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2 that responsibility. The operators that came in to 3 take control of a given panel would ask enough ques-4 tions to be able to tell what they were supposed to do.

5 A person who is coming in to monitor the electrical 6 panel would be told to make sure all the breakers are 7 closed and all the voltages were normal. He might not 8 even be briefed any more than that.

9 A person coming in on the ventilation panel 10 may be tasked with verifying that all the equipment 11 was in the ES condition.

So that briefings were probably pretty short.
Q Have you ever had any contact with B&W
design engineers in terms of discussion or training
of plant operations, transients, that sort of thing?
A I think so, yes, down at B&W simulator, some of
the instruction that discusses safety analysis and
safeguard systems and RPS, they are B&W engineers.

19 Q Outside the context of those lectures and 20 courses at B&W, have you had any contact with B&W 21 engineers in terms of a discussion about how the plant 22 works?

A Informal discussions on shift. There are
 occasionally, in terms of startup procedures, there
 were B&W engineers around, and occasionally we would

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	1	Frederick 388
	2	ask them a question or something like that. Yes. I
	3	don't remember any specifics.
10	4	Q During startup, were those people who were
(5	basically in residence here working during startup?
	6	A Yes.
	7	Q Have you ever had a B&W design engineer
	8	come in and just ask you and pump you about the system
	9	that he designed and ask you what your understanding
	10	of it is, and do you have a chance to ask him questions
	11	about how they designed it? Has that ever happened?
	12	A I don't know. Sometimes the people you are
	13	talking to, you don't even know who they are.
	14	Q Are you a member of the union?
	15	A I was at the time.
	16	Q You are not now?
	17	A Right.
	18	Q Is there any particular reason?
	19	A I have a job as a training instructor. It is a
	20	non-union position.
6	21	Q What is the name of the union to which you
C	22	belonged at the time of the accident?
	23	A It is the International Brotherhood of Electrical
	24	Workers, Local 563.
	25	Q Does Local 563 apply just to Three Mile

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	Frederick 389
2	Island, or does it apply more broadly in this region?
3	A Members also of the Crawford Generating Station
4	a little bit north of here. It is not a nuclear plant.
5	Q How long had you been a member of that
6	union up until the time you left it just recently?
7	A Since I started working in Met Ed, 1973.
8	Q Did you have regular union meetings?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Did the union become involved at all in
11	questions involving the operations, safety of the plant,
12	generally, or did it confine itself primarily to very
13	specific collective bargaining types of issues, to the
14	best of your knowledge?
15	A It was mostly concerned with labor relations,
16	and it did occasionally get involved in work-related
17	safety problems, OSHA regulations, that sort of thing,
18	but not nuclear plant safety analysis. I don't think
19	they became involved in that.
20	Q What kind of OSHA concerns would they have?
21	A You know, hard hats, safety glasses, hard steel-
22	toed shoes, proper attire at work, that sort of thing.
23	They would be involved in problems where a man had
24	broken a safety rule, or they may be involved in a
25	condition where they felt that the company wasn't

Frederick

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2 providing proper safety equipment during a certain job 3 or the right type of ladder or the right type of elec-4 trical insulating device, that sort of thing. They may 5 have to go to the company and discuss a problem of 6 that nature.

Q Did the union ever become involved with questions of radiation health before the accident? A The union members that are health physics personnel -- they are union members, and they -- I don't know to what extent they were involved.

12 Q Let me put it this way: Was the subject 13 of radiation health, the subject of radiation exposure 14 to workers a matter of discussion between the union 15 and the company, and a matter in which the union was 16 expressing an overall position?

17 A There was a union position that a man, an indi-18 vidual person's exposure should be limited as much as 19 possible.

Q What were they doing in that regard? A The man was tasked with keeping track of his own exposure, and if he felt that the company was unduly exposing him to radiation, he could approach the company or the union and demand that he be taken out of that job for a while or spelled by somebody else to limit

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1	Frederick 391
2	his exposure.
3	Q Who tasked the individual with keeping
4	track of his own exposure?
5	A As a general rule of thumb, I am not sure whether
6	that is a company rule or whether the union adopted
7	that from general health physics considerations. I
8	don't know if it is written down anywhere.
9	Q There is no automatic procedure for giving
10	people a written summary of their monthly, quarterly,
11	annual exposure?
12	A The company does that.
13	Q They do?
14	A The company makes those records available for you
15	to have any time you want.
16	Q No, the question is, is it automatically
17	kicked out, whether you ask for it or not, on some
18	periodic basis?
19	A I believe at that time it was published monthly,
20	and whenever you entered a radiation area, you were
21	required to review it. In other words, before you go
22	into a radiation area, you have to establish that
23	you don't have above your limit already or that this
24	entry is going to bring you over your limit.
25	Q Did the union get involved at all in matters

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	1	Frederick 392
	2	of the amount and type of training?
	3	A You mean did the union make demands on the
	4	company to increase the amount of training?
	5	Q Yes, or did they recommend or say that
	6	training ought to be this way or that way? Did it
	7	get involved in the issue of training?
	8	A I don't remember any instances where it did.
	9	It may have, but it has always been my impression
	10	that the company is rather strict on health physics
	11	training.
÷,	12	Q I am not talking about health physics, I
	13	am talking about training in a broad sense.
	14	A They got involved in some discussions about
	15	training, yes. In other words, usually personal-type
	16	problems, if a man was having a problem with a course
	17	and the company was threatening to expel him from
	18	the course, the union would examine the case to see
	19	whether or not the man was being unjustly treated,
	20	something like that.
	21	Q Let's take it out of that context in terms
	22	of a personal problem that may arise, and put it in the
	23	context of overall objectives and overall effectiveness
	24	and focus of training. Would the union ever get in-
	25	volved in those kinds of issues?
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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I can remember that the union would be concerned 2 about the scope of, for instance, an operator's 3 training, you know, if they felt that an auxiliary 4 operator C was being tested on or being required to 5 study, say primary systems for which he would not, 6 he is not really responsible for, then they would step 7 in and question the training and say, "This man should 8 not really be required to be responsible for this yet. 9 That comes later on in his training," and I can 10 remember discussions like that. 11 Q So do I have an accurate understanding 12 that basically the union's involvement in training 13 would be with respect to fairly specific questions 14 that might arise with respect to a particular indi-15 16 vidual? A Yes, or a particular group or point. They don't 17 audit or supervise the content of the training unless 18 they feel that this conflicts with the job classifi-19 cation or something like that. 20 Q I take it you have not seen any union 21 involvement in the very broad sense of overall training 22 objectives in the respect of if the training, for 23 instance, is adequate in connection with the responsi-24 bilities, is there enough of the training, that sort 25

of thing, broad kind of policy considerations? Did 2 you ever see union involvement at that level? 3 I don't know. I don't remember any discussions 4 A like for instance the union coming forward and saying, 5 "The training you are giving this control room operator 6 is not sufficient to put him up for a license exam," 7 something like that, because the training programs 8 that Met Ed has are fairly thorough. 9

10 You really have to know something about what 11 you are talking about to really challenge the training 12 program. Like I say, I don't remember anything like 13 that happening, although it may have.

Were there any broad policy-type concerns 14 0 or discussions between the union and the company with 15 respect to identifying and removing safety concerns? 16 A No. I suppose some of the paragraphs of the 17 contract would be interpreted as the union instructing 18 the union personnel to be conscientious in their job, 19 that sort of thing like that, but that would probably 20 21 be about it.

22 Q Did your training experience -- let's 23 confine it to the training -- did your training 24 specifically address whether the pressurizer level 25 was a measure of water inventory in the core?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 395
2	A That is the way I understood it. It must have
3	come out in training somewhere.
4	Q Is it possible for you to trace back that
5	understanding to some part of the training, specifically?
6	A No, I don't think so.
7	Q Is it your impression that that is the
8	understanding of most of the operators?
9	A Yes, that the pressurizer level is the indica-
10	tion of reactor coolant system inventory, the amount
11	of water in the system, yes.
12	Q Is it your understanding that it is the
13	indication, putting the emphasis on the word "the"?
14	A It is not my understanding now, but it was then.
15	Q. We are talking about your understanding
16	before the accident.
17	A Yes, it was.
18	In other words, if you had a level of water
19	in the pressurizer, you could assume the rest of the
20	system was full up to that point.
21	Q Was that reflected in any of the written
22	materials that were used in the training, or was that
23	again one of those things that were really a subject
24	of discussion but never written down?
25	A I don't remember having seen it written down.
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 396
2	It was just part of my training somewhere.
3	Q Can you distinguish whether that came
4	from training at Met Ed or B&W, or whether it would
5	have come fromt both?
6	A Probably both. The training is closely parallel
7	in both.
8	Q Did you ever see any marked distinction
9	or difference in approach in the training between
10	B&W and Met Ed, or did they fit together in terms of
11	an approach pattern and style quite closely?
12	A Pre ty much the same. They use the same reference
13	material and the same system diagrams, that sort of
14	thing. The lectures are pretty much the same.
15	Q After we are through, if anything in
16	writing comes to mind which connects inventory in
17	the core with pressurizer level, I would appreciate it
18	if you would let us know. We would be interested to
19	know whether that appears in the training materials.
20	A All right.
21	Q We went through, yesterday, conflicting
22	indications, conflicting signals that you had on the
23	28th when we really probably shouldn't have called it
24	a conflicting experience because you pointed out that,
25	for instance, the indication of 10 inches of water in

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	1	Frederick 397
	2	the pressurizer wasn't conflicting
	3	MR. YUSPEH: In the steam generator.
	4	MR. ROCKWELL: Yes.
	5	Q in the steam generator, it wasn't a
	6	conflicting indication, it was a spurious one; it was
	7	wrong, correct?
	8	A Yes.
	9	Q Can you think of any other indications
	10	that either were conflicting, that you had two
	11	sources of information which did not agree with each
ł	12	other, which you normally would have expected to agree
	13	with each other, or a piece of information which in
	14	retrospect was simply wrong? Are there any other
	15	items we should add to that list which we made
	16	yesterday and I can go back and refresh your
	17	recollection, if you want.
	18	A Yes, would you?
	19	Q I had on my list pressurizer level high-
	20	reactor coolant pressure low; PORV position; indicated
	21	level in the OTSG; loss of coolant accident with no
	22	radiation alarms; and emergency feedwater operating,
	23	an indication on the control board that the emergency
	24	feedwater was operating when in fact there was no flow.
	25	A I guess the indications on the reactor coolant
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 398	
2	were not either not correct, or we weren't there	
3	when they were indicated correctly, one or the other.	
4	Like I say, when we went back, the pressure was low,	
5	it was probably indicating the correct pressure, but	
6	we missed the transient because we weren't watching.	
7	I can't really classify that as an incorrect indication	
8	or conflicting; it is just that the capability to	
9	monitor the transient didn't exist.	
10	Q Is there anything else that comes to mind?	
11	A No, I think those are pretty significant right	
12	there.	
13	Q I didn't say they were not significant.	
14	A As far as picking out the big ones, that would	
15	probably be it. I don't recall any others.	
16	Q Let me tell you again that if any others	
17	come to mind after we are through, and you probably	
18	will be reading over your transcript, we would appre-	
19	ciate your letting us know. We would be interested to	
20	know, to have as accurate and complete a picture as	
21	possible of either conflicting or spurious signals	
22	that you all were experiencing in the course of the	
23	transit.	

24 A Okay.

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Q Can you describe to me in broad outline at

2 least initially what you do on a typical shift?
3 A Well, there are two or there were two operators
4 on our shift, myself and Craig. Some of the shifts
5 have three, so they have a different setup.

Eut in any given night you or either the operator were assigned responsibility for operating the plant or you are the operator assigned with taking logs and supervising the switching and tagging, and maintenance that was going on.

So, for instance, if you were the operator that was going to take the panel that night or operate the plant, you would enter the control room and make a tour, walk around and read some of the meters that you thought were important, and establish in your own mind what the status of the plant is.

You would review the log and probably just for 17 that day since the last time you were there -- usually 18 19 it involves just two or three pages that you were to 20 see if any major evolutions or changes have taken place since you were last. Then you talk with the man 21 who you are relieving. He should relate to you 22 anything that is significant, either that is changing 23 or is going to change airing your shift, surveiliance 24 25 procedures he has completed.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

	1	Frederick 400
	2	Q Were these surveillance procedures, would
	3	they be in the log too?
	4	A If they were tech spec surveillances, they should
	5	be logged, yes.
	6	He should have a written list of any kind of
	7	abnormal or unusual or anything that you might think
	8	is noteworthy, which should be written and given to you
	9	at the time of shift relief, so you can look it over
	10	and see if there is anything that you don't understand
	11	about what is going on.
÷	12	Whenever you are satisfied that you understand
	13	the status of the plant, then you relieve the operator
	14	and sign in the book as the operator on duty.
	15	In the procedure for shift relief, it also
	16	includes a review of a large variety of documents,
	17	depending on when the last time was you read the
	18	promedure review book. If you read it the night before,
	19	you wouldn't bother reading it again before you relieve
	20	the guy. You might just take the time during the shift
	21	to see if there is anything new in it. You are
	22	supposed to keep up-to-date on revisions and procedures,
	23	new operating memos, new memos `com any other superin-
	24	tendents, that you are supposed to have read that day,
	25	and check your mailbox to see what is new, training
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

material. I believe the procedure requires that you 2 read those volumes before you relieve a man but, if 3 you acknowledge the fact that you are going to review 4 that stuff during the walk, so that having taken place, 5 during the shift he is responsible for the operation 6 of the plant. In the other case, where you are 7 relieving the person who is taking logs and doing 8 safety tags, the same type of turnover would probably 9 not as extensive take place. - -----10

In other words, he will tell you that his set of logs is complete, that he didn't have any problem, or he would enumerate the problems he did have and point out any of the special readings or difficulties in obtaining readings because of out of service equipment and stuff like that.

He would also tell you what the major systems are he has tagged out for maintenance, and whether or not there are some tags leftover for you to handle on your shift or any outstanding jobs.

21 That man would probably also be involved with 22 operator news, the man who might be doing the 23 surveillance. He would have the paperwork that they 24 need. He would turn over the status of those jobs. 25 So after the relief has taken place, you generally

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Frederick

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2 go through the shift, maintaining the plant condition 3 as existed when you took over, unless the supervisor 4 comes out and tells you to change things for one reason 5 or another. That is about it.

6 Q During the shift does the operator who has 7 the control of the plant do any status checks to see 8 whether particular instruments or switches whatever 9 are in the position that they are supposed to be in? 10 A Yes.

11 Q Can you tell me about that.

12 A Well, when you have the responsibility for the 13 panel, basically your whole job is to look at the panel 14 and analyze the condition of the instruments, and 15 through the indications that you could see determine 16 whether the plant is operating normal or abnormally. 17 That is basically what you are doing.

18 The specific valve lineups and conditions of 10 components that either are running or non-running would 20 be a matter of pretty quick scan of the panel, once you 21 have gotten into the routine of doing it.

But the assumption is that if something is abnormal due to maintenance or due to surveillance procedures or something like that, there will be a tag on that piece of equipment, explaining why it is not

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 403
2	in its normal position.
3	I guess what you should be looking for is an under-
4	standing how the out of service equipment affects the
5	ability to operate the plant normally and to respond to
6	emergency.
7	For instance, during the morning before the
8	accident I was aware of a condition where the pres-
9	surizer systems were not on automatic. In other words,
10	the heaters and spray were not on automatic. I was
11	manually controlling them.
12	So I was aware of that abnormality, although there
13	were no tags present, but it was annotated in the turn-
14	over and that is what I had to do to control that system.
15	So that was it may have been considered an
16	abnormal condition, but at least it wasn't in my mind.
17	I had already in my head planned what I would do
18	immediately if there were a reactor trip to that system
19	in fact, it did later on. My first action was to put
20	that system on automatic. So that is the type of
21	thinking and planning that you do while you are
22	analyzing the status of the plant.
23	Q Is there any leaking checklist or procedure

24 where you are referring to some sort of a document and 25 then do a status check on specified systems, valves or

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1	Frederick 404
2	whatever?
3	A Not for a normal shift, no. There are surveil-
4	lance procedures that check system lineups at a given
5	frequency, whether weekly or monthly or whatever, and
6	the assumption is made if those surveillances are
7	current and correct, that it is not necessary to do a
8	valve-by-valve lineup in any given system.
9	Q Was there a surveillance procedure which
10	would have picked up the 12 valves being closed that
11	was performed?
12	A Yes. The surveillance procedure that they ran
13	did stipulate that those valves had to be open. There
14	was a mistake made in that procedure.
15	Q But, after that, was there any procedure
16	for and maybe I am using the word "surveillance"
17	incorrectly was there a procedure for checking the
18	lineup of that valve, the 12 valves, from the control
19	room on a daily or on a 12-hourly basis?
20	A NO.
21	Q And there is no reason it couldn't be done;
22	it just was not the procedure at that time, is that
23	correct?
24	A That's right. We were relying on the surveillance
25	procedure lineup to be correct. That is right.

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Frederick

2 Q Am I accurate in understanding that there 3 is no regular shift procedure for each shift where you 4 pull out essentially a blank checklist and then you 5 start walking around and start checking off that position of a certain number of valves or indicators 6 7 or whatever there is a checklist for some system, but 8 the emergency feedwater is not one of them; it was not 9 one of them at the time?

10 A That's right.

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11 Q How much of your time on shift is devoted 12 to actually monitoring the systems that are there, 13 assuming you are the one that is operating the plant, 14 and how much of it is devoted to reviewing materials, 15 whether it be the log or materials that all operators 16 are supposed to review and check off on? Is it 17 possible to give me any kind of very rough division of 18 time?

19 A I think it would be hard to determine how much 20 time you are actually looking at the panel. You are 21 aware of changes in the system without having to 22 constantly stare at the meters, in other words. 23 Q I don't mean --

24 A You don't have to scan.

25

Q You aren't physically scanning, but the

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 time devoted to essentially focusing on what is 3 happening now.

4 A Yes.

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5 Q In the plant, as opposed to focusing on 6 catching up on reading or reveiwing a procedure that you 7 may have to know some day.

8 A The manner in which you review those procedures 9 is kind of built around how you are going to monitor 10 the plant. In other words, you put your chair right 11 up at the control panel, and you face the control panel, 12 and every few sentences you look up and scan the panel. 13 That is how you do it.

14 You don't take a book and go sit in the corner of 15 the room and study it. You have to review material 16 like that while you are monitoring the panel.

Any kind of heavy studying that you might want to get involved in, you would save for the night you are on switching and tagging, the other man on the shift, and get into hard studying where you don't have to monitor the panels.

22 So that there is certainly things you would read 23 at the panel, and other things you would save for 24 later on.

25

Q If you are on switching and tagging for a

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1	Frederick 407
2	particular shift, you come in and somebody tells you
3	whatever changes have been made in switching and
4	tagging since you were on the last shift or you look
5	at the log and find out. What do you do then during the
6	shift when you are on switching and tagging?
7	A Well, like I say, you have logs to keep.
8	Q And the logs are what?
9	A Well, there are technical specifications,
10	surveillance lists associated with each limited condi-
11	tion.
	the transfer these surveillances that

In order to document these surveillances that have taken place, that operator has to take a tour of the control room, take readings, and perform tests to satisfy those requirements. He keeps track of them on a shift log, which he fills out once every hour.

He also has another set of readings, which just generally lists the conditions of the plant, by reading just about all the meters in the room, and between the computer printout that he draws from the computer and the manual readings that he takes, we get just about every reading in the control room once per shift.
Q Would that have picked up the 12 valves is

24 closed or is that the procedure which didn't include it?
25 A That didn't include it.

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1 408 2 0 Do you know -- are you aware of why valves 3 on the auxiliary feedwater would not be included on 4 that log? Would that go back, for instance, to the 5 way they are defined in the tech spec? 6 A Well, as I remember the way the feedwater is 7 defined, it is not a safeguard system, and it is merely 8 an operability requirement. In general it says the 9 emergency feedwater system will be capable of performing 10 its designed function in those modes, so that that 11 general requirement includes that 12 valve be open, 12 but it doesn't specifically include that as a check on 13 the system. 14 We do perform a surveillance that verifies within 15 the frequency specified in the tech spec that the 16 system is operable. That is what we did a few days 17 before the accident. 18 So I guess the feeling was we were fulfilling the 19 requirement that the system would really work, but 20 there wasn't any, I guess, checks and balances to insure 21 if you made a mistake on the procedure, you would pick 22 it up somewhere else. That is probably where the 23 system fails. 24 I guess what I was wondering is the way in 0 25

which a system does or does not get onto this

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surveillance procedure, that the switching and trgging 2 man does on a particular shift, does that really come 3 out the way the particular system is defined in the 4 tech spec? In other words, if it is defined as one 5 kind of a system in a tech spec, it goes into the 6 surveillance procedure, and if it is defined in another 7 way, it doesn't. For instance, if the auxiliary feed 8 had been defined as a safety system, is it your impres-9 sion that then it would have been on that surveillance 10 11 procedure?

12 A No, not necessarily. The high pressure injection 13 system was a safeguard system. We do not do a valve 14 lineup on that every shift.

15 Q I guess what I am driving at is you know
16 what the logic is for saying that certain valve lineups
17 are checked on a shift, every shift basis, and some are
18 not? How are those distinctions made?

19 A I don't know. I suppose an inadequacy would 20 have to be discovered, for instance, in a surveillance 21 procedure that required that the particular valve 22 would have to be checked every shift, which we did 23 with some of the decay heat valves, which we would 24 check that they are closed when the breakers are open. 25 We discovered there were problems. Like now everybody

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

	1	Frederick 410
	2	has realized that the 12 valves are a problem, and I
	3	am sure that is on everybody's surveillance list.
	4	That is how it happens. You learn through your mistakes,
	5	I guess.
	6	But I don't believe it was specifically excluded.
	7	It just hadn't been considered as being a source of
	8	the problem.
	9	Q Well, let me ask you this. Was the surveil-
	10	lance list that the switching and tagging man would
	11	refer to at every shift that was generated only by
1	12	experiencing a problem with a particular system or were
	13	there some things on there, regardless of whether they
	14	were experiencing problems?
	15	A Some things were on there regardless because they
	16	were mentioned in the tech specs.
	17	Q And what kind of classification or level
	18	of importance do they have to have in the tech spec in
	19	order to get onto that list; do you know that?
	20	A No, I don't. They were constantly being revised.
	21	They were being added to. There was a larger volume of
	22	things that you had to check. I guess we didn't catch
	23	that one soon enough.
	24 .	Q Who would make those decisions as to what
	25	was going into the procedure that the switching and
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 tagging man follows on a shift basis? A I don't know what the normal development is. It 3 probably comes from LER's and safety analysis letters 4 5 and things like that. But that is the same with any procedure. I could suggest a change if I wanted. 6 Q That probably then goes through PORC? 7 A Yes. The shift and daily log is not just a log 8 sheet. It is a procedure. 9 Q Do you see any information flowing into 10 Met Edison on a regular basis from B&W, information 11 that you can identify as having come from B&W? 12 A No, I am not on that chain, I think. I see the 13 14 results of that correspondence. That is about it. Q Whether or not you see it on a regular 15 basis, are you aware of any systematic communication 16 from B&W to Met Ed with respect to the nuclear steam 17 18 supply? 19 A Yes. Q What form would that regular communication 20 21 take? Well, there was a resident B&W engineer. 22 A 23 Q Lee Rogers? Lee Rogers, yes, but I saw Stan more than Lee. 24 A Q What is Stan's last name? 25

1	Frederick 412
2	A I think it is Maingi.
3	Q In what connection and in what context would
4	you see Maingi?
5	A Well, I don't really know what his job is. He
6	seemed to be rather knowledgeable in all aspects of the
7	NSSS. If you asked him a question, he would answer it
8	or be able to steer you toward a reference.
9	As far as questions about ICS response, questions
10	you might have about how the system works, parameters
11	and how they were arrived at and things like that.
12	The only communications I was referring to is that if
13	you asked, if you have a question about how the system
14	works or any procedures or something like that, you
15	could ask B&W and they would try to answer it.
16	You could either go to Stan or you could call down
17	to the Training Department in Lynchburg, where we have
18	a number up there, and just talk to the instructor.
19	Q Did you ever have occasion to do that,
20	to make a call yourself down to the Training Department
21	in Lynchburg?
22	A I don't believe I ever did, not before the acci-
23	dent. I know people that did it routinely and argu-
24 -	ments and that sort of thing.
25	Q Other than the personal contact that you

Frederick 1 have through someone like Stan Maingi, were you aware 2 of any other regular exchanges of information coming 3 from B&W? 4 A Well, I guess I wasn't involved in it, but I know 5 that the operations supervisory people were, in the 6 same way I was; asking questions and getting answers. 7 I am sure they had some interchange through letters and 8 other telephone communications, but I don't know who 9 they were talking to or in what context they were 10 11 discussing things. What about channels of information from 12 0 other vendors, other than B&W? Were you aware of any 13 systematic channels of information, other than personal 14 15 contacts? We had Westinghouse resident engineers. We had 16 A other vendors that supplied pumps or valves that would 17 come in and out occasionally. 18 But again, other than the personal contact, 19 0 were you aware of written channels of communication 20 that were used on a regular basis? 21 A It was my impression that written communication 22 would take place, but I suppose that was just an 23 impression of mine. I don't have anything to verify 24 25 that with.

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1	Frederick 414
2	Q How about information from other plants?
3	Would that be prima. 'ly through LER's?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Any other sources of information, other
6	than LER's that you know of?
7	A Personal contact.
8	Q Other than that?
9	A NO.
10	Q Have you ever seen a publication, and I am
11	just showing you one for an example, called "CURRENT
12	EVENTS - POWER REACTORS," published by the NRC. Is
13	that a familiar format to you?
14	A I don't remember having seen this type of document.
15	I may have, but I don't recall it.
16	MR. ROCKWELL: Why don't we mark it.
17	MS. GOLDFRANK: I believe it has already
18	been marked.
19	MR. YUSPEH: It was marked Porter Exhibit 2.
20	Q The document we have been referring to is
21	Porter Exhibit 2. You are not familiar with the format?
22	A No, I don't think so. No, I am not.
23	Q Was there any liquor present in the control
24.	room on the 28th?
25	A Liquor, no.

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1	Frederick 415
2	Q Any alcoholic beverages?
3	A No.
4	Q Was there any present to your knowledge
5	anywhere in the environs of the control room, whether
6	or not specifically in the control room itself?
7	A No.
8	Q Have you ever known anyone to bring any
9	alcoholic beverages into the control room before the
10	28th?
11	A No.
1 12	Q Had you ever known anyone to show up at
13	work intoxicated, before the 28th?
14	A No, not personally. I have heard stories about
15	people being drunk, but I don't remember anyone talking
16	about people being drunk on-site, no, not on the job.
17	Q Are you aware of any operators who had
18	second jobs on or before the 28th?
19	A Second jobs? Let me see.
20	Q Let us start with you. Did you have a
21	second job?
22	7. No.
23	Q Have you ever since you worked here?
24 .	A No. One guy, I don't know whether you would call
25	it a job I think he repaired chairs and stuff like
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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that. Another guy worked on used TV sets, electronics. I am not sure that they were actually jobs. I don't recall anyone having an eight-hour job. Most people have -- for instance, there is a storekeeper who owns -has a part interest in like a candy store, but I think his wife is there. You are asking me if someone had another job. Not that I know of specifically.

9 Q Before the 28th had you ever addressed in 10 training or otherwise informally how you would handle a 11 major transit or emergency where you would have a 12 tremendous number of alarms in a short period of time 13 and how you would sort out which alarms to pay attention 14 to?

15 A Yes, we had discussed it. We did it that morning 16 when the alarms came in. We realized there was such a 17 large number, we decided not to acknowledge the alarms. 18 We just let them flash until we had the opportunity to 19 read as many as we could, in an effort to get more 20 information. Once you push the button, you erase a 21 lot of information. So we decided even before this 22 accident not to push the button if we were confused 23 about the alarms.

Q Does that mean the alarm keeps sounding?
A Yes, it does.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick
2	Q Do you have to work with a horn blowing all
3	the time?
4	A Yes, to the point where it becomes seaningless
5	to try and read several hundred, then you acknowledge
6	them and try to work without them.
7	Q Had there been any discussion among the
8	operators or between the operators and the Training
9	Department of how better to deal with that kind of
10	situation, the situation that existed in the control
11	room?
12	A The alarm system itself is undergoing pretty
13	thorough work. We had two engineers assigned to it full-
14	time trying to update the alarm system and come up with
15	a better way to display the alarms.
16	That work is in progress just prior to the acci-
17	dent. They hadn't come to the point where they were
18	proposing changes.
19	The first phase of the job was to identify alarms
20	that were either unnecessary or not working properly.
21	That is what they were doing prior to the accident.
22	Q I take it one of the problems with not
23	acknowledging the alarms is that if a new alarm comes
24	on, the only indication is that one additional light
25	starts to flash. Would that be correct?
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1			Fred	lerick		418
2	A	Yes.				
3		Q And	a so one of	f the pro	blems you hav	ve then is
4	ident	ifying the	a fact that	t a new,	possibly sign	nificant,
5	alarm	has gone	off?			
6	A	Right.				
7		Q Bu	t, if I un	derstand	you correctly	y, you
8	indic	ated that	a basic d	ecision 1	had been made	before
9	this	transient	ever occu	rred. I	f you were 1	a situa-
10	tion	where a l	ot of alar	ms were	sounding, tha	t none of
11	them	would be	acknowledg	ed, so t	hat you would	have a
12	reco	rd of what	alarms ha	d sounde	d, so that yo	ou could
13	atte	mpt to ass	ess things	?		
14	A	I say th	is agreeme	ent was m	ade between t	the four of
15	us,	Bill and H	Fred and my	self and	Craig, havir	ng been
16	thro	ugh other	transients	togethe	er, and this w	was one of
17	the				omething to do	
18		Q H	ad the fou	r of you	been togethe:	r for quite
19	some	time?				
20	A	Yes, ab	out a year	, I think	κ.	
21		QI	s that typ	ical tha	t the company	will try
22	to	create a s	hift and t	hen allo	w that shift	to work
23	toge	ether over	an extend	ed perio	d of time?	
24	A	Yes.				
25		Q 4	That techni	que did	you use on th	e morning
			BENJAMI	N REPOR	TING SERVICE	

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2 of the 28th to try to sort out which were the signifi-3 cant alarms and which were alarms that you just had to 4 bypass because of the pressure of time?

Well, by knowing the positions of the important 5 A alarms, you know where to look for the ones that you 6 feel might be most significant. In other words, the 7 reactor coolant pressure alarm and high pressure 8 9 injection actuation alarms all had the same location. The feedwater alarms are in another area. If you are 10 trying to evaluate effects of the transient on, for 11 12 instance, the feedwater system, then you would read 13 the alarms associated with the feedwater system. It is 14 all grouped in one area.

15 So what you are looking for is really a special 16 alarm that you wouldn't have expected to see in a 17 transient, and try to identify that as either the source or an abnormal result of the transient. In a 18 19 loss of feedwater, you would expect to see the feed-20 water trip alarm, but you don't expect to see an alarm 21 that says the feedwater regulating valve is stuck open. 22 You wouldn't be looking for something like that. 23 Basically what you fall back on in that 0 24

24 situation is your instinct, training and experience?
25 A Yes.

	1	Frederick 420
	2	Q Rather than any set procedure?
	3	A That is right. There are procedures written for
	4	response to any given alarm window.
	5	Q You were in a situation where that was
	6	totally impossible?
	7	A Yes.
	8	2 Somebody told me that the minimum number of
	9	alarms they had ever seen in effect at any one time in
	10	the control room is 53.
	11	A I don't know that 53 is correct, but it is prob-
·	12	ably a good guess.
	13	Q . On that order?
	14	A Yes. That is one of the problems we were trying
	15	to correct with those engineers on full-time. They
	16	were trying to figure out why those alarms whether
	17	or not it was needed, and whether they should change
	18	the state of the alarm, so it was not needed. Those
	19	were the problems they were working on.
	20	Q What is the analytical process you are given
	21	in training to use in sorting out which emergency
	22	procedures to go to? The hypothetical is you are faced
	23	with an emergency. You get certain information that
	24	comes to you or is available to you in your control
	25	room. How do you take that information and arrive at

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2 a decision as to what emergency procedure to use --3 and I am asking this as to how in your training you 4 were told to go at it.

5 A Basically you try and assemble a list of symptoms 6 and try and identify the emergency procedure which 7 lists those symptoms as characteristics of that emer-8 gency.

9 What you need to work with is almost a complete 10 memorization word for word of each emergency procedure 11 and its symptoms, which is what training is centered 12 around. You are required to memorize all of the 13 emergency procedures.

14 O Is that possible?

15 A Is that impossible?

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16 Q Is it possible in your view?

17 A Yes, it is awkward, and is very difficult to 18 maintain complete memorization. I mean, over a long 19 period of time, all you can do is continue to review 20 and rememorize.

21 It is particularly wkward when a revision comes, 22 to have to forget something and replace it with a new 23 piece of information.

24. To paraphrase that is certainly acceptable, but 25 you have to maintain the original pure interpretation

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2 in order to comply with the testing requirements. That 3 has been a basis for all the training memorized symptoms 4 and the immediate actions, and you try to analyze the 5 system primary during an emergency and put them into a 6 specific symptom pattern that fits a given emergency 7 procedure.

8 You were in the control room on the 28th, 0 9 and you obviously have been through a tremendous amount 10 of review or analysis of what happened during, and you 11 have looked back at your own training. A lot of people 12 have asked you a lot of questions. What do you think 13 the experience of this accident teaches with respect 14 to how a utility can be prepared to deal with the kind 15 of accident that occurred here on the 28th? 16 A Well, from what I have seen of the training, as 17 a result of the accident, it is going to improve over 18 what we had before. It will be a more generic approach 19 to responding to an emergency, with more regard to a 20 deeper understanding of the safety analysis and how 21 ultimately that may be the only thing you have to fall 22 back on in the absence of a procedure.

The fact that drills and questions are being thrown at operators for analysis, rather than response through memory is a big change in the training.

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2 Like I said, we had to memorize emergency 3 procedures and perform that response from memory in 4 previous training.

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5 Now the emergency procedure is used as a reference, 6 and the response to the casualty is more analytical than 7 a response from memory. I believe that is a safer 8 approach.

9 Q What else do you think the accident teaches?
10 A I hope that it instills in the operator a more
11 distrusting attitude towards finalities that the safety
12 analysis presents.

If hope that it increases his questioning attitude as to whether or not the actions he is taking are complete, that is taking enough steps to verify he is moving toward a safe condition.

Q Do you think that "healthy skepticism of the safety analysis report" is at least being suggested in the training now?

20 A I don't know that it has come about in the 21 training as yet. None of the instructors have got up 22 and said, "Forget about the safety analysis. We want 23 to look at it a different way."

24. But the operators seem to be exhibiting a more
25 questioning attitude than they had before. I have been.

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In other words, I read a procedure, and then I go back and read it again in the light of what would happen if this went wrong or this automatic action didn't occur, with more attention given to multiple failures, not assuming that the plant is safe, but that you will have to do it on your own.

8 The other operators I have spoken to all seem to 9 have the same approach to the procedures and the infor-10 mation that they are receiving now.

I don't think it is something that the Training
Department or the company can instill in the operators.
I It is something we are going to have to -- it is a
personal thing you are going to have to adopt for yourself.

16 Are there other lessons that you think this 0 accident teaches in terms of how to run a power plant 17 like this at whatever level you want to select? 18 19 Up to now I have been exercising the response to A emergency in the plant. The biggest problem area I see 20 out of this accident is, in retrospect, the emergency 21 plan, the radiation emergency plan, and the communica-22 tions were all in their infant stages. They were not 23 24 as highly developed as they could be.

As we look back on it now, there are a lot of

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2 changes that can be made, as far as communications and 3 educating the public, the State agencies and all that 4 sort of thing. That stands as an area that needs a lot 5 of work.

6 Looking back on that, that is easy to say, but 7 prior to the accident the TMI emergency plan was well 8 rehearsed, and everyone was very familiar with it. It 9 seemed that all the bases were covered.

10 That is, we knew we had to contact the State, 11 which phones to use, who to talk to, how to document 12 what it was then, and what to say that would alert them 13 to any given condition of the plant. All that had been 14 thought out ahead of time.

The fact that those communications resulted in undesirable events on the public is not something that we could have foreseen, and I don't think there is a lot of lessons to be learned from that part of the accident.

As far as when you notify people and how you say what you want to say so that they understand what you are talking about, you can't just pick up the phone and say, "We have a loss of coolant accident" because not everybody understands that.

We have to realize that you may be calling up at

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4:00 o'clock in the morning and using words that the person on the other end of the phone doesn't understand. That is something we are going to have to plan against, I think.

6 The fact that we have had a loss of coolant acci-7 dent established an awful lot of equipment is in itself 8 a severe consequence of the accident, but the national and international events were not a result of what we 9 did in the plant; they are a result of what the public 10 thought was going on. I mean, nobody got hurt, but 11 12 this accident affected more people's lives than the 13 airplane crash recently.

14 Q Obviously the people here who lived.
15 through all of this are extremely aware of many of the
16 things that you are talking about. One of the problems
17 that the Commission has is how to translate what is
18 learned here onto a national level, how do you teach
19 the relevant lessons that are learned here to people
20 elsewhere. Do you have any thoughts on that?

21 A I am new at the instructor business.

Q I understand. Well, I can put it in two ways.
I would be interested in what you have to offer here,
but also if after we are through you have any thoughts,
we would be delighted to hear from you in any other

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2 form through a letter or whatever. But to the extent 3 that you have something you want to offer now, please 4 go ahead.

I found even during the accident that an awful lot 5 A of people were frightened by what was going on here --6 my relatives and my family, even my wife who works on 7 the Island was frightened. But if I was able to take 8 the time to talk to them individually and explain what 9 happened and exactly how we understood what was 10 happening and what we expected to happen over the next 11 few days, they seemed to become more calm, until I went 12 back home and turned on the TV set and started listening 13 to the media, which I feel was the greatest influence 14 in the panic and the fear that the public felt. 15 There was a great deal of sensationalism. I wish 16

17 that I had the opportunity to talk to a lot more people, 18 to try and cut back some of their excitement and their 19 panic. But I could only interface with a small amount 20 of people.

After the accident was over, months later my neighbors came by and thanked me for taking the time to talk to them because they were beginning to realize that perhaps the evacuation was unnecessary, and the media had misrepresented what was going on. They

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2 appreciated the fact that they had the opportunity to talk 3 to me, so they wouldn't panic their entire family by 4 having to displace them when it wasn't necessary.

5 And so I can't help but feel that if they had 6 been approached with a more calm attitude, a lot of the 7 repercussions that we are feeling from the accident 8 might have been minimized. This is although we can't 9 have a licensed reactor operator or a health physicist 10 expert walk down the street explaining to people during 11 an accident.

I mean, it is just not practical and you can't expect an engineer or a health physicist person who works at the plant like this to be able to communicate with the public on a mass media basis. He may not be accustomed to speaking to the public and it wouldn't come across.

But communications being the largest barrier, it is also the most difficult problem to solve. I know that Met Edison has gone through some extensive majors to try and educate the local population on what goes on here and what measures are taken to insure if this is a safe operation.

24 The construction of the observation center was 25 based on that. That was built many years ago, maybe

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429 Frederick 1 five or six years ago, for the purpose of educating the 2 public, but I am not sure that that many people are 3 interested in being educated or wanted to take the time 4 to attend a lecture or really attain some in-depth 5 6 knowledge of what was going on. It seems to be a very popular subject now, but 7 8 then it wasn't. Q Let me take you back to the more specific 9 #14 kinds of things that you as a control room operator may 10 have learned from the accident. How do you translate 11 that to a lesson which can be taught on a national 12 level, and I think it is not one thing obviously, but 13 14 it is a lot of things. A I really don't know. The technical things that 15 I have learned from the accident would be difficult to 16 17 transmit to the public. Q When I say "the national level," I mean so 18 other people in your position elsewhere would have it. 19 Obviously one concern is how do you take what you as a 20 control room operator learned and give other control 21 room operator: somewhere else the benefit of it. 22 Well, I think the best way is to try to use the 23 A simulation. I really don't know if other vendors have 24 simulators like B&W. I believe Westinghouse does. 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

But I think the hands-on operation in a similar accident would be one of the ways that I would chose first. Certainly a review of the sequence of events and a list of the errors that we made would be very important.
How much of an advantage do you think it

6 Q How much of an advantage do you think it 7 would be to have a simulator that exactly duplicates 8 the TMI control room and to have it here on-site and to 9 spend time with it during each of your one-week 10 refresher courses every six weeks?

11 A Well, there is no doubt that being able to 12 simulate accidents of this sort in an identical control 13 room, where you couldn't hurt anything, would be an 14 advantage.

But being able to anticipate casualties that 15 hadn't been considered is still the same problem. I 16 think what I am saying is having an identical control 17 room might teach you where the controls are and how to 18 read them, the specific parameters in the same loca-19 tions, but as far as developing an approach to an 20 emergency of this sort, it wouldn't be necessary to 21 have an identical simulator. B&W would suffice just 22 23 as well.

24 You are trying to develop an analytical approach 25 to an emergency, and it wouldn't be necessary to have

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
2 the exact same switches and buttons and gauges to 3 respond to. If you have something that is very closely 4 similar, that is close enough for what we are trying to 5 do.

Q As an operator who was in that emergency 6 room during the transient, what changes, if any, would 7 you make in the control room design based on, I guess, 8 during not only on that transient, but on your 9 experience in that control room up to that time? 10 A Obviously a position indicator on the PORV that 11 reveals actually whether the valve is open or shut is 12 important. We need reactor coolant drain tank instru-13 mentation in the operator's field, that is a his field 14 of vision, in his normal operating area. 15

We need an alarm system that is designed to be useful during analyzing one of these problems. We need alarms that are meaningful. In other words, you need an alarm that tells you when you have lost a feed pump, but you don't need one that tells you that there is trouble in the turbine building elevator.

You need an alarm that tells you when high pressure injection is actuated. There are other alarms that I think are not significant.

25 Out of the 1200 or 1600 alarms that are displayed







IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART



1	Frederick 432
2	up there, I am sure we could narrow that down to 100
3	or 200 without losing any vital indications. The need
4	to acknowledge wouldn't be necessary.
5	Someone, I think Mr. Kennedy, proposed a meter or
6	an alarm system that would reveal the saturation condi-
7	tions in the reactor coolant system. I am not sure
8	what type of system he had in mind. I suppose that
9	would be a good idea if it were reliable.
10	I don't think that we I think we certainly need
11	procedural changes. That is about it.
12	Q What other indication do you have of inven-
13	tory in the core besides pressurizer level?
14	A Well, there really is no other readout on the
15	panel that would tell you how much water is in the
16	system.
17	Q Let me put the question a little differently.
18	What other indication do you has to tell you that you
19	have core covery?
20	A You don't have any direct indication of that. You
21	could give any set of circumstances and you would prob-
22	ably figure out whether the core is covered by pressure
23	and temperature relationships and that sort of thing
24	and the ability of the secondary system to remove heat,
25	whether you have flow to the core. But there is no way

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2	of telling how much water is in the vessel.
3	During the weeks that followed the accident, that
4	was one of our primary problems. That is why we
5	eventually filled the system to a solid condition to
6	verify through pressure-temperature relationships that
7	the system was solid, and then maintain it solid from
8	then on because it was the only way we could guarantee
9	that there is water in the system.
10	Q Have you ever been involved in exercises
11	where you simulate the transients from other plants,
12	other the 'MI 2, to see what effect they would have
13	on TMI 2 if they occurred here? Obviously this would
14	have been done with another B&W simulator.
15	A I think we have used as initial conditions some
16	transients at other plants, yes.
17	Q Did you have any specific training to become
18	an instructor?
19	A Nc. I am not really officially an instructor yet.
20	I have to attend an instructor school. I don't know
21	when that will be right now. The schedule is kind of
22	up in the air. But I will attend an instructor school
23	and I will be observed by qualified instructors until
24	it has been demonstrated that I am effective as an
25	instructor.

	1	Frederick 434
	2	Q Where will that be?
	3 P	I think NUS.
	4	Q What does "NUS" stand for?
	5	MR. YUSPEH: NUS is a consulting firm that
	6	specializes among other things in consulting to
	7	the nuclear industry. That is the name of the
	8	corporation, "NUS."
	9	Q How long a course is that, do you know?
	10	A No, I don't know how long it is.
	11	Q Are you teaching now as instructor?
,	12	A I was scheduled to this week. Along with that
	13	there is a general physics instructor and an NUS
	14	instructor that is supposed to sit in on my classes and
	15	audit what I do.
	16	They review all the material that I prepare for
	17	the lecture and, as far as whether or not it complies
	18	with the objectives of the training and whether or not
	19	I covered it in sufficient depth and all that sort of
	20	thing, they determine that. I haven't given any
	21	lectures as of yet.
	22	Q Will there be other training, other than
	23	the NUS course that you described, to prepare you to
	24	become an instructor? Has there been other training?
	25	A Not that I know of, other than, you know, actually
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 doing the training under supervision.

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Q I want to ask you if you have made any 3 statements since the accident. I know you have. Let 4 me define what I mean by "statements." That would be 5 anything which you have reduced to writing yourself 6 about the accident or things connected with the accident 7 or anything which anybody else has reduced to writing, 8 based on what you said. Obviously that would include 9 transcripts of interviews, testimony, that sort of 10 thing. It would include any written statements that 11 you made or memorialized in any other way, for 12 instance, if it were taped on a tape recording. 13 A Yes, there is all kinds of transcripts. 14 Q We can go through it now or would you 15 prefer just to sit down and make a list and send it to 16 us. We can do it on the record here first right now. 17 A A list of the different agencies that I have 18

19 spoken to?

20 Q Yes. What we want you to do is come up with 21 a list of statements that you have made, in other words, 22 interviews that have been transcribed or recorded, and 23 the written statements that you have made. We can do 24 that here on the record. I know there three ablot. I amtrain 25 wondering. I don't care which way you do it.

	1	Frederick 436
	2	A You mean the dates?
	3	Q Your best estimate of the dates.
	4	A I wouldn't be able to give you the dates. I can
	5	give you the names of the organizations though. That
	6	is about it.
	7	Q What is more efficient, to do it right now
	8	on the record or for you to submit us a list?
	9	A I don't know that I can compile a list. I don't
	10	know that I have in my possession all the transcripts
	11	and tapes and things that are referred to.
1	12	Q Let us try to go through it now. If I
	13	understand it correctly let me take it in chrono-
	14	logical order to the best of my understanding.
	15	A Okay.
	16	Q You were interviewed on March 30, which
	17	would be two days after the accident, by Lorn & Reppert,
	18	and that was tape recorded and transcribed?
	19	A Yes. Are you saying that is the first one?
	20	Q I don't know. That is the first one I know
	21	of.
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	attempt to debrief us immediately after the accident.

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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

or.

1	Frederick 437
2	Q Who is that?
3 A	Walter Marshall.
4	Q Did Mr. Marshall tape record the interview?
5 A	No. He took whites on the first half of the
6 inter	view, and then later on we were able to get a
	recorder and record some of it.
8	Q Have you ever seen his notes or transcript
9 of th	he part of the interview that was tape recorded?
	Yes, but I don't know where that stuff is right
ll now.	
, 12	MR. ROCKWELL: I will direct this to your
13	counsel because he may or may not have it, but
14	could we have a copy of whatever notes or tran-
15	scripts there was from that interview.
16	Q Was that on the 29th?
17 A	I believe so.
18	Q And then we covered the one on the 30th,
19 the	interview conducted by Mr. Lorn and Mr. Reppert.
20	Our understanding is that there was another
21 int	erview on the 6th of April with Van Witback. Do you
22 rec	all that interview?
23 A	Yes.
24	Q Was that the next interview, that you had, in
25 af	ter the one on the 30th?
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Frederick 438
	2	A No. There was some NRC interviews somewhere in
	3	
	4	Q Okay. Tell me about the NRC interviews.
	5	A I approached the company, Met Ed supervision, with
	6	the proposal to get together with some kind of a team to
	7	debrief us on the accident before our memories began to
	8	fade.
	9	Somehow we got directed to a few NRC officials,
	10	who began to interview us. They interviewed the four
	11	of us as a group and then again individually.
e	12	Q Who were the officials involved in those
	13	interviews?
	14	A Their name was Phil Madden, and I don't remember
	15	the other man's name, just two NRC officials.
	16	Q And when you say "the four of us," that is
	17	Frederick, Faust, Simon and Zewe?
	18	A Yes.
	19	Q So for you personally there would have been
	20	two sessions, one group and one individually?
	21	A Actually my individual session was coupled with
	22	Bill Zewe's we were there together and actually
	23	it was in the back seat of a car with a tape recorder
	24	going. It that the mext interview that you
	25	You see, the idea was that Bill and I had the fear

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2 if they didn't get started soon, we would begin to 3 forget things, which in fact did happen.

We approached the company to try and get someone to interview or debrief us formally, and the company was, I guess, incapable of doing that at the time because everything was happening.

8 Talking about the 29th and 30th, everything was 9 pretty busy. So really they had to call in the NRC, and 10 they asked if they had any people available. They came 11 up with these two guys, and it was their intent to 12 debrief us as well as they could, and then turn that 13 information over to their I&E Division with the intent 14 of giving us transcripts_that the company could use.

15 Q Did you ever get a transcript?

16 A I think so.

25

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17 Q Or copies of tapes?

18 A I don't know if I got the tapes. I believe I got 19 one or the other. I have not extensively reviewed all 20 the transcripts and tapes that have been sent to me. 21 I probably will now. It has been so long, but originally 22 I tried purposely not to review them extensively, so 23 that I wouldn't contaminate what I knew with what the 24 other guys knew.

Q Could we have a copy, please, of any BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Frederick 440
	2	transcripts that exist of either the group interview
	3	with the two NRC inspectors or the individual one that
	4	Mr. Frederick gave?
	5	(There was discussion off the record.)
	6	A I am not sure whether I received from NRC or what-
	7	ever. It seems to me there should be a central place
	8	where all these transcripts are already amassed. Can't
	9	we get them for you?
	10	Q Sure. I am really directing the question
	11	to counsel.
ř.	12	MR. YUSPEH: I will take care of it.
	13	MR. ROCKWELL: We will be making requests
	14	all through the depositions, and they will
	15	coordinate. Then we have a record of an inter-
	16	view that was conducted by the President's
	17	Commission on May 10.
	18	THE WITNESS: They came on-site to interview
	19	me. I don't know what motivated them to do it.
	20	I submitted a written statement of my comments,
	21	as far as some things I wanted to say about the
	22	accident. I submitted it to those people, and
	23	they said that they would attach it as an amend-
	24	ment or an addition to my second testimony. I
	25	didn't see it come back.

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1	Frederick 441
2	Q I don't see it here. That is the first I
3	knew about it.
4	A I gave it to an elderly gentleman who they iden-
5	tified as the technical advisor. He said he would
6	present it to the other two and expected to see that as
7	an attachment. This is more than a bunch of personal
8	comments and answers to some of the questions you asked.
9	But I wrote it down because my memory was best then.
10	Reporters had asked me questions and I refused to
11	answer. I wanted to give my answers to the questions
12	to the official source, and I wrote them down. I
13	don't know what happened to that document.
14	Q We will check on that. I take it you don't
15	have a copy, is that it?
16	A I don't think I do.
17	Q We will check on that. If we can find it,
18	we will send a copy to you. It should be around. I
19	don't know why it is not here.
20	A If I do have a copy, and I may actually have one
21	I am not concerned about my having it, but I want to
22	know what happened to it.
23	Q We will check and get back to you.
24	(There was discussion off the record.)
25	Q Back on the record. Obviously you also
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	1	Frederick 442
	2	testified before the President's Commission on the 30th
	3	of May, and you testified before the Udall on the 11th
	4	of May with Mr. Faust. Do you recall any other inter-
	5	views or public testimony which you had given since the
	6	accident?
	7	A There have been many NRC interviews.
	8	Q Since that first interview?
	9	A Yes. There was one conducted down here in the
	10	trailer.
	11	Q How many would you say over and above the
1	12	ones that occurred immediately after the accident?
	13	A Four or five at least.
	14	Q Have you received the transcripts on all of
	15	those?
	16	A I think so.
	17	MR. ROCKWELL: We request copies of those
	18	transcripts as well, please.
	19	Q Have there been any other interviews by any
	20	other organization, other than the ones we have now
	21	covered?
	22	A We covered Met Ed and GPU and NRC and the
	23	President's Commission and the Udall committee. I think
	24	that is it.
	25	(There was discussion off the record.)
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Frederick 443	
	2	THE WITNESS: Other than the debriefing I	
	3	told you about in Met Ed in the first couple of	
	4	hours in the first day, rather, there has been	
	5	meetings between myself, the four of us actually,	
	6	and investigating engineers to try and interpret	
	7	-aphs and sequence documents and things like	
	8	that, to try and get a clear picture of what	
	9	happened. That has happened hundreds of times.	
	10	It is not really a formal interview or anything	
	11	that has been transcribed.	
,	12	For instance, that document that you have	
	13	there entitled, "Sequence of Events," we have had	
	14	some input into that.	
	15	Q Other than that one thing which you wrote	
	16	out on your own and gave to the President's Commission	
	17	in May, have you written anything else?	
	18	A No.	
	19	Q Let me just identify a couple of things from	
	20	the personal file you made available to us. There is	
	21	one black notebook which has two white labels on it.	
	22	The first is, "ICS Response Characteristics, Training	
	23	Manual, Book No. 58" with your name on it. Is this the	
	24	book that was put out by Babcock & Wilcox?	
	25	A Yes.	

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	1	Frederick 444
	2	Q And it was supplied to you in the course of
	3	one of the training programs?
	4	A I don't remember when I received it. I had to
	5	sign it out from the Training Department. I believe
	6	they received a shipment of those books, and they
	7	assigned one to each one of the operators by number,
	8	so that we could review it and maintain it as a refer-
	9	ence.
	10	Q So you think you got it from your Training
	11	Department?
''	12	A But they got it from B&W.
	13	Q And do you know to the best of your recol-
	14	lection when you received this Book No. 58?
	15	A Prior to the licensing in October of '77.
	16	(There was discussion off the record.)
	17	MR. ROCKWELL: I would like to mark some of
	18	these things. Do you have any objection to our
	19	marking the originals and xeroxing them and
	20	returning copies to you or would you prefer to
	21	xerox them and mark copies?
	22	(There was discussion off the record.
	23	The morning session recessed at 12:30 p.m.)
	24	000
	25	

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2 AFTERNOON SESSION
3 1:30 P.M. RESUMED
4 E D W A R D R. F R E D E R I C K, having
5 been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand
6 and testified further as follows:
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

445

8 BY MR. ROCKWELL:

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Q Before we get to the subject of the letter 9 from you to Mr. Seelinger, let me ask you about one 10 document which has previously been marked Dunn 11 Deposition Exhibit 35. It is a memorandum from a 12 Mr. Walters at Babcock & Wilcox to a Mr. Kelly also at 13 B&W. It refers to another memorandum that Mr. Kelly 14 had written earlier. I think you may have had a chance 15 to look at it briefly before we went back on the record, 16 but if you haven't, and you would like to, let me ask 17 you to take a quick look at it, so you have it in mind. 18 Mr. Kelly's memorandum precedes Mr. Walters' response. 19 I remember looking at these a few minutes ago. 20 A Q If you want more time to take a look at it --21 Are you going to quiz me on this? 22 A I am just interested in asking you about 23 0 your views on Mr. Walters' comments. Take a quick 24 moment to read t. Have you now had a chance to look 25

	1	Frederick 4	46
	2	them over?	
	3	A Yes.	
	4	Q As you can see from looking at them,	
	5	Mr. Walters is responding in his November 10, 1977 m	emo-
	6	randum to Mr. Kelly's memorandum of November 1st.	
	7	Mr. Walters says in the first paragraph, "In talking	
	8	with training personnel and in the opinion of this	
	9	writer, the operators at Toledo responded in the cor	rect
	10	manner concerning how they had been trained and the	
	11	reasons behind the training."	
1	12	In order to make sure you have a clear	
	13	unde standing of what happened in Toledo, that he is	
	14	referring to, the was a transient that occurred on	
	15	September 24, 2977 in which a PORV failed to open.	
	16	There was a temporary loss of all feed. Pressurizer	
	17	level went high with reactor coolant pressure going	low,
	18	and the operators terminated high pressure injection	
	19	apparently focusing on pressurizer level alone.	
	20	Assuming those facts about the Davis-Bes	se
	21	transient, and then having in mind this first paragra	aph
	22	of Mr. Walters, would you agree with the conclusion	that
	23	is expressed there?	
		A Yes.	
	25	Q That those operators responded in accord.	ance
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	1	Frederick 447
	2	with their training, assuming their training was the
	3	same as yours?
	4	A Yes. You have to make that assumption, yes.
	5	Q Then he goes on to say, "My assumption in
	6	the training assumes first that RC pressure and pres-
	7	surizer level will trend in the same direction."
	8	Based on your training, is that what you
	9	would have assumed?
	10	A Yes.
	11	Q Then he goes on, "For small leak, they keep
,	12	the high pressure system on up to a certain flow, to
	13	maintain pressurizer level."
	14	Is that consistent with your training?
	15	A Yes.
	16	Q Let me advise you that Mr. Walters told us
	17	that in preparing that memorandum he talked to Mr. Goslow
	18	and Mr. Streeter, whose names you have mentioned
	19	earlier in the deposition.
	20	Do you remember eve having any discussions
	21	with Mr. Goslow or Mr. Streeter on those subjects that
	22	you can pull out of your memory?
	23	A No. They did discuss with me actual simulator
	24	transients and hypothetical transients during the
	25	training and during the testing that I went through with
	1	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	- rederick 448
2	them, but I don't remember this particular set of
3	circumstances being discussed.
4	Q Do you know of anything in your own training
5	that would be inconsistent, that is not consistent with
6	the conclusions or the assumptions that Mr. Walters is
7	making in the first and second paragraphs of this
8	memorandum?
9	A Since the situations are so similar, I reacted
10	in the same way that these operators did. I have to
11	agree with his conclusion here that it was the training
12	that we all received that caused us to take the actions
13	in the two transients that were so closely parallel.
14	(There was discussion off the record.)
15	(Documents described below were marked
16	Frederick Deposition Exhibits 16 through 19 for
17	identification, respectively, this date.)
18	Q I refer you to Frederick Deposition Exhibit
19	16. This is produced to us for a review as a part of
20	one of your files. Do I correctly identify it as a
21	sequence of startup events. Let me modify that. Is it
22.	a sequence of events or a listing of events that occurred
23	during the startup in February through May of 1978, and
24	it is not your list?
25	A Yes, I didn't write it.

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	1	Frederick 449
	2	Q Who did write it, do you know?
	3	A I don't remember who did write that. I don't even
	4	remember how I came across it. I am not even sure I
	5	read the whole thing. I stuck it in the envelope
	6	thinking I would read it, thinking it would be inter-
	7	esting that someone had taken the trouble to list all
	8	that stuff.
	9	Q I thought you had mentioned a name in
	10	connection with who may have written this list. Do you
	11	have any recollection of that?
'	12	A Did I say it on the record?
	13	Q No, I thought you mentioned a name, but I
	14	may be mistaken. Do you have any idea as to who may
	15	have written this?
	16	A It may have come through the Startup Department,
	17	the engineers who would be doing the startup.
	18	Q But you can't suggest any individual?
	19	A Those engineers are John Ulrich, I think he is
	20	at GPU as an employee, and Jack Garrison, a Met Ed
	21	employee. I can't remember any of the other names right
	22	now. Those are two of the startup engineers.
	23	I believe it was extracted from their log or they
	24	may have been keeping a running accounting of the days
	25	for some reason.
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 450
2	Q Do you know any other detail about the
3	significance of this list or why it was put together?
4	A No, it was just interesting, I suppose.
5	Q Referring you now to Frederick Deposition
6	Exhibit No. 17, do I correctly identify it as a letter
7	or a note in your handwriting, dated May 3, 1978 to
8	Jim Seelinger from yourself?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Have you had a chance to review that today,
11	so that you have the content of the letter fresh in
12	your mind?
13	A I reviewed it briefly. I didn't read the whole
14	thing.
15	Q If you would like to take the time, please
16	feel free to do so.
17	A Okay.
18	Q Have you now had a chance to review
19	Deposition Exhibit 17?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And I correct that this letter was produced
22	to us pursuant to a request that we made yesterday in
23	connection with the subpoena that is outstanding from
24	the Commission to Met Edison?
25	A Yes.

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		1	Frederick 451
#16		2	Q Now, could you tell me the background for
sm/ w		3	this letter which is marked as Exhibit 17? The letter,
		4	itself, refers to an evaluation of an April 23, 1978
C		5	transient that apparently Mr. Seelinger or someone
		6	close to him had ma e; is that right?
		7	A Yes.
		8	Q And it is your reaction to the evaluation
		9	by Mr. Seelinger or whomever of this April 23 transient?
		10	A Yes. That is exactly what it is. It is my
		11	reaction. It didn't involve a great deal of studying,
	,	12	it is just comments that I wanted to call to Mr.
		13	Seelinger's attention to see what he would reply.
		14	Q What knowledge did you have of that
		15	transient? Had you been in the control room at the
		16	time of the transient?
		17	A Yes.
		18	Q Tell me what happened during that transient
		19	as best you recall it now.
		20	A That is tougher than it may seem. I have an
(21	awful lot of memories that I lost through this accident.
		22	Q Describe it in broad detail.
		23	A We experienced a feedwater transient that caused
		24	
		25	valves and they stuck open rather than reseating after
			BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

	1	Frederick 452
	2	they relieved the excessive pressure. It caused a
	3	severe cooldown 'ransient.
	4	Q When you refer to main steam valves, are
	5	you referring to the bypass or the atmospheric?
	6	A The main steam safety relief valves that relieve
	7	to the atmosphere.
	8	Q To the atmosphere?
	9	A Yes.
	10	Like I say, this letter kind of lists the problems
	11	that I saw in the accident that I didn't think ware
,	12	touched by his evaluation.
	13	Q Were you present in the room during the
	14	entire transient?
	15	A Yes.
	16	Q Who else was present?
	17	A The shift supervisor was Bernie Smith and I think
	18	Craig Faust and Hugh McGovern were on the shift with me
	19	at the time.
	20	Q McGovern would have been foreman?
	21	A No, he was a control room operator in training.
	22	The foreman, I don't remember. It may have been Pat
	23	Loidonn.
	24	Q Was that transient a transient that led
	25	to a prolonged shutdown of Unit 2 in 1978?
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	Frederick 453
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2	A It resulted in replacing all the main steam
3	safety valves.
4	Q The plant was down for several months, is
5	that correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q You referred to a report or actually used
8	the word "your evaluation" in your letter to Mr.
9	Seelinger. Do we have a copy of the evaluation that
10	you were referring to here in the room, and will you
11	identify it for us?
12	A I can't positively identify this document. I
13	remember this document being one that I remember I was
14	responding to, but it looks like the same thing to me.
15	The only reason I identified it as being from Jim
16	Seelinger is that it had a cover letter on it for us
17	to review it and it was from him, I believe, so that
18	is why I addressed this letter to him. I don't even
19	know for sure that he was the author of the document.
20	I was addressing it more to his position which
21	was technical superintendent of the unit more than to
22	him personally.
23	(Discussion was held off the record.)
24	Q Mr. Frederick, I think while we have been
25	through a number
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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of documents that relate to the April 23rd transient 2 here at TMI 2 and you had segregated out of those docu-3 ments something which appears to me to be some sort of 4 a report or analysis, and just so we identify it 5 correctly, it is a Table of Contents, that is the 6 first page, and it appears to be on the order of 75 to 7 10 pages long, and the first page number is A2-3. 8 Does that appear to be the report or 9 evaluation to which you have had reference in the 10 first paragraph of your May 3, 1978 letter to Seelinger? 11 Yes. That appears to be the same document. 12 A MR. ROCKWELL: Why don't we have that 13 marked as this time? 14 (Above-described document was marked 15 12 Frederick Deposition Exhibit 20 for identifica-16 tion, this date.) 17 The report evaluation, let's call it the 18 2 "Seelinger Evaluation" just to use a shorthand term 19 for it, has now been marked Frederick Deposition 20 Exhibit 20; am I correct? 21 22 A Yes. Now, when you wrote your letter, had you 23 0 had a chance to review the evaluation? 24 25 Yes. A

455 Frederick 1 Reading from your letter, you indicate: 2 Q "Dear Jim, your evaluation of the April 23rd 3 incident would have been more complete and accurate if 4 mention were made of these items: 5 6 "No. 1, along with the problem of the stuck open safeties should be noted that some safeties did 7 8 not lift when they should have." 9 Can you tell me what you meant by that? A After reviewing the evaluation, some of the 10 operators -- meaning the operators on my shift and the 11 12 shift supervisor -- were discussing the transient and 13 we thought it was just as significant that some of the 14 safety valves did not open when their setpoints were 15 reached, that that was just as important as if when 16 stuck open after they did, after the correct setpoint, 17 that both of them indicated unsafe conditions. 18 Q Do you know how much above the setpoint for 19 some of those safeties the pressure went withor their 20 opening? 21 A No, I don't recall. That data, from when they 22 tested the relief valves subsequent to the transient, 23 revealed that the setpoints were not all repeated. In 24 other words, before they decided to replace all the 25 safety valves, they tested them all again and they found BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 456
2	that as carefully as they were putting in the setpoint,
3	they weren't able to repeat actuation at the setpoint,
4	each time would be a little higher or lower, and it was
5	that inaccuracy that made basically the decision to
6	replace the valves.
7	Q Do you know who manufactured the safety
8	relief va_ves?
9	A The original ones?
10	Q The ones that were in place on the 23rd.
11	A I don't remember the name. I think they have
' 12	Dresser valves in there now.
13	Q You don't know whether Dresser was the
14	manufacturer?
15	A No. We changed manufacturers. The original
16	manufacturers, I don't remember right now.
17	Q Crosby?
18	A No, I don't think so.
19	Q How many of the safety valves did not lift
20	when they were supposed to?
21	A I should probably have been more specific in this
22	letter in giving him the setpoint and the number of
23	valves, but I don't remember what I was basing that
24	statement on.
25	Q Are you fairly certain, as you recall, that
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	l Frederick	457
2	2 there was more than one?	
3	A Yes, there were several. I would say three or	
4		
5	Q Would a transient where you had a trip,	
6	그는 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같은 것 같이 가지 않는 것 같이 많이 없다.	1
7		
8	sequence?	
9	A No. The feedwater system complicated the tran	sient
10		
11		
12		
13	minutes. It took us a few minutes to get to that	
14	station and run the speed of the pump down, so we wer	е
15	running cool at the time with the feedwater running a	nđ
16	the safety relief valves stuck, and it was stated in	
17	the evaluation that it was the equipment response to	
18	the feed pump that kept the pressure from going as lo	w
19	as it did.	
20	Q What was the original cause of the trip of	n
21	the 23rd?	
22	A I don't remember that.	

23 Q Well, would it be fair to say that where you
24 had safeties failing to lift at their setpoints and
25 where you have a trip, that at least in those terms you

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1	Frederick 458	
2	are looking at a multiple failure?	
3	A Yes. You had failure or out of spec condition	on
4	caused the original trip and then you had another	
5	failure complicate the transient. Yes, that is what	t
6	I consider to be a multiple failure.	
7	Q And then to the extent that you wanted t	to
8	regard slow reaction time in terms of manually	
9	throttling back the pump, you may be into a situation	on
10	where you even have three simultaneous	
11	A Three compounding effects, yes.	
12	Q Was that ever discussed at the time of	the
13	transient, that it was more than a single failure	
14	incident?	
15	A It was discussed among, like I say among us	
16	operators as I decided to write this letter, which	I
17	guess is rather unusual to specifically address one	
18	person with concerns like this. It probably should	
19	have been brought off through a different avenue, in	n
20	other words, through the Training Department or some	e -
21	thing like that.	
22	Q Was there a clear avenue?	
23	A Yes. I should have	
24	Q In Metropolitan Edison for expressing t	hese
25	kinds of general safety concerns?	

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	1	Frederick 459	
	2	A As I said before, I should have addressed this	
	3	to my supervisor who was Bernard Smith that night, but	E
	4	he was filling in for Bill Zewe that night for some	
	5	reason. In other words, he is not my normal superviso	r
	6	and I should have addressed those concerns through the	
	7	supervisor rather than going directly to Mr. Seelinger	
	8	MR. YUSPEH: I presume the reason though	
	9	that it was addressed to Jim Seelinger was	
	10	because it was in response to a memorandum circu	-
	11	lated by Jim Seelinger; is that correct?	
'	12	THE WITNESS: Yes.	
	13	Q But I take it other than sending it up	
	14	through the management chai: through your immediate	
	15	superior there was no other standardized procedure or	
	16	review group at Met Ed to which you would address a	
	17	letter of this sort?	
	18	A I don't know if there is a procedure for doing it	t.
	19	I would have to either address it to my supervisor or	
	20	to the operating engineer or particular engineer I knew	R
	21	was cognizant of the system. I was concerned with	
	22	there is no written procedure on how to submit a	
	23	suggestion.	
	24	Q Or there is no central group that exists as	;
2	25	a clearing house for any safety concerns such as the	
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

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1	Frederick 460
2	ones you were bringing up here?
• 3	A Not outside of the chain of command, so to speak.
4	Q You mentioned that you had discussed
5	A Could I look at this?
6	Q Sure. Did you want to take a moment to look
7	at it?
8	A No. I think as I wrote this letter I was
9	following along the recommendations section of this
10	report.
11	Q Feel free to take a moment now and also to
12	refer to the recommendations as we discuss your letter.
13	Do you want a moment to go through
14	A Just a minute, yes.
15	(A brief recess was held.)
16	Q Coming back to your letter, I think you
17	indicated that you had some discussion or there had
18	been some discussion between yourself and some of the
19	other operators. Was this letter a product of discus-
20	sion that you and other operators had been having in
21	the days following the transient?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Did it reflect not only your thoughts but
24	some of the thoughts they had as well?
25	A I think it would be more accurate to describe it
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Fr	rederick	461
	2	as the thoughts I came	away from the discus	sions with.
	3	I can't say it represen	ts anybody else's.	
C	4	Q But these w	ere the ideas or poir	nts that you
	5	ade in your letter or		
		aised and discussed with		
	7			
	8	Q Did anyone s	suggest that you writ	e a letter?
	9 1			
	10	Q That was you	idea?	
	11 A			
#17	, 12	Q Now, do you	want to tie the first	
	13 y	our letter in with some		
	14	is a report of the tran		ht which
	15 A			
			at it because I just	
	17	at is how I wrote the :		
	18	re significant question		
	10		cure + has recently b	
	20	oduced to us and I have		
	21	you want to tie it in,	please do, as we go	forward.
()	^	Yes.		
	22	Q Going to the	second part of your	letter,
		indicate, "Flow testi	ng of the MUV-16s con	npletely
		ores the fact that MUV	-17-18 are open durin	ng ES."
	25	What does "ES	mean?	
		Denver		

1	Frederick 462
2	A Emergency Safeguards or Safety Features Actuation.
3	Q Then you continue, "This causes runout on
4	the makeup pumps and erroneous flow indications which
5	mislead the operator."
6	Could you explain what that means, that
7	second point in the letter?
8	A One of the points of discussion I brought back
9	from the transient was that we were observing inaccurate
10	flow through the high pressure injection lines, and that
11	statement was made in the report that on the ES, when
12	the operator saw inadequate flow through the MUV-16s,
13	he didn't realize flow was also going through MUV-17
14	and MUV-18. I took that as a point of contention. It
15	was Jim McGovern and myself who came to that conclusion
16	and pointed it out to the supervisor as the reason that .
17	we were experiencing inadequate high pressure injection
18	flow.
19	I thought it was conflicting with the conclusion
20	that we made that the MUV-17 and 18 were a problem,
21	and he stated in his report that we didn't recognize
22	that. I felt that was worthy of mention.
23	That kind of describes that during the startup
24	testing that we did, when we set the mechanical restric-
25	tion on the high pressure injection valves which

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Frederick 463 t: ottle them automatically to 250 GPM, it doesn't at the same time have MUV-17 and 18 open which are the normal makeup values.

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5 In other words, when we did the flow setting on 6 those valves, we didn't account for the flow that also 7 goes through the normal makeup line.

8 Q I think you have lost me. Can we go back?
9 Let me tell you what I don't understand. I don't
10 understand the connection between the 16 on the one
11 hand and the 17 and 18 on the other.

12 A The 16s are referred to as high pressure injec-13 tion values that are automatically opened on the actua-14 tion of the safeguard system. They move from full shut 15 to some mechanically stop position that will allow 250 16 GPMs to flow through that system behind pressure or 17 operating pressure.

MUV-17 and 18 are two values through which normal makeup to the reactor coolant system passes during normal operating conditions. When pressurizer level goes down, MUV-17 opens to refill the pressurizer. When it gets up high, it closes. It is an automatic level control.

24 Valve 18 is the block for that automatic control 25 valve.

Frederick

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During that transient, when pressurizer level 2 began to decrease, 17 and 18 opened and when ES actuation 3 occurred, the 16s also opened, so what we had was the 4 emergency flow path and the normal flow path open at 5 the same time. That made the emergency flow path 6 experience less flow than what would have been indi-7 cated if the normal flow path was shut. 8 So when we recognized that during the accident, 9 duiing the transient and late in the analysis of the 10 transient, we decided it was worthy to point out to 11 someone that the 17 and 18 should be shut during a 12 13 transient like that. 14 You mean automatically shut? 0 15 Yes, so that you could be assured that your high A 16 pressure injection was not starved for water. 17 So the erroneous flow indications which you 0 refer to in Point No. 2 of your letter which mislead 18 19 the operator relates to the fact that you have less flow than you would expect through the 16 because the 17 and 20 21 18 was open? 22 Yes. 23 Q And then trying to relate that back to Point No. 7 on Page 11 of the Seelinger analysis, he 24 25 says, "On ES actuation, when the operator saw inadequate BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1 465 Frederick 2 flow to the MUV-16s, he did not realize flow was also 3 going through the MUV-17 and the MUV-18." 4 Now, can you tell me how you disagree with 5 that statement if you disagree with that statement? 6 A I disagreed with it because, as I remember, we 7 realized where the extra flow was going and we made a request to close MUV-18. I feel he was in error 8 9 in making that statement. 10 Q Let's go on to Point No. 3. This is on 11 Page 2 of your letter: "The alarm system in the control 12 room is so poorly designed that it contributes little 13 in analysis of the casualty. The other operators and 14 myself have several suggestions on how to improve our 15 alarm system. Perhaps we can discuss them sometime, 16 preferably before the system as it is causes severe 17 problems." 18 Can you tell me what you had in mind and 19 the other operators had in mind with respect to the 20 poor design of the alarm system? 21 A You want to know why I feel it is a poor alarm 22 system? 23 0 Yes. 24 A Well, simply because there are so many alarms . 25 There are, I know for sure, over 1,000 alarms displayed

2 on the panels that the operator can see. There is no 3 way to differentiate between important alarms and 4 unimportant alarms either by sound or by visual repre-5 sentation, so that in a transient which initiates 100 6 or 200 alarms, all of the alarms become meaningless 7 because you don't have time to read them and you have 8 no way of sorting out which one is important unless you 9 take the time to read them all, and you very seldom 10 have that much time.

11 Q I want to make sure that you are referring 12 to your analysis and reaction to the transient 13 in the spring of 1978 and not the analysis and reaction 14 you had to the transient in March of 1979.

15 A Yes, that's right.

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16 Well, other than the number of alarms, the display 17 is difficult to read and the acknowledging system was at 18 that time inadequate because if you acknowledge alarms 19 that are recently actuated, you also erase or cancel 20 out alarms that have been in for some time. So you 21 don't really have any way of maintaining a status of 22 alarms or a sequence of alarms as they existed from the 23 beginning of the transient.

24. Q Now, you mentioned the alarms are difficult 25 to read. What do you mean by that?

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1	Frederick 467
2	A Well, from where the operator stands at the front
3	of the console, the alarms are about 10 feet away and
4	they are in, I would say, type that is maybe 3/8 to a
5	half inch high.
6	Q You mean you can't read the letters?
7	A Yes; it is difficult to read.
8	Q Too small?
9	A Right, and the display is kind of confusing.
10	In other words, the writing is small, the number
11	of alarms in any given space is rather large there
12	may be, I think, 35 alarms in any given group which is
13	represented in a two-foot by two-foot area approx -
14	mately so that when they are flashing on and off,
15	trying to read them from that distance and maintain
16	what you are trying to see while it is flashing is
17	difficult.
18	So it is intended that you push the button to
19	stop it from flashing so you can read it after it lights
20	up. They are easier to read after it lights up, but if
21	you don't want to push the button, you have to read
22	them while they are flashing.
23	Q The reason you wouldn't want to push the
24	button is what, again?
25	A You would clear alarms that have just come in

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2 mementarily and go out again, but you would also freeze 3 in alarms that for which the alarm condition still 4 existed. So that as soon as you push the button 5 alarms that were there for only a few seconds would 6 disappear and you wouldn't be able to tell whether or not they actually ever did come in.

8 MR. YUSPEH: When you have a blinking light 9 that represents an alarm and you push the button 10 to acknowledge it, does the light stop blinking 11 but it stays lit until the alarm situation has 12 been resolved?

13 THE WITNESS: It depends on whether the 14 alarm condition is clear. If the alarm condition 15 suddenly exists and the alarm starts to flash, it 16 flashes brightly and so long as the condition 17 exists, it will continue to flash, and when you 18 push the button and the condition continues to 19 exist, it will stay brightly lit. When the alarm 20 condition clears, it would begin to flash again, 21 but somewhat dimmer.

22 We push the button to clear it. That is 23 the sequence that you should go through, but 24 this could happen several -- our several hundred 25 alarms, so many coming in, so many going out,

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 469
2	some remaining in, some are clearing, so each time
3	you push the button, it does the same thing, it
4	does all four ctions at the same time.
5	Q Are therr any other things relating to the
6	poor design c' te alarm system that you had in mind
7	when you wrote that letter?
8	A I think at that time I had a few suggestions how
9	to improve it or at least how to weed out some of the
10	unimpor ant alarms.
11	What I intended was that he would assign an
' 12	engineer to work with an operator on a long-term basis
13	to kind of correct some of the problems that we thought
14	existed in the alarm system.
15	Q Can you remember what specific suggestions
16	you had in mind at the time?
17	A Well, as far as hardware goes, I wanted to change
18	the acknowledging system.
19	Q Yes, how?
20	A So that it took at least another button, one to
21	acknowledge an alarm that is coming in, and there
22	should be a separate button that clears an alarm for
23	which the alarm condition no longer exists; in other
24	words, the same button shouldn't do those two functions.
25	Q Say that again.
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 470
2	A I wanted to change the system so that it was at
3	least a two-button system, one button would acknowledge
4	alarms as they became new. Alarming conditions existed,
5	and you get an alarm, you should be able to acknowledge
6	that with one button. The other button would be to
7	acknowledge an alarm which is clearing an alarm condi-
8	tion that is ended.
9	Q Were there other changes to the alarm
10	system hardware that you had in mind?
11	A I wanted to have more stations at which you
12	could acknowledge alarms. At that time we had only one
13	button in the control room to acknowledge all of the
14	alarms. It was located on the center console.
15	Q Was that also the condition on March 28 of
16	1979, that you had one button to acknowledge all alarms?
17	A No. We had, I think they installed three or four
18	other buttons since that April accident in 1978.
19	Q Had you installed a two-button acknow edge-
20	ment system?
21	A No.
22	Q As of the 28th of March 1979?
23	A No. The system was essentially the same as it
24	was in April except that they installed a few more
25	buttons of the same type that we had before.

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1	Frederick 471
2	Q What other system changes did you have in
3	mind for the alarm system?
4	A I wanted to eliminate a good number of alarms by
5	evaluating their importance. In other words, an awful
6	lot of alarms that we have on the front panel that an
7	operator doesn't necessarily need during a transient
8	of this type, what I consider administrative alarms or
9	inconsequential alarms, but for information purposes,
10	should be on a different panel or be eliminated
11	altogether.
12	Q Have you done any alarm-by-alarm analysis
13	of which ones were necessary and which ones you thought
14	could be eliminated and which ones you thought were a
15	question mark?
16	A I never wrote it down, but we had several in mind
17	that we could eliminate.
18	Q I take it you had in mind that you might
19	eliminate several hundred?
20	A Yes.
21	Q You never made a list up?
22	A No.
23	Q What other specific changes did you have in
24.	mind for the alarm system?
25	A There had to be a better way for identifying alarms

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	1	Frederick 472
	2	from satellite panel3.
	3	Q By "satellite panels," you mean what?
	4	A Panels that are located elsewhere in the control
	5	room or elsewhere in the plant; in other words, in a
	6	different building.
	7	Q Why did you need a better way to identify
	8	alarms from satellite panels?
	9	A Most of the satellite panel alarms come in on one
	10	of the rear panels. It is the same panel that has the
	11	reactor coolant drain tank on it, the ventilation
,	12	system. That has the same sound, same acknowledging
	13	system as all the other alarms in the front panel. So
	14	there is no way to differentiate between a rear panel
	15	alarm and a front panel alarm. You have to walk around
	16	to see the light flashing.
	17	In the event an alarm on the front panel came in
	18	simultaneously with a satellite alarm, you would clear
	19	them with the same motion and never know that the
	20	satellite alarm had, in fact, come in.
	21	We had discussed installing different sounds for
	22	different panels. We have, I guess, 19 or 20 panels in
	23	the control room that have alarms on them, and we
	24	thought that either dividing the room into zones by
	25	sound or by single visual indicators this is the

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2 area that the alarm is in -- something like that, that 3 would be helpful in quickly locating alarms.

As it is now, the way the control room is lit and with the reflection from different panels, it is often very difficult to see alarms even if it is flashing, especially if it is a clearing alarm; it is very dim.

9 It is also interesting to note that of the 1200 10 or 1600 alarms that are there, each one has two light-11 bulbs in it. Each one is tested daily to see whether 12 it is operable. But we still have alarms in which 13 lightbulbs are blown out so that if that particular 14 alarm were to actuate, it would not flash but still 15 sound, the audio alarm, the audible alarm, and it would 16 be impossible to detect without testing each panel and 17 examining each alarm individually to see if the light-18 bulbs were good.

19 Q There is no other backup system to go on?
20 A Thats' right.

21 Q Did you have any other ideas in mind at 22 that time?

A I don't think so. That is about it. These were all things I wanted to discuss with either him or the engineer that he assigned to examine the problems with

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	1	Frederick 474
	1	Frederick 474
	2	the alarm system.
	3	Q Let me jump ahead a little bit in time.
	4	We have Mr. Seelinger's response to your letter which
	5	was dated, it seems to be dated the same date; is that
	6	right?
	7	MR. YUSPEH: Yes.
	8	Q Yes, May 3, 1978. Did you get his response
	9	to your letter on or about the date he wrote it?
	10	A Within a few days, yes.
	11	Q Did you ever have a chance to talk with him
t	12	in person about the points you had made and the
	13	responses he had given?
	14	A No, I don't recall. After he sent this letter in
	15	reply to mine, I didn't follow it up because I was
	16	waiting to see what actual programs were undertaken as
	17	a result of this letter and our correspondence.
	18	Q Up until the time of March 28, 1979, did
	19	you ever have a chance or occasion to talk with him
	20	about your letter and his response?
	21	A I can vaguely recall discussing the content of
	22	the letter. Neither one of us had a copy of the letter
	23	with us at the time and we were just discussing whether
	24	or not in general things were going to be done about my
	25	concerns, and I believe he stated at that time that the

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analysis that he wrote up was going to be forwarded to 2 GPU with various action items noted, and then he would 3 have to wait and see what GPU considered to be impor-4 tant before they could take action. 5 Q Why did he have to send it to GPU, to your 6 7 understanding? Well, I imagine because they are the corporate 8 A mother, so to speak, and pass any design changes and 9 major modifications through their engineering evaluation 10 11 group. Q Since we have just been discussing Point 12 No. 3, let's look at his response to your Point No. 3. 13 He says, "In order to insure and understand 14 each of the things you said: One" -- by this, and I 15 assume he is referring to your Point No. 3, "I assume 16 17 you meant the safeties" --A He is referring to my Point So. 1. 18 19 I get it, all right. He is referring to 0 your Point No. 1, so let's go back to your Point No. 1 20 and his comment addressing your Point No. 1 is this: 21 22 "By this, I assume you meant the safeties lifted prematurely on the B side. I am not sure this 23 is true. Please respond to this." 24 Was it true that they lifted prematurely 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 476
2	on the B side?
3	A I don't recall now. There was, you know, exten-
4	sive testing after this that decided which valves
5	opened and which ones didn't, which valves had the
6	proper setpoints, and I don't remember what the results
7	of that testing were because they wound up replacing
8	them all anyway.
9	Q He says, "Please respond to this."
10	Did you ever go back and check to see
11	whether the safety lifted prematurely on the B side?
12	A I don't remember.
13	Q Then his response to your Point No. 2, he
14	says, it is addressed under his recommendations and
15	action items.
16	Was it?
17	A I will have to look. I didn't have my own copy
18	of this report. It was a circulated memo for review,
19	so I probably didn't have one to pull out and check.
20	Yes, that would be at Page 16, "Procedure Changes,"
21	1(c).
22	Do you want me to read that?
23	Q Yes, please read it into the record.
24	A It says, ring of the
25	tion to not only monitor high pressure injection flows,
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Frederick 477
	2	but also flow through MUV-17 and MUV-18. Flag how to
	3	properly throttle flow in this situation - Mackey -
	4	May 10."
	5	Obviously Terry Mackey was supposed to take
	6	action on that.
	7	Q Was that basically the point that you were
	8	making?
	9	A Yes, that it should have been pointed out in the
	10	procedure that MUV-17 and 18 will cause erroneous indi-
	11	cation of high pressure injection flow.
,	12	Q Going on to his response to your Point No. 3,
	13	he says that his response is the same as the response
	14	to your Point No. 2, namely, apparently that it is
	15	addressed under recommendations and option items.
	16	A That is the alarm system.
	17	It had to be covered under "Other" on Page 17,
	18	No. 2. It says, "Escalate the alarm window correction
	19	program in priority. This will eliminate an excessive
	20	number of lighted panel alarms at the base condition
	21	and give the operator a better chance to focus on what
	22	to respond to. Shovlin ongoing."
	23	It doesn't, however, address all the concerns
	24	that I pointed out.
	25	Q Let's go on to your Point No. 4. Your point

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1 478 Frederick 2 reads, "Your report mentions adding more valve condi-3 tions to the control room on feedwater/main steam 4 related valves. This should be given very high priority!" 5 Why did you think this should be given 6 higher priority? 7 Some of the valves that were not indicated in the A 8 panel were the main feedwater control block valves 9 which operators have repeatedly pointed out to super-10 vision as being a problem. We didn't know the position 11 of some of the major feedwater drain valves, and on 12 loss of feedwater the position of those valve is very 13 critical in analyzing the situation. 14 Q At that time where would you have to go to 15 get a position indicator on those block valves? 16 A You would have to go directly to the valve and 17 look at the stem position outside of the plant. 18 Q How much before this April 23rd transient 19 had that been a concern, that the block valves were not 20 gauged in the control room or indicated in the control 21 room? 22 I don't know. It came up several times during A 23 the startup. I don't know that we ever documented it 24 other than in field change requests. 25 Has that been accomplished, the indicating 0 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 of block value positions for the feedwater main steam
3 values by the time of the accident on the 28th of
4 March, 1979?
5 A Yes.

6 Q Your Point No. 5 reads, "The suggestion is 7 made in your report to provide the control room with a 8 system and tank volume reference. That is an excellent 9 idea."

10 What do you mean by a system and tank
11 volume reference?

12 A It would be a book of graphs and tables that would 13 list by system name the total water volume or steam 14 volume of that system, including all the tanks at 15 different operating temperatures. We have one up there 16 now.

17 Why is that such a good idea? 0 18 A Well, we needed an easy reference when you are 19 making -- for instance, when you are going to make a 20 boron concentration change in the reactor coolant 21 system, if you have one book that contains the graphs 22 and tables that you need to make the calculation, it 23 makes your job a lot easier. When you are trying to 24 refer to tank volumes and system volumes during an 25 emergency, it would be best to have those available in

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2	a single volume that you could quickly locate the
3	information rather than having to search through an
4	operating procedure or through a system description.
5	Q Seelinger indicates in his response to your
6	Point No. 3 that he is not sure he understands your
7	comment and that he thinks perhaps it is more all-
8	encompassing than what he had in mind. Would you get
9	back to him on that point?
10	A I don't knew.
11	Q By the way, he does indicate in the sentence
12	he refers to "what I had in mind." Would you infer
13	from that that he, in fact, did write these recommen-
14	dations?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Going on to your Point No. 6, "You may want
17	to consider a mechanical switch to actuate an alarm
18	which indicates the steam safeties are lifted. It
19	would be actuated by the steam flow and seems more
20	reliable than a sound-actuated system."
21	Had there been some problem with reli-
22	ability in that system in the past or during the
23	transient?
24	
25	the steam relief valves were open, and his report
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Frederick

2 proposed a system of microphones and speakers to relay 3 the sound of the steam passing through the pipes up to 4 the control room as an indication that these steam 5 relief values were open.

5 Some of us felt that that might not be adequate, 7 that a mechanical system like this might be more 8 advantageous. As it stands now, I would change this 9 recommendation to agree with the installation of the 10 audible signal because it is much more effective.

Il Q Why is it more effective?

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12 A Because what I proposed would result in just 13 another alarm light, okay, whereas his results in a 14 distinguishable change in sound in the control room 15 and it is much more effective. I think it is a better 16 idea.

17 Q Let me make sure I understand what you are 18 saying. You did not have an indication that the steam 19 safeties had come into play at all or you did not have 20 an indication that they were holding open?

A We did not have any way of telling that the steam relief values were open at any time, whether they were stuck or whether they were cycling as they should have because they are located outside the control room and the sound doesn't penetrate the walls. You can't hear

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them, so during that transient we didn't realize that 2 the steam relief valves were stuck open because we had 3 no indication of it other than the fact that we were 4 cooling down which we thought was a feedwater transient. 5 When someone walked through the control room door, 6 it just happened that the turbine building door was open 7 at the same time and we could hear the relief valve 8 open. Someone opened the door and the sound level 9 changed, so that is why we developed this as a way to 10 check the valve open. 11 Q His comment to your Point No. 6 is, "They 12 will evaluate it," right? 13 Yes, that's right. 14 A Q Your Point No. 7, "I feel that the mechanical 15 values, poor system designs, and improperly prepared 16 control systems were very much more the major cause of 17 this incident than was operator action. Although 18 training is always essential and welcome, nothing that 19 we study or practice could have prepared us for this 20 unfortunate chain of events. 21 Could you tell me what you had in mind in 22 your Point No. 7 that I ust read? In other words, 23 what lies below the surface of those words? 24 A I believe it was his comments on operator action 25

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2 on Page 11. It seems to me that he was enumerating 3 the causes of the transient relating all our, most of 4 those causes to operator action. I immediately took 5 offense to that, of course, but I wanted to point out 6 that much of what he saw was not what we were trained 7 on because we hadn't considered that transient in our 8 training, stuck open relief valves. 9 Q You have not considered that? 10 A No. So I guess he made seven or eight comments 11 here directed toward operator action. It seems to me 12 he was emphasizing operator action as a compounding 13 effect without stipulating the cause for those operator 14 actions. 15 Q And you were trying to probe the reasons for 16 the actions that you as operators had taken? 17 A Yes. 18 And relate them back to what you point out 0 19 as mechanical failures, poor systems designs and 20 improperly prepared control system? 21 A Yes. 22 Q What did you have specifically in mind when 23 you referred to "mechanical failures," the failure to 24 open of the safeties? 25 A They were stuck open.

1	Frederick 484
2	Q Failure to reclose?
3	A Yes.
4	Q But you also had some that never opened at
5	all.
6	A Yes, but we didn't know that at the time. We
7	discovered that later on in testing.
8	Q Were there any other mechanical failures
9	that you experienced in the course of the transient?
10	A I don't remember what the initiating event was.
11	That is my problem. I would have to review the transient
, 12	to find out. In other words, to refresh my memory on
13	exactly what happened.
14	Q Did the PROVs stick open on this transient?
15	A That is what I was trying to remember. I am not
16	Q Then you say "poor system designs." What
17	did you have in mind there?
18	A Specifically that those two components about the
19	poor system design and improperly prepared control
20	system were kind of linked between how they represented
21	the system on the control panel. We couldn't see all
22	the valves that were necessary to control the system.
23	As a result of this transient, we got more indications
24	installed on the panel. I was more concerned with the
25	design of the display of the system rather than the
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1	Frederick 485
	2	design of the components, I think.
	3	Q Would that be similar to the concern you
	4	have already expressed about the fact that you didn't
	5	have a quench tank or drain tank pressure and tempera-
	6	ture indicators within immediate view during the March
	7	28, 1979 transient?
	8	A That would be a similar concern, yes.
	9	Q Was there anything else behind your comment
	10	in Point No. 7 of your letter?
	11	A I can't really remember very many specifics. It
,	12	is a pretty old letter.
	13	Q Going to Mr. Seelinger's response to your
	14	Point No. 7, he says, "I tend to agree with you;
	15	however, you now know that on a steam leak the only way
	16	to mitigate the consequences is to boil the OTSG dry."
	17	What is that supposed to mean?
	18	A I think it was a reference to the new piping we
	19	were receiving as a result of the transient that we
	20	were now to change our operating philosophy and allow
	21	the steam generators to boil dry on a major steam leak
	22	rather than trying to feed the leak which was not some-
	23	thing that we had specifically been trained on prior
	24	to that transient.
	25	As a result of that transient, he is saying we are
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 486
2	now going to change our operating philosophy.
3	Q If you were to boil the steam generator dry
4	in that kind of a situation, what would you do for heat
5	sink?
6	A Well, the reason for boiling steam generator dry
7	was to initially start the pressure transient in the
8	steam system and get the steam relief valves to reseat
9	if they have to.
10	Q But you are still going to have decay heat
11	from the core, right?
12	A Yes. You are soon going to have to begin feeding
13	the steam generators either through the emergency feed
14	or feed system, but for the time you let them boil dry.
15	Q Did they give you that training, to boil
16	the steam generator dry under those particular circum-
17	stances?
18	A They included it in the emergency procedure,
19	I believe. I don't remember how it was treated in
20	training or the simulator. I didn't go to the simulat t
21	between that transient and this one, so whether they
22	covered that in the training, I don't know.
23	Q Did they cover it in the training that was
24	given here on the Island?
25	A I believe so, in the context of reviewing the
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	1 Frederick	487
	2 new emergency procedure.	
	3 Q Did you ever get that training?	
	4 A Yes, I think so.	
	5 Q Eid they tell you how you boil a steam	
	6 generator dry, would you just cut off all feed?	
	7 A Yes.	
	8 Q How long would it take to boil dry in i	those
	9 circumstances?	
	10 A I don't know.	
	11 Q Any estimate?	
1.1.1.1	12 A I think it would be less than a minute knowi	ng
	13 what I know now.	
	14 Q Did they give you any guidance once yo	
	15 the steam generator dry as to how long you could 1	let it
	16 stay dry?	
	17 A I don't remember any specific guidance along	
	18 lines. It may be in the procedure. I just don't	
	19 remember it.	
	20 Q Did they give you any guidance once y	
	21 it dry what to do for an alternative heat sink if	your
	22 core pressure and temperature started to rise rap	
	23 A No, I don't remember any guidance like that	
	24. Q How would boiling the OTSG dry mitig	ate the
	25 consequences of a steam leak?	
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

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	1	Frederick	488	
		Well, steam leak would have to eventually sto	op	
	3 becau	se you would run out of steam. There would be	no	1.
	4 more	water to convert to steam and the steam would	stop.	
	5	Q You just wouldn't have any steam?		
	6 A	Yes.		
	7	Q Your Point No. 8, "I feel that a very		
	8 criti	ical eye should be turned toward the test acce	itiale	
	9 crite	eria we are using on" and then you have the in	lltidis	
	10 "RPS"	" and "ICS."	-	
	11	What is "RPS," reactor pressure syste	m ?	
1	12 A	Reactor protection system.		
	13	Q And "ICS" stands for integrated contr	01	
	14 syst	tem?		
	15 A	Yes.	test	
	16	Q What do you mean when you refer to the	10 2000	
	17 acc	eptance criteria?	ther	
	18 A	The startup cest acceptance criteria. In		
	19 wor	ds, criteria by which the systems are declare	đ	
	20 ope	erable and capable of performing their design	functions	5.
	21	Q Why did you think that you needed to	, turn	
	22 a c	critical eye on those acceptance criteria?		
	23 A	I think in this report he pointed out that	t the	
	24 fe	edwater valves respond more slowly in automat	ic than	
	25 th	ey do in manual, and I am having trouble reme	mbering .	
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE		

Frederick

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specifics I based that comment on, but it had to do 2 with how the ICS and RPS responded to the loss of feed 3 in the trip. I must have had some concerns about 4 whether or not the ICS was capable of responding to loss 5 of feed or something like that; I don't remember. 6 Q But there was some question in your mind 7 about the underlying criteria by which the reactor 8 protection system and the integrated control system 9 were deemed to be adequate or sufficient? 10 11 Yes. A Q Did you ever have an opportunity to discuss 12 that with an engineer? 13 A Not that I remember. I may have, but I don't 14 15 remember. Seelinger says in his response that he will 16 0 look at that question. Did you ever have a response 17 from him on that point? 18 19 A No. Coing to your Point No. 9, "You might do 20 0 well to remember that chis is only the tip of the 21 iceberg. Incidents like this are easy to get into, and 22 the best operators in the world can't compensate for 23 multiple casualties which are complicated by mechanical 24 and control failures." 25

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick	490
2	You used the term "multiple casualties.	•
3	Had that term ever been used before that? Had you	
4	heard any discussion about casualties in the traini	ng
5	program?	
6	A Yes. You have I think there must be a bas	sic
7	differentiation between a multiple casualty and a	
8	single failure criteria for FSAR. They are not	
9	necessarily the same thing.	
10	A multiple casualty would be, to me, at leas	t
11	according to this letter here, more than one probl	.em at
, 12	the same time, you would have a reactor trip, loss	s of
13	feed, stuck open relief valve, and whatever, exces	ssive
14	the that. Those are multiple	e
15	to not fall into the r	ealm
16	iteria for safeguard systems,	a11
17		
18	Q They do or do not?	
19	A Inc)	
20) THE WITNESS: (To Mr. Tew.) Do you a	agree
2		
2	n .	ailure
2	3 criteria is that in a redundant system, for inst	ance
2	emergency feed system, single failure of the eme	rgency
2	25 feedwater system seems complete failure of one t	train,
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

#21

	1	Frederick 491
	2	okay. In other words, an entire train of emergency
	3	feedwater is rendered noperable.
	4	A multiple falure of a safety system would, to me,
	5	indicate both trains, emergency feedwater eliminated by
	6	some means.
	7	Now, multiple casualty, as I was referring to it
	8	here, referred to several different systems and not
	9	eliminate a total safeguard system.
	10	Q I see.
	11	A I guess the best way to say it is I was
ŕ	12	complaining that I wasn't equipped to react to a
	13	casualty which compounded itself in this way and was not
	14	properly indicated on the control board.
	15	Q Were you also indicating that the multiple
	16	casualty, as you called it in your letter, was not
	17	accounted for in the single failure criterion?
	18	A I think I was saying I was not trained to recog-
	19	nize or to react to a multiple casualty of any sort.
	20	What I was trying to point out just a moment ago is I
	21	wasn't specifically referring to a single failure
	22	criteria that they were discussing in the Unit 2
	23	accident.
	24	Q His response then is "The ability to do this
	25	comes with experience and I think the operators who had
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Frederick 492
2	this transient performed very well considering their
3	experience."
4	When he says "the ability to do this," is it
5	your impression that he is referring to the ability to
6	compensate for multiple casualties?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Let me go back to your comment No. 9. You
9	say, "it is only the tip of the iceberg." What do you
10	mean by that?
11	A I was trying to get I guess I was trying to
12	initiate some kind of probe into the incident or the
13	accident that could result in a transient that the
14	operators were not prepared to respond to by saying
15	"it is the tip of the iceberg." I was suggest. that
16	there might be other mechanical failures that would
17	cause a similar chain of events that we hadn't discussed
18	in our training up to that time and that somebody ought
19	to look at it.
20	Q Was that also a product of your discussion
21	with the other operators?
22	A I don't know.
23	Q Do you know whether the other operators that
24	you have discussed the April 23rd transient with ever
25	reduced anything to writing?
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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	2	A No, I don't. I believe that the supervisor,
	3	Bernie Smith, also wrote a letter to Seelinger as kind
	4	of a, like a reactor trip report, a common report that
	5	you fill out after a transient, telling him what you
	6	did. The supervisor is tasked with giving a summary of
	7	the transient. I believe he included some of his own
	8	personal comments in that and submitted it just through
	9	the paperwork chain.
	10	Q You didn't see that letter or report in any
	11	of the other materials that you reviewed here in
,	12	connection with the Seelinger evaluation?
	13	A No.
	14	Q That was Bernie who?
	15	A Smith. That is only as assumption on my part. I
	16	am not sure whether he did or not.
	17	Q Then going on to the end of your letter,
	18	"Some of our suggestions are good. We made suggestions
	19	on feedwater valve indications years ago (submitted many
	20	FCRS)" FCRS are what, again?
	21	A Field change requests.
	22	Q "We have complained about this alarm system
	23	Strive
	24	field change requests, what are they? I don't think we
	25	and the second time
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Frederick

494

2 A During the startup it was a form that we used to 3 point out to the engineering evaluation group that there 4 may be something that we should have changed to make it easier to operate or to provide better indication in 5 6 the control room or any type of change that you thought 7 was worthwhile, you could submit on that form and it 8 would be evaluated and acted on if they thought it was 9 necessary. 10

What we had been finding on these suggestions on feedwater and on the alarm system is that they were never passed on for action.

13 Would they all have been put through in the 2 14 form of a field change request or would there be other 15 paperwork channels that you would follow ? 16 I think that is the one we were using. A 17 And to whom would a field change request be 0 18 addressed? It is by its nature addressed to a 19 particular position? 20 A I think so, yes.

21 Q What is that?

A I don't know. At the time it went to startup group I don't know what happened to those documents or where they are now.

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Q Is the startup group a defined group?

	1	Frederick 495
	2	A No. I refer to that as being the interfacing
	3	engineers between Met Ed and the construction firm when
	4	they are deciding what they want to include in the plant
C	5	as far as equipment, et cetera.
	6	Q During 1976 to 1978 would there have been
	7	a lot of field change requests filed, is that a fairly
	8	common thing?
	9	A Yes.
	10	Q What kind of numbers would we be looking at,
	11	say, on a monthly basis, 100, 5 and I know this is
,	12	perhaps just guesswork on your part?
Υ	13	A Somewhere between 5 and 100; I don't know. I
	14	imagine the Operations Department probably submitted
	15	10 to 20 a month, something like that on a good month.
	16	Q You started in 1973. When would field
	17	change requests have come into use, first come into use?
	18	A I believe they were in use before I arrived.
	19	Well, all during Unit 2 construction. I don't know when
	20	they really would have originated as a document.
	21	Q I mean in their use at TMI 2 they would
\bigcirc	22	have been in use during construction?
	23	A Yes.
	24	Q You indicate that "We have complained about
	25	this alarm system since Day 1." Day 1 being what point
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 in time? Obviously before you had a control room built, 3 you wouldn't have been complaining about it, would you? 4 A When the operators first went over there and 5 started examining the control panels and the alarm 6 panels as they were being built, we were impressed 7 right away with the number of alarms, and I think it 8 was our job to become familiar with the control room 9 and how it was laid out, and that was a comment that we had from the beginning, that the alarm system seemed 10 11 to be rather extensive. 12 Q When would you have had that first exposure

13 to the number of alarms, how much before the spring of 14 1978?

15 A In 1975 or 1976 when they were building the 16 control room, we were over there on shift.

17 Q When you said "we made suggestions on 18 feedwater value indication two years ago," that is what 19 we have already discussed; is that the one we have 20 referred to a moment ago?

21 A Yes.

25

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22 MR. ROCKWELL: For the record, I would like 23 to request all of the FCRS from July 1, 1974 --24 no, from July 1, 1975.

THE WITNESS: We may be able to separate

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 497
2	them by systems; in other words, you may be able
3	to get the FCRS concerning the feedwater system
4	and the FCRS concerning the alarm system rather
5	than get them for everything.
6	MR. ROCKWELL: Let me put it this way and
7	then you can suggest any modifications: I would
8	like to have available to us all of the FCRS from
9	January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1978. If they can be
10	segregated by subject matter, could those FCRS
11	relating to feedwater valves and alarm systems be
, 12	made available to us, and I would suggest that
13	they don't need to be copied at this point if we
14	could just have them available so we can review
15	them, that would be sufficient for the time
16	being.
17	MR. YUSPEH: If they are here on site, can
18	we simply direct you to where they are located
19	and give you access to them?
20	MR. ROCKWELL: Absolutely.
21	Or if they are not too voluminous, maybe
22	they could be brought over here and we could
23	review them over here.
24	MR. YUSPEH: All right.
25	Q There is a P.S. on your letter, "By the way,
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 498
2	we had a 37 GPM primary leak during evolution."
3	Does that mean a leak in the primary system?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Where was that leak?
6	A I don't remember. We must have done a leak rate
7	prior to the accident and he didn't mention it during
8	his evaluation. I thought that he might want to
9	investigate this and maybe make it as a comment in the
- 10	initial plant conditions prior to the incident when he
11	was setting up his evaluation.
, 12	Q Is that a significant leak rate, 17 GPM?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Is that a leak rate which would permit
15	continued operation within the tech spec?
16	A It would depend what type of a leak it was.
17	Q You mean where it is in the system?
18	A Yes.
19	Q You don't remember, as you sit here now,
20	where it was?
21	A No, I don't.
22	Q Seelinger's response to your PS is "Maybe
23	the leak should have been mentioned, although I am not
24	sure it added to the incident significantly at the
25	actual time of the incident."

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	1	Frederick	499
	2	Did you feel, based on what you had	seen
	3	from the control room, that it did add significa	intly?
	4	A I don't remember if I felt it was signific	ant or
	5	not. I just thought that in the drawing of the	picture
	6	of the initial conditions or the accurate pictur	e of
	7	the transient, maybe it should have been incorpo	
	8	I guess he didn't think it was that important.	
	9	Q Do you know whether the leak precede	d the
. 1	10	transient?	
1	11	A No, I don't remember. I don't think it wo	uld have.
, 1	12	That is a rather large leak.	
1	13	Q In that large a leak?	
1	4	A Yes,	
1	5	Q Has there ever been any other corresp	ondence
1	6	between you and anybody else that you know of rel	
1	7	to this April 23, 1978 transient?	
1	8	A I think this is about the only time I wrote	. a
1	9	letter to someone in supervision concerning a tra	
2	20	Q Do you know of any other operator who	
2	21	ever written a letter expressing concerns about a	
2	2	transient or concerns about a circulated circumst	
2	3	to someone in the management structure?	unce
2	4	A I don't recall ever hearing about anybody d	loing it
2	5	Someone may have written a letter; I don't know a	
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

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	1	Frederick 500
	2	Q Obviously I am just asking about your
	3	knowledge.
	4	A I don't know if I have heard that that I remember.
	5	MR. ROCKWELL: Off the record.
	6	(Discussion was held off the record.)
	7	Q My understanding is that the Exhibit 20 has
	8	come from a group of documents which were produced in
	9	response to a request during Mr. Hilbish's deposition
	10	on July 9 and that that request in that deposition
	11	related to a number of memoranda relating to the
1	12	April 23, 1978 transient here at TMI 2. I would like
	13	to request that, or to ask that Met Ed review whether
	14	or not we have everything in these materials relating
	15	to April 23rd transient, and if not, if we could be
	16	advised of whatever materials do exist at this point
	17	I am primarily not interested in the reactimeter data
	18	or strip chart or raw technical data, but rather in
	19	analysies and evaluations and I would ask that the
	20	indication of what else is available in the files that
	21	addresses itself primarily to correspondence, memo-
	22	randa, analyses, evaluations, reports, that sort of
	23	document.
	24	Q Now, referring you, Mr. Frederick, to
	25	Frederick Deposition Exhibit 19, did this come from

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1	Frederick 501
2	the miscellaneous file in the materials that you
3	submitted for our review?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Do I correctly identify it as a memorandum
6	from G. P. Miller to TMI staff relating to overtime
7	policy?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And has this been in effect since it was
10	issued in June of 1978, to your knowledge?
11	A I don't know. I haven't read it. I mean what I
, 12	remember I would have to review it because it was
13	stuck in that folder for about a year.
14	Q If you review it, do you think you would be
15	able to tell if it is in effect now?
16	A Yes.
17	(A brief recess was held.)
18	Q Have you now had a chance to review
19	Frederick Deposition Exhibit 19?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Does that appear to you to be the overtime
22	policy which is presently in effect?
23	A It resembles it very closely. I am not sure
24	whether all of the details are correct. It is over a
25	year old. There may have been some changes.

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1	Frederick 502	
2	Q But it is a general	
3	A Generally it is about the same, yes.	
4	Q Are you aware of an investigation that was	
5	made by a Mr. J. G. Miller of why the 12 valves were	
6	closed on the 28th? Was there an investigation after	
7	the March 28, 1979 accident?	
8	A No, I don't think so.	
9	Q Did he ever talk to you about what if	
10	anything you knew about that?	
11	A You mean talking about the operation manager,	
, 12	Jack Gary Miller?	
13	Q No.	
14	A No?	
15	Q I am talking about another Miller. We are	
16	referring to a man named J. G. Miller, John G. Miller,	
17	an older man?	
18	A I don't know that I ever talked to him. Many	
19	people asked me why they were shut and I usually said	
20	I don't know.	
21	Q Mr. Ed O'Connor, who also was working with	
22	Mr. J. G. Miller on that investigation, did you ever	
23	talk to a man named O'Connor about that subject?	
	A I don't know.	
25	Q They apparently, as far as I understand,	
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

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2 they were commissioned by Met Ed to make the investi-3 gation. We were just wondering if they had talked to you.

5 I really don't know if I have talked to them or A 6 not.

7 At this time, Mr. Frederick, I am going to Q 8 recess your deposition. In recessing it, we leave you 9 subject to recall for further testimony by deposition 10 should that be necessary at some future point. We don't 11 have any present plan to call you, but if it is 12 necessary, we will let you know through counsel and we 13 will set it up.

> I thank you for your patience. (Whereupon, the deposition was adjourned at 3:35 p.m.)

12- Jana

Edward R. Frederick

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Subscribed and sworn to 30 before me this_.

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23 1979 21

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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Frederick 503
2	they were commissioned by Met Ed to make the investi-
3	gation. We were just wondering if they had talked to
4	you.
5	A I really don't know if I have talked to them or
6	not.
7	Q At this time, Mr. Frederick, I am going to
8	recess your deposition. In recessing it, we leave you
9	subject to recall for further testimony by deposition
10	should that be necessary at some future point. We don't
11	have any present plan to call you, but if it is
12	necessary, we will let you know through counsel and we
13	will set it up.
14	I thank you for your patience.
15	(Whereupon, the deposition was adjourned
16	at 3:35 p.m.)
. 17	
18	Edward R. Frederick
19	
20	Subscribed and sworn to
21	before me this
22	day of
23	1979
24	Notary Public
25	000

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1			504
2		ĪŅDĒX	
3	WITNESS	DIRECT	
4	Edward R. Fr	rederick 316	
5			
6			
7		EXHIBITS	
8	FREDERICK DE		
9	FOR IDENTIFI	CATION	PAGE
10	14	Memo dated May 10, 1978, from J. R. Floyd to various operating and supervisory personnel on-site	316
11			
12	15	Memo dated June 8, 1978, from Mr. Floyd to shift supervisors	316
13	16	Listing of events that occurred	448
14		during startup in February through May of 1978	
15	17	Letter dated May 3, 1978 from	448
16		Mr. Frederick to Jim Seelinger	
17	18	May 3, 1978 memo from Mr. Seelinger to Mr. Frederick	448
18	19	Memorandum from Mr. Miller	448
19	20	"Seelinger Evaluation" bearing	454
20		on the first page No. A2-3	
21			
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		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE	

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2	C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E
3	STATE OF NEW YORK)
4) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
5	We, STEPHEN MCCRYSTAL, Notary Public of the
6	State of New York and STANLEY RUDBARG, C.S.R. and Notary
7	Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that
8	
9	the foregoing deposition of EDWARD R. FREDERICK was
	taken before us on the 24th day of July, 1979.
10	The said witness was duly sworn before the
11	commencement of his testimony; that the said testimony
12	was taken stenographically by ourselves and then
13	transcribed.
14	The within transcript is a true record of
15	the said deposition.
16	
17	We are not related by blood or marriage to
18	any of the said parties, nor interested directly or
10	indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor are we in
19	the employ of any of the counsel.
20	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set
²¹ c	our hands this 2-day of July, 1979.
22	Q (h) (
23	Stephellilicher Mal Ille
24 s	TEPHEN MCCRYSTAL
25	

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

Corrections to July 22, 1979, Deposition of Edward R. Frederick

Page 24	Line 25	Change Peters	To Read Beens
28	3	Courses	quizzes
47	9	Box	books
52	242	control randoral	class class
54	16	class	clock
87 93 95 113 114 134	17 20 25 23 15 9	division Seven matter please verify - I fuel notice them habits	revision Several Met Ed believe this should be "no two? look at their bats

Edward rrederick

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Subscribed and sworn to before he this 30 day

1 1 01 Notary Public

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

Corrections to July 22, 1979, Deposition of Edward R. Frederick

Page	Line	Change	To Read
140	4	£111	? throttled ?
160	13	Geempanied	covered
160	22	spray	spring
176	81.100	syartist.	hottest
197	7	isolated	unisolable
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311	7	1,412	a-delete - not transcribed correct
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22-22 Edward R. Frederick

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 day

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

Corrections to July 22, 1979, Deposition of Edward R. Frederick

Page	Line	Change	To Read
338	10	decleshifs	backshifts
319	4	whole package	multiple failure
412	23	and	to evid
428	20	MAJONS	measures
428	22	IF	that
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440	19	them	me
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mele la Edward R. Frederick

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 day

1979 of UL Notary Public

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POOR ORIGINAL

to George Kunder and somewhere in the conversation we just pulled it out. 3

This business about the T sat meter, I believe you 4 asked me whether I think it is valuable. I don't know 5 what you are looking for there. Any information you 6 can get is valuable. You have to analyze whether or not 7 8 or how it is valuable. It can provide pressurizer level 9 I suppose you could say that about every 0 10 gauge.

11 Α Right.

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(There was discussion off the record. Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the deposition was adjourned until the following day at 7:30 a.m.

Edward R. Frederick

18 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 19

day of__

21 1979

My Commission Expires New 19, 1973

Notary Public

WALLARD PROPERTY Noticinal Joints Guild , Pa

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	1	Frederick 311
	2	open, that the operator reported a temperature of 345
	3	degrees downstream of the valve.
	4	Q What plant was that, do you know?
	5	A This one.
	6	Q Was this in the spring of '78?
	7	A Yes. It was a little accident that resulted in
	8	putting in the new indicator.
	9	Q Had you been aware of that reading before
	10	March 28, 1979 or have you found out about it since?
	11	A I don't know. I am a little cloudy about when I
	12	learned all this stuff.
	13	MR. ROCKWELL: We will break now and start
	14	again tomorrow. We will resume at 8:00 o'clock.
	15	(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at
	16	4:00 p.m.)
	17	Co and a l
	18	Edward Conder
1	19	Edward R. Frederick
	20	Subscribed and sworn to
$(\mathbf{j}_i)_{i \in I}$	21	before me this 30
	22	day of fully
	23	
	24	
	25	Notary Public Nultar Public Drenny Bake Lounty Pu
		HY DEMONSTRATE TO THE HIS BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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Laura Maria Lind

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