# U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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Report No.	50-219/80-24					
Docket No.	50-219					
License No.	DPR-16	Priority	CategoryC			
Licensee:	Jersey Central	Power and Light Co. (JCP&L)				
	Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road					
	Morristown, New	w Jersey 07960				
Facility Na	me: Oyster Cr	eek Nuclear Generating Static	on (OC)			
Inspection	at: Oyster Cy	eek site at Forked River, New	Jersey			
Inspection	conducted: June	27, 1980				
Inspectors:	Dherman he	. Ju	8/5/80			
	N. M. Terc,	Radiation Specialist	date signed			
			date signed			
	RIA	Ban	date signed			
Approved by	R. J. Bores, Special Pr	Chief, Environmental and oject Section, FF&MS Branch	date signed			

# Inspection Summary:

Inspection on June 27, 1980 Areas Inspected: This inspection was limited to the emergency planning areas addressed in Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-13), dated May 16, 1980. The inspection involved 8 onsite inspection-hours by one regionally based inspector. Results: Of the three IAL 80-13 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found. It was determined that the licensee's actions and results achieved had met the intent of the Immediate Action Letter.

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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

### DETAILS

### 1. Individuals Contacted

#### Principal Licensee Employees

\*Carroll, J., Station Manager Turner, D., Health Physics Supervisor Watsor, B., Health Physicist Tompson, R., Engineer US.AS, D., Engineer Eichenlaub, K., Engineer Young, J., Group Shift Supervisor

\*Denotes those present at exit interview.

2. General

On ay 16, 1980, the Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued an Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-13) to the Jersey Central Power and Light Company involving three areas of the licensee's emergency planning program at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

The licensee's resolution of each of the three areas addressed in IAL 80-13 is discussed below:

3. Emergency Organ zation

During an NRC Health Physics appraisal conducted in May 1980, the licensee's emergency organization was found to be poorly defined and generally inadequate. There was a need to clarify the organizational structure for the command and control relationship of the various functional areas of emergency activities, and clearly assign individuals, by position or title, to the various areas of functional activity.

The licensee has since provided a satisfactory outline and block diagram describing the emergency organization. Morever, the licensee has formulated a clear description of the interface between the site emergency organization and the corporate support group.

The organizational structure for the command and control relationship of the various functional areas of emergency activities has been developed by the licensee and the assignment of individuals to the various areas of functional activity has been made by position or title and name as required.

Based on the above, the licensee's actions meet the intent of the Immediate Action Letter in this area.

# 4. Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures

During the HP appraisal, the auditor noted various deficiencies in the emergency plan implementation procedures.

a. The procedure pertaining the licensee's capability for rapid detection and measurement of environmental airborne radioiodine concentrations was found to be inadequate, in that, the licensee had failed to perform an adequate efficiency determination for the instruments/detectors used to analyze radioiodine in the sampling cartridge.

The licensee has since performed an adequate efficiency determination for radioiodine (silver zeolite) cartridges as follows:

A new cartridge (silver zeolite) was subjected to a air flow containing radionuclides, including radioiodine. To insure that the distribution of the adsorption of radioiodine in the cartridge would correspond to the distribution during actual emergency conditions, the same sampling conditions were used to "spike" the calibration cartridge as are used for emergency conditions sampling. In order to accurately determine the amount of radioiodine in the cartridge, a Ge(Li) spectroscopy system was used. Using this reference value the proper efficiency was obtained for the specific geometry for use during actual emergency conditions.

b. The operational/reliability check of survey instruments was found to be inadequate, and check-sources were not readily available.

During emergency conditions rapid operability checks are required for quick verification that instruments are operating properly. Furthermore, criteria are needed to determine use or rejection of instruments.

Since the appraisal, the licensee has developed an adequate operability check method by empirically establishing the random error due to measurement and a confidence interval within which the check source count-rate should fall. The sources of a variable systematic error were eliminated by fixing the source to the side of the scaler and roviding a constant, reproducible, relative position between source and detector.

The criterion for acceptability/rejection of survey instrument has been modified so that the instrument is not erroneously rejected when in actuality is working properly, and vice versa.

c. The license had failed to develop procedures governing the action of repair/corrective action teams. During the HP appraisal the auditor found that there were no procedures for authorizing, organizing and providing guidance on personnel health and safety issues for the group of individuals in charge of performing in-plant corrective/repair actions.

The licensee has since developed a new procedure addressing the above issues for forming repair/corrective action teams. The procedure was verified by the inspector to include adminstrative, organizational, as well as, safety related issues.

### d. Various Procedural Discrepancies

In addition to the above, other deficiencies were found in various emergency implementation procedures during the same HP Appraisal. The significant ones have been corrected and have been incorporated into a revised set of procedures. The above actions were verified by the inspector.

Based on the above, the licensee's actions and results achieved meet the intent of the IAL in this area.

### 5. Training

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The inspector reviewed a sampling of the training and retraining of individuals assigned various functional areas of the emergency response activities in accordance with the emergency organization.

The inspector verified by means of interviews and field testing of procedures in different areas: e.g., measurement of radioiodine by environmental radiation monitoring teams; dose assessment and projection using in-plant instrumentation and isopleths, that the required training/retraining in these areas had been satisfactorily completed. In addition, the inspector questioned a Shift Supervisor, to verify that he understood the administrative policy and the command structure of the emergency organization. The inspector found no problems in this area.

Based on the above findings, the licensee's actions and results meet the intent of the IAL.

## 6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the Station Manager at the conclusion of the inspection on June 27, 1980. During this meeting the inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the inspection findings. The inspector stated that the licensee had met the intent of the Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-13).