



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-416/80-12 and 50-417/80-08

Licensee: Mississippi Power & Light Company
Jackson, MS

Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417

License Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119

Inspection at Corporate Headquarters Jackson, MS, Natcl.ez, MS and Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, MS

Inspector: M. D. Hunt 6/24/80
M. D. Hunt Date Signed

Approved by: J. K. Rausch 6/24/80
J. K. Rausch, Acting Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 27-30, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 26 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Unit 2 storage areas, licensee identified item, noncompliances, IE Bulletins and Circulars, Inspector Followup Items, and Unit 1 housekeeping and storage of installed equipment.

Results

Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in five areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction: Unauthorized cutting of rebar - paragraph 5).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

T. E. Reaves, Manager of Quality Assurance (QA)
W. E. Edge, Quality Program & Audits Coordinator
A. T. Ramey, QA Representative
*J. W. Yelverton, Field QA Supervisor
*D. L. Hunt, Plant Quality Supervisor
*D. F. Mahoney, QA Representative
*H. D. Morgan, Construction Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included 10 construction craftsmen.

Other Organizations

Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)

*J. K. Conway, Project Field QC Engineer
*D. M. Lake, Field Construction Manager
*M. L. Rayfield, Lead Resident Engineer
*R. L. Scott, QA Manager
*M. R. Lindsey, Lead QA Engineer

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 30, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the noncompliance in the area of cutting rebar during the installation of concrete hangers for electrical supports. A stop work order was issued May 30, 1980 to cover this area. Retraining has been required before work in this area can resume.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Deficiency 416/417/80-02-01, Failure to properly evaluate and report 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiencies; The inspector discussed the changes that are in progress to existing procedures that will more clearly define the criteria for the determination of reportability of significant deficiencies as defined in 10 CFR 50.55(e). These corrective actions are described in MP&L's May 6, 1980 response. The A-E at the direction of MP&L is reviewing items previously evaluated under now superceded criteria for reportability. The licensee has agreed to submit a list of deficiencies that would have been reportable under their new criteria but have been corrected and/or evaluated. The list will describe the deficiency and the corrective action taken and be submitted as an addition to their May 6, 1980 response. However,

it was agreed that if during this evaluation an item was found reportable under Part 21, MP&L would report in accordance with the requirements.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 416/417/80-02-02, Failure to properly evaluate and report 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiencies; The licensee has reported the condition described in MCFR 26, 41, and 62 to RII and have submitted reports regarding the three condition. This items will be followed as reportable licensee identified items.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector examined the storage facilities for Unit 2 equipment at the warehouse in Natchez, Mississippi and the lay-down areas at the site. The protection of equipment in these areas appeared adequate.

A tour of Unit 1 was made to examine the installed equipment storage and observe work in progress. Modifications were being made to a section of feedwater piping. Discussions with the foreman indicated that he was knowledgeable of the requirements for welding QC hold points and procedures.

During the examination of the diesel generator building the inspector observed electricians drilling at the base of diesel generator QIP75-E001B to install concrete anchors. During discussions with the workers it was noted that they had hit rebar in the base and were in the process of drilling through it with the masonry bits. The inspector inquired about permission to cut the rebar and was informed that they had been instructed to drill through the rebar then advise their foreman who would enter the fact on the Rebar Cut Log. This action appears to be in noncompliance with BPC work Plan Procedure C-24 and Specification 9645-C-103.1 which require the responsible field engineer to obtain appropriate approval before cutting rebar. This noncompliance is identified as an infraction 416/80-12-01, Failure to control the cutting of rebar.

The licensee immediately began an investigation to determine the extent of the problem. Review of the practices of all crafts during the installation of concrete anchors was made. MP&L advised the inspector that all other crafts except the electricians had programs which complied with procedures and specifications. A stop work order on drilling of holes for electrical supports was issued May 30, 1980. This order requires reinstruction of field engineering and electrical craft personnel on the requirements of WP/PC.

During followup examination of this noncompliance the inspector reviewed copies of the Rebar Cut Log that is periodically forwarded to EPC Project Engineering for evaluation. There was no record available to indicate that an evaluation of the Rebar Cut Log was performed. This evaluation is

performed off site and there is no recorded information available to ensure that the results of the Rebar Cut Log evaluation had not found areas where the cutting of rebar was detrimental. The licensee will examine this area during an upcoming QA audit at the A-E offices. This item will be identified as an Inspector Followup Item 416/80-12-02 Review of Rebar Cut Log.

6. Licensee Identified Items (LII) 10 CFR 50.55(e)

(Open) LII 416/80-12-03 and 417/80-08-01, Failure of G. E. handswitch. MP&L reported that the GE type CR2940-US203E handswitch had failed due to spring slippage from a retaining post.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-04 and 417/80-08-02, Valve stem protectors cause valve misoperations. The licensee reported on March 14, 1980 that excessive threads on the valve stem caused the valve stem protector to stall the limitorque operator thus opening the torque switch prematurely.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-05 and 417/80-18-03, Loss of offsite power effects. MP&L reported March 17, 1980 that a LOP would trip the RPS MG set and also trip the core display monitoring system.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-06, Pipe hangers not installed in accordance with specifications. MP&L reported that 23 of 77 pipe hangers did not meet specifications.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-07, Unqualified Class IE cable splices. MP&L reported that class IE cable supplied by Rockbestos may contain unqualified splices.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-08 and 417/80-08-04, Common Mode Failure of Rosemont Model 115L Trip Unit. MP&L reported that a change in the output signal occurs when the internal temperature reaches 175 degrees F. Rosemont had determined the cause to be a capacitor which will require replacement.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-09 and 417/80-08-05, Electro-hydraulic (EH) control actuator selection. MP&L reported that inaccurate nomographs could result in an actuator being selected for the wrong service.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-10, Rodent damage to electrical equipment. MP&L reported that the internal motor leads for MOV (Q1E 125-024B-B) and jockey pump B (Q1E-12B-003B-b-B) for the RHR system had been damaged by rodents. Damage appears isolated to the terminal strips.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-11, Reactor vessel feedwater nozzle porosity. MP&L reported that PT examination on the inner bore region of one FW nozzle revealed 2 areas of numerous rounded and two linear indications. GE is to evaluate.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-12, Byron Jackson pumps supplied for HPCS. MP&L reported that torquing instructions for design requirements were revised but not incorporated during assembly of the pump.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-13, HPCS Control Panel not installed according to specifications. MP&L reported that the HPCS diesel generator control panel was mounted using 20 plug welds instead of using 40 concrete anchors as specified and as the panel had been seismically qualified to use.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-14, Adjustable threading dies damage conduit; MP&L reported that the adjustable dies damaged the inside of conduit with caused damage to cable during installation.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-15 and 417/80-08-06, Diesel generator control panel defects. As a result of a Part 21 report, MP&L notified RII that they have the condition reported.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-16 and 417/80-08-07, Incorrect schedule piping in fuel pool. MP&L reported that schedule 40 piping had been substituted for schedule 10 piping by Texas Pipe Bending for fuel pool cooling piping. An evaluation of the hangers is required.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-17 and 417/80-08-08, Instrument Calibration. MP&L reported that an audit of the US. Navy Oceanographic Office (Computer Sciences Corp) has disclosed a deviation from calibration standards without MP&L approval.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-18 and 417/80-08-09, Failure of containment gas monitoring system pump. As a result of a Part 21 report by Concept Inc, MP&L reported that their system is subject to failure as described in the report.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-19, Defective factory test of carbon filters. As a result of a Part 21 report submitted by the Farr Co., MP&L reported that they have returned 24 carbon filters to the supplier for retesting.

(Open) LII, 416/80-12-20 and 417/80-08-10, Defective SB-12 switches. As a result of IE circular 79-17, MP&L has identified eight switchgear units containing defective SB-12 switches. The switches will be replaced.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-21 and 417/80-08-11, Pratt Valve Pneumatic Actuators - Bettis Robot. As a result of a letter from Henry Pratt Valve Company, MP&L reported that valves installed in certain orientations fail when a key in the valve shaft to actuator becomes dislodged.

(Open) LII 416/80-12-22 and 417/80-08-12, Inadequate sensitivity of radiograph film. MP&L reported that subvendor radiograph film submitted by the NSSF vendor did not meet code requirements.

7. Inspector Followup Items (IFI)

(Closed) IFI 416/417/80-01-01, Offsite warehouse storage; the inspector examined the MP&L warehouse facilities at Natchez, Mississippi. Items 7a, 7b, and 7c in RII report 316-317/80-01 have been resolved adequately.