U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/80-25

Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Safeguards Group

Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

P. O. Box 15830

Sacramento, California 95813

Facility Name: Rancho Seco

Inspection at: Rancho Seco Site

Inspection conducted: August 11-15, 1980

Inspectors: R J Dodds for 8/26/80
P. P. Narbut, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: R J Dodds 8/26/80
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Engineering Support Branch Date Signed
Reactor Construction & Engineering Support Branch

Summary:

Inspection on August 11-15, 1980 (Report No. 50-312/80-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspector of the licensee's activities performed in response to open items from previous inspections and inservice inspection data review. The inspection involved 40 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified as a result of the inspection.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

   a. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

   *R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
   *R. Miller, Chem. Rad. Supervisor
   *T. Tucker, Acting Operations Supervisor
   *G. L. Coleman, QA Engineer
   *D. Blachley, Mechanical Engineer
   *J. McCulligan, Engr. & QC Supervisor
   *H. Heckert, Nuclear Engineer Tech.
   L. Smith, Generation Engineering
   B. Stiver, Plant Mechanical Engineer
   J. Parman, QC Inspector
   J. Dowson, QC Coordinator
   G. A. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
   J. Uhl, Plant Mechanical Engineer

   *Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 15, 1980 which was attended by J. O'Brien, NRC Resident Unit Inspector.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

   a. (Closed) Open Item: Main Steam and Main Feed System containment penetration radiographs were not in compliance with the radiographic procedure (Item 50-312/79-03/01).

   The inspector examined the configuration of the main steam and main feed system containment penetrations as depicted on drawing M-119. The configuration prohibited including one wall thickness on each side of the weld and would not permit penetrameter placement on the penetration sleeve. The licensee representative stated that the Level III nondestructive examiner who reviewed the radiographic films did not believe the image of the aluminum film holder on the film (in the area of interest) interfered with the interpretability of the film. The inspector had no further questions.

   b. (Closed) Open Item: Licensee actions required subsequent to a water hammer event on December 15, 1978 (Item 50-312/79-03/02).

   The inspector's concerns were resolved through the licensee's actions taken as a result of IE Bulletin 79-02, "Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts", and the consequent committed actions which included 100% inspection of anchors and commitments to increased detail in procedures and increased Q//QC involvement. This item is considered closed on the basis of the IE Bulletin 79-02 actions.

c. (Closed) Open Item: The final report on IE Bulletin 79-02 had not been submitted to the NRC (Item 50-312/79-17/03).

The licensee submitted a final report dated June 26, 1980. This item is considered closed.

d. (Closed) Open Item: Several sliding supports had lost their sliding function due to support modification work (Item 50-312/79-17/07).

The remaining action for this item was to complete a system walkdown to identify and remove "Concressive" compound from sliding surfaces. The inspector examined the walkdown records and verified each support had been inspected for Concressive compound and, if applicable, the compound removed and the support subsequently verified to be free of compound. This item is considered closed.

e. (Closed) Open Item: Resolution required for method of ultrasonic calibration for axial scan of steam generator secondary manway nuts (Item 50-312/80-05/02).

The inspector examined the records of the ultrasonic examination of the steam generator manway nuts (Examination C.1.4.6). The records showed that the calibration performed for the axial scan of the steam generator nuts was the proper back reflection method. The licensee representative stated that procedure clarification was determined not to be required. The inspector had no further questions.

f. (Closed) Open Item: The lists of supports analyzed and tested for IE Bulletin 79-02 should be verified complete.

The remaining action for this item, identified in Report 50-312/80-08, was to compare the Bechtel list of analyzed supports and the SMUD list of tested supports and ensure the lists were in agreement. Bechtel Letter BSL-1057 of April 9, 1980 completes the comparison. The letter identified a discrepancy of eight supports. The eight supports were reviewed with licensee personnel and determined to be quality class 2 reactor building purge air supply supports outside the containment. The bulletin requirements do not apply to these supports. This item is considered closed.

g. (Closed) Open Item: Pipe support is inaccessible for inspection (Item 50-312/80-08/02).

Support NSW 5G-48401-11 identified in Report 50-312/80-14 as inaccessible for inspection was resolved by not taking credit for the support and adding a new support NSW-5G-48401-13 in an accessible area. This item is considered closed.

h. (Closed) Open Item: Justification for not testing small bore piping support had not been provided as required by IE Bulletin 79-02 (Item 50-312/80-14/01).

The licensee provided justification in the final report submitted June 26, 1980. This item is considered closed.

i. (Closed) Open Item: Licensee committed to perform metallographic analysis on the cracked weld on valve PLS-036.

The inspector examined the report on PLS-036 weld cracking provided by the licensee. The report is by Anamet Laboratories Inc., dated April 30, 1980 and is entitled "Analysis of Weld Cracking". The report concluded that cracking of the weld was due to the use of a nickel base alloy insert ring; probably ER NI Cr-3 (Inconel). The wye ring was supposed to have been 308L (stainless steel) material. The material came from the supply of wye inserts the licensee had maintained from original construction. Licensee representative stated that to the best of their knowledge no otner wye insert welds had been made since initial operation. The PLS-036 weld was a unique case because of restricted work space and high radiation levels. As a subsequent action licensee personnel discarded the remaining supply of wye insert wings.

The PLS-036 valve problem had been bypassed by removal of the valve and capping of the pipe. The pipe caps were welded with normal weld rod, not wye inserts. The inspector had no further questions.

3. Review of Inservice Examination Data

The inspector examined the inservice inspection (ISI) report for the 1980 refueling outage. A sampling of the ASME Section XI categories of examination was examined to determine if the non destructive examination (NDE) data covered the scope of examination as described in the ASME Code and the licensees ISI program. A list of comments requiring resolution was provided to licensee personnel. Subsequent to further discussion with licensee personnel by telephone after the exit interview all items were resolved except for the reactor vessel skirt inspection (Category H Table IS-251 of the ASME Code) which was not performed this outage due to high radiation levels. The examination was rescheduled to the fourth refueling outage by Field Change 599-0481-12-01-0031. However, the requirements of table IS-242 were not met. Table IS-242 requires a percentage of the examination to be completed by the first one third of a ten year inspection interval. The first one third of the interval was completed in the 1980 outage. The licensee representative committed to consider initiating a relief request to NRC (Licensing) which is currently reviewing the previously submitted revised SMUD ISI program. Therefore this item will be inspected further in a future inspection (Item 50-312/80-25/01).

The inspector examined the records of evaluations of reportable indications:

B.1.18.4, Peripheral CRDM motor tube to extension weld.
B.4.5.6.1, Pressurizer surge line pipe to elbow weld.
C.1.1, Steam generator A upper tube sheet to shell weld.

For examination C.1.1 the evaluation record listed three indications whereas the data record listed five reportable indications. Subsequent discussion with the licensee representative indicated that all five reportable indications had been evaluated satisfactorily but two had not been listed on the evaluation record because their layouts duplicated the listed conditions. The inspector had no further questions.

The inspector examined the following leakage test records:

L.O.1, Reactor Coolant System
L.O.2.3, Make Up Pump
L.O.2.8, Building Spray B
L.O.3.5, Condensate Storage
L.O3.12.1, Auxiliary Feed Pump A (including bearing and seals)
L.O.3.13.1, Auxiliary Feed Pump B (including bearing and seals)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.

The inspector examined the data records for recordable indications on the following support examinations:

C.2.6.5, Feedwater A Spring hanger
C.26.119, Make up suction Spring hanger
C.2.6.124, Decay Heat Removal A Spring hanger

The records indicate the cold spring setting on the hangers were properly reset. It was established by discussion with the licensee representative that the two supports with loose fasteners were not in an inoperable condition as a result of the conditions found. The inspector had no further questions.

The inspector examined the following data records for examinations:

B.1.3.1, Reactor Vessel circle seam weld flange to upper shell
B.2.11.1, Pressurizer manway studs and nuts
C.2.3.11, Decay Heat Removal B Piping 6 inch Branch Connection
B.1.3.2, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Flange to Head

No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.

4. Exit Interview

At the conclusion of the inspection a meeting was held with the licensee personnel denoted in paragraph 1. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. At the request of the inspector the licensee representatives agreed to forward a copy of the detailed inservice inspection report to the NRC. The inspector informed the licensee representatives that, with the closeout of the open items related to IE Bulletin 79-02, the licensee's actions for the bulletin were considered complete.