6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.1 RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.1 The Station Superintendent shall be responsible for overall operation of the Millstone Station Site while the Unit Superintendent shall be responsible for operation of the unit. The Station Superintendent and Unit Superintendent shall each delegate in writing the succession to these responsibilities during their absence. ch 3F 3F

6.2 ORGANIZATION

OFFSITE

6.2.1 The offsite organization for facility management and technical support shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-1.

FACILITY STAFF

6.2.2 The Facility organization shall be as shown on Figure 6.2-2 and:

a. Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.

b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor.

c. At least two licensed Operators shall be present in the control room during reactor start-up, scheduled reactor shutdown and during recovery from reactor trips.

d. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor.

e. All CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading shall be directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.

f. A site Fire Brigade of at least 3 members shall be maintained onsite at all times. The Fire Brigade shall not include 2 members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit or any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency. 3F

6.3 FACILITY STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

6.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, except for (1) the Health Physics Supervisor who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 1, and (2) the Shift Technical Advisor who shall have a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.

TABLE 6.2-1

MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION#

LICENSE CATEGORY	APPLICABLE MODES	
	1, 2, 3 & 4	5 & 6
SOL	1	1*
OL	2	1
Non-Licensed	2	1
Shift Technical Advisor	1	None Required

*Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling individual supervision CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading.

#Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours to accommodate injury or sickness occurring to on duty shift crew members.

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DISCUSSION OF TMI TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

(1) The issue of auxiliary feedwater systems is discussed in the forwarding letter.

(2) The section on accident monitoring instrumentation is not being proposed at this time. It is noted that Reference (1) proposes the addition of instruments 11 through 18 to an existing table. The first ten instruments are not currently a part of the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications. It would be inconsistent to incorporate the TMI-related items into the Technical Specifications, in the absence of the other parameters. Use of these instruments is adequately and appropriately addressed in plant operating procedures. Furthermore, many of these parameters are not of immediate importance to safety as discussed previously.

(3) The model specification regarding PORV's has been customized to conform to the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications. The times allowed for corrective action allowed by the action statements have been changed to allow for containment entry of other corrective measures to be taken before a plant shutdown must be initiated. The times proposed are reasonable when compared to the time permitted by other action statements for inoperability of equipment of greater safety significance. Further information supportive of this position is provided in Reference (13). The model Surveillance Requirement regarding emergency power supplies to the PORV's has been deleted as the normal power supply for the PORV's and block valves is the emergency power supply.

(4) Specifications for pressurizer operability are proposed to be modified. A value of 130 Kw of pressurizer heater capacity has been previously established to be adequate to ensure natural circulation in the hot standby condition. A value of pressurizer water level is not being proposed. Additional evaluation is required to develop meaningful values in consideration of providing a reasonable operating band which is compatible with accident analysis assumptions. The absence of the model bases to address the question of pressurizer level is an additional reason for this segment of the LCO to be unaddressed at this time. The model Surveillance Requirement regarding emergency power supplies to the PORV's has been deleted as the normal power supply for the pressurizer heaters is the emergency power supply.

(5) Specifications regarding CI valves are adequate in their current form.

(6) The matters of the STA and the license conditions were discussed in the forwarding letter.