

Appendix A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Wisconsin Electric Power
Company

Docket No. 50-301

Based on the inspection conducted on June 4 through 27, 1980, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC regulations as indicated below. Items 1 and 2 are infractions and are applicable to Unit 2.

1. Technical Specification 15.3.3.A.1.d requires two RHR pumps to be operable for normal reactor operation. TS 15.3.3.A.2.b permits one RHR pump to be out of service during reactor operation under certain specified conditions.

Contrary to the above on June 19, 1980, while the 3D emergency diesel generator was out of service for annual maintenance (rendering the A safeguards train, including RHR pump 2P10A, inoperable during a loss of AC power event) the suction valve for RHR pump 2P10B was cycled from full open to full closed and back to full open. For approximately 90 seconds, while the suction valve was being cycled, both RHR pumps would have been inoperable had a loss of AC power event occurred.

2. Technical Specification 15.3.7, item B.1, paragraph d, states: "Either bus A03 or A04 may be out of service for a period not exceeding 7 days provided both diesel generators are operable and the associated diesel generator is operating and providing power to the engineered safeguard bus normally supplied by the out of service bus." The basis to the Technical Specification states in part: "Separation is maintained in the 4160-volt system to allow the plant auxiliary equipment to be arranged electrically so that redundant items receive their power from the two different buses. For example, the safety injection pumps are supplied from the 4160 volt buses 1-A05 and 1-A06 for Unit No. 1 and 2-A05 and 2-A06 for Unit No. 2...." General Design Criterion 17 states in part: "The onsite electric power supplies...shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure." (Also assuming a loss of offsite power.)

Contrary to the above, engineered safeguards buses 2-A05 and 2-A06 were electrically connected and both were supplied by 4160 volt bus A-04. This condition was identified on June 9, 1980 by the licensee and is believed to have existed since May 2, 1980 following a loss of AC power test.