

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 1 | L | Q | A | D | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | \_\_\_\_\_ | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 0 | 9  
7 8 90 91 98 99 104 105 110 115 118 120

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | While performing Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure time testing, QOS 250-4,  
0 3 | valves A0-2-203-1C and Q0-2-203-1D had closure times of less than 3 seconds. Also,  
0 4 | full closed indication was not received from valve A0-2-203-2B. The probable con-  
0 5 | sequences were minimal since any abnormal pressure transients received from an auto-  
0 6 | matic closure of the main steam isolation valves would have been distributed across  
0 7 | the other two main steam lines. Valve A0-2-203-2B was visually timed at 3.7 seconds  
0 8 | which is within the limits prescribed in Technical Specification Table 3.7.1.  
7 8 9 30

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | C | D | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | G | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | D | 16  
7 8 9 11 12 13 19 20  
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 0 | 21 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 2 | 2 | 24 25 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 31 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32  
18 | ACTION TAKEN | E | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 37 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 41 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | Y | 24 42 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 43 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | C | 6 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 25 44 47

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The cause of valves A0-2-203-1C and A0-2-203-1D was the speed control being out of  
1 1 | adjustment. The drywell was deinerted and the valves were adjusted and retimed to  
1 2 | within the prescribed limits. The cause of valve A0-2-203-2B not having full closed  
1 3 | indication was a faulty limit switch. The limit switch will be repaired or replaced  
1 4 | during the next Unit 2 Outage.  
7 8 9 30

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 4 | 9 | 29 30 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 44 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Routine Test | 32 46

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 44 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36 45

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39 40

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41 42

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43 44

2 0 | PUBLICITY FILED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45 46 | NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Debra Kehret PHONE 309-654-2241, ext. 179

8010800444

- I. LER NUMBER: 80-22/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

During Main Steam Line Isolation Valve closure time testing, QOS 250-4, valves A0-2-203-1C and A0-2-203-1D had closure times of less than three seconds. Table 3.7.1 of the Technical Specifications require a closing time of three to five seconds. Also during the test, valve A0-2-203-2B did not get a full closed indication. A visual timing of A0-2-203-2B was performed. A0-2-203-2B timed closed in 3.7 seconds.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The effect on the safety of the reactor was minimal. The requirement for the valves to close in greater than three seconds is to prevent an abnormal transient in the main steam lines. In the event of valves A0-2-203-1C and A0-2-203-1D closing too quickly, the transient would be distributed across the two other main steam lines. The faulty light indication for A0-2-203-2B presented no adverse safety concern, since the valve was visually timed closed at 3.7 seconds.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of the malfunction was due to equipment failure. For valves A0-2-203-1C and A0-2-203-1D the speed control on the isolation valve was out of adjustment. For valve A0-2-203-2B the limit switch was faulty.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

After the initial timing of valves A0-2-203-1C and A0-2-203-1D, the NRC resident inspector and NRC Bethesda office were notified. The drywell was deiserted and the closing times were re-tested to within the limits after the speed control valves were readjusted. Valve A0-2-203-2B was visually timed in the MSIV room. Its limit switch will be repaired or replaced during the next Unit 2 outage.