

Metropolitan Edison Company Post Office Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 717 944-4041

Writer's Direct Dial Number

September 29, 1980 TLL 435

Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: B. H. Grier, Director Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Amenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 (TMI-1 and TMI-2)
Operating License Nos. DPR-50 and DPR-73
Docket Nos. 50-289 and 50-320
IE Bulletin 80-15

This letter is in response to IE Bulletin 80-15, concerning the possible loss of emergency notification system (ENS) with the loss of offsite power. A review of the ENS telephone installation at TMI was conducted in conjunction with Bell of Pennsylvania personnel.

The ENS telephone is a dedicated line leaving TMI via transmission/distribution (T/D) carrier equipment installed on site. This installation requires power supplies both at the site and at Harrisburg, PA Bell facilities. The Bell facilities have a battery emergency power system. The telephone equipment, including the T/D carrier equipment, is fed from a breaker on the 1B ES Valve Motor Control Center at TMI-1. This control center has safeguards diesel generator backup from the IE engineered safeguards bus. This supply backed up by an onsite emergency power source, is considered an equally reliable power supply as a battery and inverter supply. During a loss of offsite power, the ENS would be available after a maximum 10-second delay for diesel start and load acceptance. Administrative procedures for each unit will be in place prior to November 1, 1980, requiring notification to the NRC Operations Center within one hour of the time one or more of the ENS extensions were found to be inoperable. A procedure, presently exists for testing the safeguards diesels. During implementation of this procedure, the entire ES train is supplied power from the safeguards diesels and offsite power is severed.

The 1B Valve Bus will be supplied power safely from the IE safeguards diesel. This surveillance verifies and records that "block 1" components located on the 1B ES Valve Bus do not trip on undervoltage during diesel load acceptance. The breaker supplying the T/D carrier telephone equipment will react to undervoltage conditions in an identical manner as the ES valve supplied from the 1B ES Valve Motor Control Center. These test results will be available for onsite review. This test is the most thorough way available to verify that

extensions of the ENS will remain functional in the event of loss of offsite power. This procedure will be implemented prior to startup.

This review and preparation of this report required 75 hours.

Sincerely,

Director-TMI-1

HDH: DGM: 1ma

cc: R. W. Reid

B. J. Snyder

J. T. Collins

H. Silver

D. Dilanni

Director

Division of Reactor Operations Inspection U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, D.C. 20555