

SP906-1

DUKE POWER COMPANY


ELECTRIC CENTER, BOX 38189, CHARLOTTE N. C. 28242

L. C. DAIL
VICE PRESIDENT
DESIGN ENGINEER-10

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206

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September 25, 1980

Secretary of the Commission
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Attention: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject: NUREG-0654
Comments
Duke File: A-12.16.1

Dear Sir:

Attached are Duke's comments on NUREG-0654, entitled "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

Very truly yours,

L. C. Dail, Vice-President
Design Engineering Department

EKM/pam

Attachment

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COMMENTS ON NUREG - 0654
ENTITLED " CRITERIA FOR PREPARATION AND
EVALUATION OF RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN SUPPORT OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS "

| <u>SECTION</u> | <u>PAGE</u> | <u>COMMENT</u> |
|----------------|-------------|--|
| Table B-1 | 31-32 | At least one hour is required to supplement shift staffing, based upon notification and travel time. Several hours (1-4) may be required for corporate personnel to reach the station. The requirement for maintenance personnel on-shift cannot be justified from a cost benefit standpoint; support within one hour is adequate. |
| G.3.b | 43 | News media personnel must be prevented from interfering with personnel in the emergency response organization in the Emergency Operations Facility. Co-location should be permissible only if barriers are available to achieve some separation. |
| H.2 | 44 | There is no apparent basis for having Emergency Operations Facility within one mile of the reactor. |
| H.6 | 45 | We presume this paragraph is intended to apply only to portable monitoring equipment. |
| H.9 | 46 | Paragraph H.1 specifies an onsite operational support center in accordance with NRC letter dated 10/30/79; criteria in this paragraph conflict with that letter. |
| I.5 | 48 | See comments for Appendix 2. |
| J.10.c | 52 | It is impossible to notify all segments of transient and resident population. |
| J.10.h | 54 | Jurisdictional boundaries may not be conducive to relocation centers 5-10 miles beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ. |
| N.1.a | 61 | Exercise frequency should not require participation by any organization more often than once per year. This would apply to state and local governments, licensees and individual nuclear stations. |
| N.2.e | 63 | Health physics drill frequency should be annual to be consistent with other drills. |

| <u>SECTION</u> | <u>PAGE</u> | <u>COMMENT</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|---|
| <u>App.2</u> 1.c.(1) | 2-1 | The acceptance criteria go well beyond installed equipment capabilities at operational stations. Parameters needed should be related to predication methods used. |
| 1.c.(4) | 2-2 | There is no justification for redundant power sources if capability to obtain meteorological data via backup system/procedures exists. |
| 2.c.(1) | 2-3 | The most likely situation requiring a backup system would be as a result of natural phenomena (tornado, etc.), which would most likely incapacitate all onsite meteorological capacity. Thus a remote backup is preferable, but the information may not be representative of site environs. |
| 2.c.(5) | 2-3 | Application of quality assurance requirements to meteorological systems serves only to limit available technology/vendors and extend the schedule. This proposed requirement could not be backfit to existing systems. |
| 2.c.(6) | 2-3 | If two methods to obtain meteorological data exist, redundant power sources cannot be justified. |
| 3.c.(1) | 2-4 | "Real-time" should be changed to "periodically using the latest available information." |
| 4.c.(1) | 2-5 | Meteorological information is characteristically slow in rate of change, and should be validated prior to off-site transmission to preclude decisions/recommendations based upon erroneous information. Since "real-time" information cannot be justified, the most accurate means of data transmission is telephone/telecopier. |
| App.3 | 3-1 | <p>The design objective of notifying the affected population within a 10 mile radius within 15 minutes cannot be justified. The only accidents that could result in releases within 30 minutes per WASH 1400 are those denoted as PWR 8 and PWR 9. Releases from such accidents are low level, short duration and extremely low probability.</p> <p>Based upon the above and plume dispersion characteristics, it is more reasonable to begin notification of population out to a 2-3 mile radius in a short time-frame. Beyond 2-3 miles, significantly more time should be allowed.</p> |