UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Numbers: 50-321/89-31 and 50-366/89-31

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201

Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366

License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch Units 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: October 28 - November 24, 1989

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors: _____ 12-1-89
John E. Menning, Senior Resident Inspector — Date Signed

_____ 12-1-89
Randall A. Musser, Resident Inspector — Date Signed

Approved by: _____ 12-2-89
Kenneth E. Brockman, Chief, Project Section 3B — Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Testing Observation, and Followup of Previous Inspection Findings.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. However, one weakness was identified during this reporting period. The weakness was related to the licensee's controls for ensuring that the most current revisions of procedures were utilized in the plant (paragraph 4).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Davis, Manager General Support
J. Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
*P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
*O. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance Manager
G. Goode, Engineering Support Manager
*M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
J. Lewis, Acting Operations Manager
*C. Moore, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
H. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
*H. Sumner, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
*S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
R. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

*J. Menning
*R. Musser

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2

Unit 1 continued to operate at power during this reporting period. Unit 2 remained in the condenser retubing/refueling outage that commenced on September 4, 1989. The reloading of the Unit 2 core was completed on October 30, 1989.

The inspectors kept themseives informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included control room manning, access control, operator professionalism and attentiveness, adherence to procedures, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, instrument readings, recorder traces, annunciator alarms, operability of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system channels, availability of power sources, and operability of the Safety Parameter Display system.

These observations also included log book entries, tags and clearances on equipment, temporary alterations in effect, ECCS system lineups, containment integrity, reactor mode switch position, conformance with technical specification safety limits, daily surveillances, plant chemistry, scram discharge volume valve positions, and rod movement controls. This inspection activity involved numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.

The operability of selected safety-related systems was confirmed on, essentially, a weekly basis. These confirmations involved the verification of proper valve and control switch positioning, proper circuit breaker and fuse alignment, and the operability of related instrumentation and support systems. Major components were also inspected for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and general condition. On November 2, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the Unit 1 SGTS. Proper switch, electrical, and valve alignments were confirmed using Attachments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, to procedure 34SO-T46-001-1S. On November 13, 1989, the inspector confirmed the operability of the "1A", "1B", and "1C" emergency diesel generators. Proper switch, breaker, and valve lineups were confirmed using Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 5 to procedure 34SO-R43-001-1S. During this walkdown, the inspector observed that valve 1R43-F089B was unlabeled. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Shift Supervisor. On November 16, 1989, the operability of that portion of the Unit 1 PSW system within the Intake Structure was confirmed. Proper breaker, switch, and valve positions were verified using Data Packages 1 and 2 to procedure 34SO-P41-001-1S.

General plant tours were conducted on, at least, a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, diesel generator building, intake structure, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were toured. Observations included general plant/equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire alarms, fire extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, fire barriers, emergency equipment, control of ignition sources and flammable materials, and control of maintenance/surveillance activities in progress. Radiation protection controls, implementation of the physical security program, housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, control of missile hazards, and instrumentation and alarms in the main control room were also observed.

The inspectors observed selected operations shift turnover briefings to confirm that all necessary information concerning the status of plant systems was being addressed. Each briefing was conducted by the oncoming OSOS. The inspectors noted that each OSOS discussed existing plant problems, activities that were anticipated for the shift, and any new standing orders or management directives. Radiological and industrial safety were generally stressed. The STAs discussed any recent procedure revisions that impacted the attendees. The inspectors attended shift turnover briefings on the following dates and shifts: November 17, 1989 - Day, November 22, 1989 - Day, and November 24, 1989 - Day.

Several active safety-related equipment clearances were reviewed to confirm that they were properly prepared and placed. Involved circuit breakers, switches, and valves were walked down to verify that the clearance tags were in place and legible and that the equipment was properly positioned. Equipment clearance program requirements are specified in licensee procedure 30AC-OPS-001-0S, "Control of Equipment Clearances and Tags." On November 2, 1989, Unit 1 equipment clearances 1-89-1068 and 1-89-1120 were walked down. These clearances (1-89-1068 and 1-89-1120, respectively) were placed to ensure that the core spray jockey pump would not lose suction if the AOV suction valve (1E21-F070A) isolated on loss of air. This was needed to support maintenance on a PSW valve pit sump pump motor. On November 15, 1989, Unit 2 equipment clearance 2-89-1586 was walked down. This clearance was placed to support maintenance on the "2B" RHRSW pump motor.

Implementation of the licensee's sampling program was reviewed by the inspector. This review involved observation of sampling activities (reactor coolant and tank sampling) and chemistry surveillance. Related records were also reviewed. During this inspection period, the inspector monitored the following activities. On November 2, 1989, the inspector observed portions of the calibration of the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor (1D11-K604) in accordance with procedure 62CI-CAL-009-0S. On November 17, 1989, the inspector observed the Off Gas (Stack) Monitors Monthly Source Check in accordance with procedure 62CI-CAL-007-0S.

The licensee's deficiency control system was reviewed to verify that the system is functioning as intended. Licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-004-0S, "Deficiency Control System," establishes requirements and responsibilities for the preparation, processing, review, and disposition of deficiency reporting documents. This procedure applies to all deficiencies affecting equipment, procedures, or personnel. Deficiencies are reported on Deficiency Cards. On October 30, 1989, the inspector reviewed recently prepared DCs and verified that the DCs had been prepared as required by the controlling procedure and that several deficiencies that were noted in the Shift Supervisors' logs had been documented on DCs. More specifically, the inspector observed that DC 2-89-3440 had been prepared to document the unanticipated tripping of scram discharge volume level switch 2C11-N660B/N060B. It was also noted that DC 2-89-3469 had been generated to document the upscale failure of the "2A" SRM. On November 13, 1989, the inspector also reviewed recently prepared DCs and verified that problems observed in the plant had been properly documented. The inspector noted that DC 1-89-4668 had been prepared to document the unanticipated cycling of drywell floor drain sump pump 1G11-C001B. It was also noted that DC 2-89-3677 had been generated to document a defective gasket in the scavenging air inlet manifold of emergency diesel generator 2R43-S001A.

Selected portions of the containment isolation lineup were reviewed to confirm that the lineup was correct. The review involved verification of proper valve positioning, verification that motor and air-operated valves were not mechanically blocked and that power was available (unless blocking or power removal was required), and inspection of piping upstream of the valves for leakage or leakage paths. On November 1, 1989, the inspector reviewed the following Unit 1 containment isolation valves: 1C41-F006, 1D11-F051, 1D11-F053, 1E11-F004A, 1E11-F011A, 1E11-F011B, 1E11-F016A, 1E11-F016B, 1E11-F023, 1E11-F026A, 1E11-F026B, 1E11-F030A, 1E11-F030C, 1E11-F055A, 1E11-F055B, 1E11-F103A, 1E11-F103B, 1E21-F001A, 1E21-F015A, 1E21-F015B, 1T48-F340, and 1T48-F341. On November 9, 1989, the inspector reviewed these additional Unit 1 containment isolation valves: 1E11-F028A, 1E21-F031A, 1E21-F031B, 1E21-F036B, 1E21-F044A, 1E41-F104, 1E41-F111, 1E41-F121, 1E41-F122, 1P21-F353, 1P33-F004, 1P33-F005, 1P33-F006, 1P33-F012, 1P33-F013, 1P33-F014, and 1P41-F050.

During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's controls on overtime of personnel who perform safety-related functions. Section 6.2.2.g of the technical specifications establishes requirements for the control of such overtime, and Section 8.4 of licensee procedure 30AC-OPS-003-0S, "Plant Operations," provides implementing instructions to support the technical specification requirements. On November 3, 1989, the inspector reviewed a Maintenance Department Overtime Report for the month of September and determined that technical specification and procedural requirements had been met.

On November 17, 1989, the inspector verified that all required notices to workers were appropriately and conspicuously posted pursuant to 10 CFR 19.11. The licensee has established posting locations at the Waste Separation and Temporary Storage Facility, Simulator Building near the breakroom, Service Building near the cafeteria, and Security Building. The inspector reviewed the postings at these locations and observed no discrepancies.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Maintenance Observation (62703) Unit 2

During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all, or part, of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality controls. The primary maintenance observations during this month are summarized below:

Maintenance Activity		Date
a.	Reassembly of the Reactor Vessel, in accordance with procedure 52GM-MME-004-2S and MWO 2-89-3330	11/06-08/89
b.	Detection of a Ground on the "2A" Station Batteries, in accordance with MWO 2-89-6014	11/17/89
c.	Installation of the "2B" RHRSW Pump Motor, in accordance with MWO 2-89-4929	11/21/89
d.	SLC System Pump and Accumulator Cleaning and Precharge Check, in accordance with procedure 52PM-C41-103-2S and MWO 2-89-6113	11/22/89

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Unit 2

The inspector observed the performance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, verification of conformance to the technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all, or part, of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during this month are summarized below:

Surveillance Testing Activity		Date
a.	Scram Discharge Volume Isolation Valve Timing and Closure Test, in accordance with procedure 34SV-C11-002-2S	11/03/89
b.	Diesel Generator "2C" 18-Month Surveillance Test, Part 3 (LOSP), in accordance with procedure 42SV-R43-017-2S	11/06/89

c. Sampling of the Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tanks, in accordance with procedure 62CH-SAM-003-0S — 11/17/89

d. Control Rod Scram Accumulators Pressure and Leak Detectors Functional Test and Calibration, in accordance with procedure 57SV-C11-003-2S — 11/22/89

On November 3, 1989, during the performance of "Scram Discharge Volume Isolation Valve Timing and Closure Test," conducted in accordance with procedure 34SV-C11-002-2S, the inspector noted that the operator performing the surveillance was utilizing a procedure that was not the most current revision. Specifically, procedure revision number "REVISION 0, EDITORIAL CHANGE 1" was being utilized in lieu of the most current revision number, "REVISION 0, EDITORIAL CHANGE 2". The inspector informed the Shift Supervisor of the discrepancy, who then immediately stopped the surveillance test. A comparison between the two versions of the procedure revealed that all differences were editorial in nature, and, therefore, did not affect the technical aspects of the procedure. A similar discrepancy was discussed in NRC Inspection Report Numbers 50-321/89-27 and 50-366/89-27. A weakness exists in this area, since several instances have recently been identified in which the most recent revisions of procedures were not being used. Licensee management should stress, to all procedure users, the importance of utilizing the most current revision of a procedure. The inspector will continue to monitor licensee performance in this area as well as following up on the licensees response to IFI 50-321,366/89-27-03.

One weakness was identified.

5. Followup of Previous Inspection Findings (92701) Units 1 and 2

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 321,366/88-40-01, Actions to be Taken to Ensure Auto Tie of the Emergency Diesel Generator

The inspector reviewed the corrective actions implemented by the licensee to ensure auto tie of the emergency diesel generators. The first corrective action involved implementation of a DCR to change the setpoint on the underfrequency relay (which controls the auto tie speed of the engine) from approximately 59.6 Hz to approximately 58.8 Hz. The inspector reviewed the closed out DCR packages (DCR 88-203 for Unit 1 and DCR 88-204 for Unit 2) and confirmed that the changes had been implemented. The second corrective action involved the resetting of the "Governor Not At Synch Speed Setting" annunciator. The inspector confirmed that this alarm was received on all five EDGs prior to reaching 58.8 Hz by reviewing the monthly operability procedures (34SV-R43-001-1S - "1A" EDG, 34SV-R43-002-1S - "1B" EDG, 34SV-R43-003-1S - "1C" EDG, 34SV-R43-001-2S - "2A" EDG, 34SV-R43-003-2S - "2C" EDG) which were

temporarily modified in May 1989 to perform this test. The third corrective action involved modifying the annunciator response procedures for the "Governor Not At Synch Speed Setting" alarm. The inspector reviewed the procedures (34AR-652-108-1S - "1A" EDG, 34AR-652-208-1S - "1B" EDG, 34AR-652-308-1S - "1C" EDG, 34AR-652-108-2S - "2A" EDG, 34AR-652-208-2S - "1B" EDG, and 34AR-652-308-2S - "2C" EDG) in the control rooms and determined that they were adequate and would perform their intended function. Review of this matter is closed.

6. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 27, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. Emphasis was placed on the weakness discussed in paragraph 4. The licensee was also informed that the IFI discussed in paragraph 5 was considered closed. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Item Number	Status	Description/Reference Paragraph
321,366/88-40-01	Closed	IFI - Actions to be Taken to Ensure Auto Tie of the Emergency Diesel Generator (paragraph 5)

7. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOV - Air Operated Valve
CFR - Code of Federal Regulations
DC - Deficiency Card
DCR - Design Change Request
ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System
EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator
ESF - Engineered Safety Feature
Hz - Hertz
IFI - Inspector Followup Item
LOSP - Loss of Off-site Power
MWO - Maintenance Work Order
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSOS - On-Shift Operations Supervisor
PSW - Plant Service Water System
RHRSW - Residual Heat Removal Service Water
SGTS - Standby Gas Treatment System
SLC - Standby Liquid Control
SRM - Source Range Monitor
STA - Shift Technical Advisor
TS - Technical Specifications