TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 1578 Lookout Place

NOV 17 1989

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - SPECIAL REPORT 89-14

The enclosed special report provides details concerning fire barriers being nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with Action Statement (a) of Limiting Condition for Operation 3 7.12.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6651.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs

Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SPECIAL REPORT 89-14 UNIT 1

Description of Event

On October 21, 1989, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, 2,235 pounds per square inch gauge, 578 degrees Fahrenheit, four fire barriers (Fire Doors A-25, A-29, A-42, and A-46) were nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. Fire Doors A-25 and A-46 are on auxiliary building Elevation 669 serving the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) 1A-A and 2A-A rooms respectively. Fire Doors A-29 and A-42 are in the same respective building locations serving the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1B-B and 2B-B rooms respectively. The fire doors were breached to run temporary hose lines from leaking room coolers in the CCP rooms to the floor drain in the TDAFWP rooms. As required by the action statement of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12, a roving fire watch was established, and fire detectors in the area were verified operable within one hour. On November 14, 1989, the temporary hoses were rerouted to motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump drains, and the fire breaches for TDAFWP Fire Doors A-25 and A-46 were closed. This also included the rerouting of the temporary hose reported in Special Report 89-09.

Cause of Event

The floor drain in each CCP room leads to the tritiated drain collector tank. The CCP room coolers are leaking essential raw cooling water (ERCW) from their cooling coils. Because ERCW is simply river water, it is not prudent or cost-effective to treat it as radiological waste; i.e., the increased volume of water impacts needed radiological waste processing capabilities. Thus, the decision was made to run temporary hose lines from the CCP room coolers to alternate drains. The temporary hose lines will remain in place until the CCP room coolers are replaced.

Analysis of Event

This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of Action Statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12. A roving fire watch was established to inspect the associated rooms on an hourly basis ar required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12. The existing fire detection and fire suppression system for the affected areas is operable and would actuate in the event of a fire. Therefore, there is no danger to safety-related equipment.

Corrective Action

The roving fire watch will remain in effect until the CCP room coolers are replaced, the temporary hose lines removed, and the fire barriers restored to functional status including the Fire Door A-28 reported in Special Report 89-09. SQN has developed an action plan to coordinate the replacement of the room cooler cooling coils. This work will be scheduled and completed as the replacement cooling coils for the room coolers are received. The scheduled arrival date for the last cooling coil is January 12, 1990.

Commitment

None.