

FGE



August 29, 1980
CPY-835-80

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1990 North California Blvd.
Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specifications, Paragraph 3.7.1.6, attached is a revision to Licensee Event Report No. 80-05, concerning a situation where main steam isolation valves failed to close as required.

Sincerely,

C. P. Yundt
General Manager

JCP
CPY/JCP:na
attachments

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UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE APRIL 22, 1980

1. Report No.: 80-05
2. a. Report Date; August 29, 1980
b. Occurrence Date: April 11, 1980
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048
4. Identification of Occurrence:
Main steam isolation valves failed to fully close as required.
5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
The plant was in various modes of operation including Mode 3, hot standby and Mode 2, startup during the three separate instances covered by this report.
6. Description of Occurrence:
During periodic surveillance testing and during startup physics testing, various main steam isolation valves failed to fully close in response to a manual closing signal. In all cases, the packing on the operating shaft was readjusted and the valves operated properly.
7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The apparent cause of this occurrence is component failure. The failure to close was due to the valve stem sticking in the open position.
8. Analysis of Occurrence:
This event had no effect on plant or public safety. The valves were not called on to perform their safety function during this time. Had the valves been required to perform their safety function, they would have performed as required because the valves are reverse seating swing check valves which will seat with steam flow. In all cases, failure of the valves to close has occurred during no-flow conditions, which relies on gravity to close the swing check valve. This occurrence is one of a valve specifically designed for a particular type of service (steam flow through valve) being tested during other conditions for which it was not designed (no steam flow). This is required due to the difficulty of testing them with steam flow.
9. Corrective Action:
The immediate corrective action taken in each case was to loosen the packing and cycle the valves. This is not a permanent solution, however, because this results in steam leakage past the packing. The permanent corrective action(s) is still being investigated. Options discussed so far include

strengthening the spring in the existing operator, adding a positive operator in the close direction, replacing the packing with another type or with a mechanical seal. Another option being investigated is changing the test procedure and/or the Technical Specifications to perform the test with steam flow in the valve.