

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-409/80-04

Docket No. 50-409

License No. DPR-45

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue, South
La Crosse, WI 54601

Facility Name: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

Inspection At: La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI

Inspection Conducted: June, 1980

Inspectors: <i>K. R. Ridgway</i> K. R. Baker (June 6-20, 1980)	<u>7/9/80</u>
<i>K. R. Ridgway</i> K. R. Ridgway (June 2-13, 23-27, 1980)	<u>7/9/80</u>
<i>K. R. Ridgway</i> W. L. Forney (June 2-6, 23-30, 1980)	<u>7/9/80</u>
<i>K. R. Ridgway</i> M. W. Branch (June 2-6, 1980)	<u>7/9/80</u>
Approved By: <i>K. R. Ridgway</i> D. C. Boyd, Chief, Projects Section 4	<u>7/9/80</u>

Inspection Summary

Inspection during June, 1980 (Report No. 50-409/80-04)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's operational safety; surveillance; maintenance, TMI short-term modifications, and followup action relative to IE Bulletins, IE Circulars, and open inspection items. This inspection involved 244 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.

Results: In the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- *J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- *G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
- *L. Goodman, Operations Engineer
- *L. Krajewski, Health and Safety Supervisor
- *H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- *S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer
 - W. Angle, Process Engineer
- *M. Polsean, Shift Supervisor
- *W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument and Electrical
 - R. Wery, QA Specialist
- *G. Joseph, Security and Fire Protection Supervisor
 - L. Kelley, Assistant Operations Supervisor

*Denotes those present at exit interview.

In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.

2. General

The reactor was shut down on June 21, 1980, to repair a leaking mechanical seal on control rod 24 and to replace a leaking seal on the 1A Forced Circulation Pump. The facility was restarted on June 29. The refueling outage is now tentatively scheduled for the last of September, 1980.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of June, 1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of LACBWR reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of June, 1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the alternate core spray system to verify operability. The

inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Maintenance requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were reviewed:

Forced Circulation Pump 1A seal replacement and Control rod 24 seal replacement.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the fire detection and alarm system, nuclear instrumentation full scram hot short and Emergency Diesel Generator 1B monthly test and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the test activities listed above.

6. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

80-04 - During Testing (TS 5.2.6) while shutdown, the 1A Reactor Emergency Flooding Vent Valve did not open.

7. IE Circular Followup

For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.

79-18 - Proper installation of Target-Rock Safety Relief Valves
79-19 - Loose locking devices on Ingersoll Pump propellers
79-21 - Prevention of unplanned releases of radioactivity
80-11 - Emergency Diesel Generator lube oil cooler failures
80-12 - Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator key may fall out of place when mounted below horizontal axis.

8. Special Inspection Regarding TMI Short Term Items (NUREG 0578)

During the inspection in May, 1980, the inspectors reviewed commitments made by the licensee regarding short term TMI items. Several items were left open following that inspection. These items were reviewed and closed during this inspection as follows:

- a. (Closed) Unresolved Items 50-409/80-01, 02 and 03, NUREG - 0578
Item 2.1.3.a: The inspectors determined that approved procedures are in place for the maintenance of the safety valve position indicators and that facility drawings have been modified to reflect the new installation.
- b. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-409/80-01-05, NUREG - 0578, Item 2.1.6.a: The inspector verified that the leak testing of the Component Cooling Water System and the Off-Gas System had been placed on the refueling surveillance schedule.
- c. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-409/80-01-06, NUREG - 0578, Item 2.1.8a., b. and c.: The inspector reviewed the following procedures to determine that operating and calibration procedures

are in place for the stack noble gas monitor and the control room and technical support center radioiodine monitors:

- a. EPP-21, Sample Collection and Analysis During Emergencies, Issue 0, March 6, 1980.
- b. HSP-2.7, Calibration of Installed Radiation Monitors, Issue 1, May 21, 1980.
- c. HSP-6.16, Radioactive Off-Gas System Analysis, Issue 2, October 5, 1979.

9. Use of Senior Operators in LACBWR Training, TI 2515/36

The responsibility for the training program at LACBWR is under the direct control of the Assistant Superintendent and the Training Supervisor who both hold SRO licenses. Most of the training is conducted by them and other SRO's, however, LACBWR also uses the expertise of engineers with 10 to 15 years experience in reactor operations and engineering to present some lectures in the areas integrated response and transients. These engineers are not applying for SRO licenses.

10. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.