

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment 1
TLL 446

CONTROL BLOCK: (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 P A T M I 2 (2) 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) 4 1 1 1 1 1 (4) (5)
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 58

LICENSEE CODE

LICENSE NUMBER

LICENSE TYPE

CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE (L) (6) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 (7) 0 8 0 8 8 0 (8) 0 9 0 5 8 0 (9)
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

REPORT SOURCE

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On August 6, 1980, the Babcock & Wilcox Research Department (B&WRD) informed Met-Ed
0 3 that they could not perform the analysis on our August 4th RCS coolant sample. On Aug-
0 4 ust 8, 1980 this lack of performing the RCS coolant dissolved boron and hydrogen ana-
0 5 lyses was determined reported as a violation of Tech Specs 3.1.1.2 and was considered
0 6 reportable under Section 6.9.1.8(b). The event had no effect on the health and safety
0 7 of the public.

0 9 SYSTEM CODE (Z) (Z) (11) CAUSE CODE (X) (12) CAUSE SUBCODE (Z) (13) COMPONENT CODE (Z) (Z) (Z) (Z) (Z) (Z) (14) COMP. SUBCODE (Z) (15) VALVE SUBCODE (Z) (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER NO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR (8) (0) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. (0) (3) (6) OCCURRENCE CODE (0) (1) REPORT TYPE (L) REVISION NO. (0)
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN (X) (18) FUTURE ACTION (X) (19) EFFECT ON PLANT (Z) (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD (Z) (21) HOURS (0) (0) (0) (0) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (Y) (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB (Z) (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (Z) (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (Z) (9) (9) (9) (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The B&WRD has been performing our RCS dissolved boron and hydrogen concentration ana-
1 1 lyses for some time but contamination of their facility prohibited their performance
1 2 of this set of analyses. At the time of Notification, analyses at an alternate lab was
1 3 sought but determined impossible in the required time. Met-Ed is in the process of
1 4 establishing on-site capabilities for performing the routine RCS coolant analyses.

1 5 FACILITY STATUS (X) (28) % POWER (0) (0) (0) (29) OTHER STATUS (30) Recovery Mode METHOD OF DISCOVERY (D) (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Notification by B & W Research Dept.
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT (Z) (33) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) N/A
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (37) TYPE (Z) (38) DESCRIPTION (39) N/A
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (0) (0) (0) (40) DESCRIPTION (41) N/A
7 8 9 11 12 80

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (42) TYPE DESCRIPTION (43) N/A
7 8 9 11 12 80

2 0 RELIABILITY TESTED DESCRIPTION (44) N/A NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 11 12 88 89 90

8009180 426

NAME OF PREPARER Steven D. Chaplin

PHONE (717) 948-8461

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT

TMI-2

LER 80-036/01L-0
EVENT DATE - August 8, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On August 4, 1980, the weekly Reactor Coolant System (RCS) sample was drawn and sent to Babcock and Wilcox Research Department (B&WRD) in Lynchburg, VA. The B & W facility has been performing our weekly RCS dissolved boron and hydrogen concentration analyses since the Unit 2 facility is not equipped to perform these analyses.

On August 6, 1980, B&WRD informed Met-Ed that their facility had become contaminated to the point that they were unable to perform the analyses on our RCS sample. The possibility of having these analyses performed by another laboratory was investigated and found not to be possible within the time required. On August 8, 1980, with the sample results delinquent, the event became prompt reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(b).

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

This event was caused by B & W's Laboratory being too contaminated to safely perform our weekly RCS sample analysis.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the "A" steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation heat removal in the RCS System.

Although the exact RCS dissolved hydrogen and boron concentrations could not be determined by analysis during the week of 8/4/80, that does not indicate that the given concentrations were either totally unknown or unacceptable.

The only makeup to the reactor coolant is from the Standby Pressure Control System (SPC). The SPC System is maintained within the limits of 3000 to 4500 ppm boron and less than 15 cc/kg total dissolved gas was verified by on-site analysis. Since the RCS status was known for the previous week and any additions by the SPC System were within the limits, it was known that the RCS chemistry could not have been out of its limits of 3000-4500 ppm for boron. With respect to the dissolved Hydrogen, operating experience has shown that the concentration could approach, to its limit, the minimum concentration only after major evolutions. No such evolutions occurred, therefore, no deviations from the norm were expected.

B&WRD resumed the weekly analysis with the August 11, 1980, sample. The results showed boron concentration of 4100 ppm and hydrogen at 12cc/kg.

The August 4, 1980, sample was analyzed on August 15, 1980, with results of 3860 ppm for boron and 1.25 cc/kg hydrogen. This hydrogen sample is non-representative due to the 11-day wait between sampling and analysis.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

Upon Notification by B&WRD of their inability to perform the analysis, Met-Ed investigated the possibility of having the analyses performed by another laboratory and found that it was not possible within the required time period.

LONG TERM

Prior to this occurrence, Met-Ed initiated steps to decrease our dependence on an outside agency to perform these routine analyses. To that end, equipment necessary for on-site analyses was ordered. To date, some of that equipment has already been received. Once all the equipment is received, setup and appropriate operating and administrative controls are in place, the task of routine analyses will be performed on site.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A