	PART 21 IDENTIFICATION NO. 8	The solution of the solution o	PANY NAME Comsip, Inc.
	DATE OF LETTER 8122180		
	DATE DISTRIBUTED 915160	ORIGINAL REPORT	SUPPLEMENTARY X
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	REACTOR (R) X	FUEL CYCLE &	SAFEGUARDS (S)
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	AEOD MNB 7602	LOEB / MPA MNB 5715	NMSS / SG SS-881
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	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE ATTACHED REPORT INDICATES LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR		
	FOLLOWUP AS SHOWN BELOW:		
	IE X	NRR	NMSS OTHER
	RC1 ROD SG FFMc1 ROD SG		REV. 8/1/80

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1418 E. Linden Avenue P.O. Box 152 Lindon, NJ 07036 (201) 486-1272 Telex 13-8496

OR ORIGIN

10850 E. Rush S Art South El Monte, 1 91733 (213) 442-0882 Telex 67-4768



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August 22, 1980

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Mr. Robert H. Engelken Director, Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1990 N. California Blvd., Suite 202 Walnut Creek, CA94956

Comsip, inc.

RE: Clarification of 10CFR21 Report

Dear Sir:

In our letter of 3 April, 1980, we reported a pump failure in our containment gas monitoring system. This failure was due to deadheading the pump. In a subsequent letter of 31 July, 1980, we reported on a possible reportable defect under 10CFR21. After a review of the circumstances, we find that the second report should be an expansion of the original 3 April, 1980 report.

The second failure was due to again deadheading the pump but with the inclusion of a check valve and bypass line for pressure relief. While the pressure relief did prevent the pump failure as intended, the lest conditions were made severe enough that the pump motor shaft failed.

In practice the check valve will be set at a lower relief pressure, 85 psig vs. 100 psig, and the deadhead condition will be alarmed so that it will not continue for four hours as it did during the test. In addition a, noted in our 31 July, 1980 report, we are changing the motor shaft design to increase the safety factor.

Comsip will continue the corrective actions as indicated in our 31 July, 1980 letter. We request that this be considered as part of the original 10CFR21 report made on 3 April, 1980.

Sincerely,

chipme Maleron Wayne Mercer

General Manager

WM/jr