CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY



and the second

203-666-6911

BERLIN, CONNECTICUT P. 0. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 05101

The

August 1, 1980

Docket No. 50-213 A00672

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Reference: (1) B. H. Grier letter to W. G. Counsil dated October 17, 1979 transmitting I&E Bulletin No. 79-13, Revision 2.

Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Summary Report - NRC I&E Bulletin No. 79-13 Inspection Results

In accordance with Items 2 and 6 of Reference (1), attached as Appendix 1 is the summary report on inspections of the feedwater system piping at the Haddam Neck Plant. These inspections were accomplished during the recently completed refueling outage.

As stated in the Conclusion Section of Appendix 1, no unacceptable components of the feedwater system piping have been identified.

With the docketing of the Appendix 1 report, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) has fulfilled the requirements of Reference (1).

Very truly yours,

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

G.

W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President

Attachment

# DOCKET NO. 50-213

# APPENDIX 1

1

# HADDAM NECK PLANT

SUMMARY REPORT (79-13) INSPECTION RESULTS

### CY SUMMARY REPORT (79-13) INSPECTION RESULTS

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

In response to the requirements of NRC 16E Bulletin 79-13, Revision 2, an inspection program of the feedwater piping system was instituted during the Connecticut Yankee refueling outage commencing on May 3, 1980. The volumetric and surface inspections were performed by qualified NDT personnel. An authorized code inspector witnessed all volumetric inspections.

#### 2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to present a summary of the inspection findings in accordance with Item 6 of NRC ISE Eulletin 79-13, Revision 2, dated October 17, 1979.

#### 3.0 DISCUSSION

The steam generator feedwater nozzle to elbow welds are 14", Schedule 80, while the remaining feedwater piping system piping is 12", Schedule 80. All four steam generator feedwater nozzle to reducer welds were inspected previously in October 1979 per the original requirements of NRC 1&E Bulletin 79-13 dated June 25, 1979.

In accordance with NRC I&E Bulletin 79-13, Revision 2, dated October 17, 1979, the feedwater system piping inspection program for the 1980 refueling outage consisted of the following.

- (a) Volumetric inspection of all four steam generator feedwater nozzle to reducer welds.
- (b) Volumetric inspection of first three piping welds outboard of the steam generator feedwater nozzles per feedwater loop.
- (c) \*Surface inspection of the feedwater piping to containment penetration welds.
- (d) Volumetric inspection of the feedwater piping base material immediately downstream of the auxiliary feedwater connection.
- (e) Visual inspection of feedwater piping supports and snubbers located inside containment for operability and conformance to design.

\*NRC 1&E Bulletin 79-13, Revision 2, requires a volumetric inspection of the feedwater piping to containment penetration welds. Based on the fact that these welds are inaccessible from one side, a volumetric inspection was considered to be impractical. Per discussions with responsible NRC, Region 1, 1&E personnel on March 12, 1980, NRC concurred that a surface examination utilizing the magnetic particle inspection method was sufficient to meet the requirements of NRC 1&E Bulletin 79-13 for the feedwater piping to containment penetration welds.

### 4.0 INSPECTION RESULTS

# 4.1 Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle to Reducing Elbow Welds

All four steam generator feedwater nozzle to reducing elbow welds were 100% RT inspected per the NRC ISE Bulletin 79-13 requirements.

Based on the review of the 1980 RT films, it is concluded that no cracking as observed at other PWR units nor other unacceptable code a scontinuities were detected in the steam generator feedwater nozzle to elbow welds and adjacent base material.

#### 4.2 Feedwater System Piping Welds

A total of twelve (12) feedwater system piping welds (three per loop) were 100% RT inspected per NRC I&E 79-13 requirements.

Based on our evaluation, it is concluded that no unacceptable code discontinuities were detected in the feedwater system piping welds and adjacent base material.

# 4.3 Feedwater Line to Containment Penetration Welds

All four feedwater line to containment penetration welds were 100% inspected by the magnetic particle method from the accessible side inside containment.

No unacceptable code discontinuities were detected in the feedwater line to containment penetration welds.

#### 4.4 Feedwater Piping Base Material

An area of base material of at least one feedwater pipe diameter in length immediately downstream of the auxiliary feedwater connection (in turbine building) in all four feedwater loops was 100% RT inspected.

No unacceptable code discontinuities were detected in the base material subject to RT inspection. An area of  $2^{11} \times 3^{11}$  was not accessible for RT inspection in one loop due to existing instrumentation attachments.

# CY SUMMARY REPORT (79-13) INSPECTION RESULTS

# 4.5 Visual Inspection of Supports and Snubbers

All feedwater piping supports and snubbers inside containment were visually inspected for operability and conformance to design. Some minor discrepancies relating to conformance to design were identified, reviewed, and dispositioned. These discrepancies were of little consequence as far as support/snubber operability of the feedwater pipe support system is concerned.

### 5.0 CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 No cracking as observed generically at other PWR units was detected in the steam generator feedwater nozzle to reducing elbow welds (14", Schedule 60) and adjacent base metal.
- 5.2 No unacceptable code discontinuities were detected in: (1) the feedwater piping welds (12", Schedule 80); (2) the feedwater line to containment penetration welds; and (3) the feedwater piping base material immediately downstream of the auxiliary feedwater connection.
- 5.3 The feedwater piping supports and snubbers inside containment were confirmed to be operable. Minor discrepancies relating to conformance to design were identified, reviewed, and dispositioned.