

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

Report No. 50-219/80-03

Docket No. 50-219

License No. DPR-16 Priority -- Category C

Licensee: Jersey Central Power and Light Company

Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Forked River, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted: January 21-25, 1980

Inspectors: R. L. Nimitz  
R. L. Nimitz, Radiation Specialist

3/20/80  
date

R. L. Nimitz for  
G. P. Yuhas, Radiation Specialist

3/20/80  
date

Approved by: Peter J. Knapp  
Peter J. Knapp, Chief, Radiation Support Section

4/2/80  
date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on January 21-25, 1980 (Inspection Report No. 50-219/80-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors of the Radiation Protection Program during refueling including: training; advanced planning and preparation; qualification of personnel; exposure control; radiation protection procedures; radioactive and contaminated material control, plant tours and follow-up on previous enforcement action. Upon arrival at 1:40 p.m. on January 21, 1980, areas where work was being conducted were examined to review radiation safety control procedures and practices. The inspection involved 86 inspector-hours on site by two NRC regional based inspectors.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in 4 areas; four items of noncompliance were identified in three areas; (Infraction - Failure to perform evaluation as required by 10 CFR 20.201b sufficient to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.202, Paragraph 6b; Infraction - Failure to use respiratory protection equipment as stipulated in 10 CFR 20.103, Paragraph 6c; Infraction - Failure to adhere to procedures in accordance with Technical Specification 6.11, Paragraph 7a; Deficiency - Failure to label radioactive material as required by 10 CFR 20.203(f), Paragraph 8.)

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- \*T. Crimmins, Manager, Generation Engineering
- \*G. Evigan, Director, Safety Generation
- \*W. A. Garvey, Director, Station Administration
- \*A. Jackson, Safety Representative
- \*R. Pelrine, Chemical Supervisor
- \*W. Popow, Director, Construction and Maintenance
- J. Rigger, Security Supervisor
- \*D. Ross, Manager, Nuclear Generation (Via Telecon)
- \*J. L. Sullivan, Jr., Unit Superintendent
- \*D. W. Turner, Supervisor Health Physics

\*Denotes those persons present at the exit interview on January 25, 1980.

The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the Health Physics (HP) staff (station and contractor), maintenance personnel and reactor operation personnel.

### 2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Noncompliance (219/78-23-05): Failure to Label Containers of Radioactive Material in Accordance with 10 CFR 20.203. Inspector tours of the controlled areas identified several containers of radioactive material not labeled in accordance with 10 CFR 20.203 (Details, paragraph 7).

(Open) Inspector Followup Item (219/78-23-11): Upgrading of Calibration and Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Instruments. Inspector review of instrument source checks prior to instrument use indicates no acceptance criteria were established and implemented (Details, paragraph 10b).

### 3. Training

The inspector audited the licensee's radiation worker training course for conformance to 10 CFR 19.12, "Instructions to Workers" and Licensee Radiation Protection Procedure 915.6, Rev. 0, "Training in Radiation Protection."

The inspector noted the licensee is in the process of reviewing and upgrading the existing radiation worker training course as a result of Inspection 79-18 conducted October and November of 1979.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

#### 4. Advance Planning and Preparation

The inspector reviewed the implementation of the licensee's planning and preparation for the current outage in the area of radiation protection. The following was noted:

- The licensee supplemented his staff of radiation protection personnel by use of contractor technicians. These are discussed in paragraph 5.
- The licensee provided instructions and procedures for the contractor technicians at their work location. The instructions and procedures addressed the technician's job function.
- The licensee appeared to have adequate supplies in the area of protective clothing, respiratory protective equipment and radiation survey meters on hand.

In discussing the torus decontamination, the inspector noted the licensee became aware of substantial changes in the radiation exposure levels associated with work in the torus as compared to previous outages. The discussions indicated radiation levels had increased by a factor of 8 above normal levels. The inspector discussed the above with licensee representatives and questioned them with regards to special actions taken to reduce exposure prior to start of torus work.

The discussions indicated an attempt was made to obtain a hydro-lazer device to decontaminate the inside of the torus prior to working, however, this device was not used. The licensee utilized crews of personnel with brooms and shovels to clean and decontaminate the torus. The inspector noted crews at times worked in radiation fields as high as 500 millirem/hr. Additionally, floor surveys of the torus indicated exposure rates of 1500 millirem/hr gamma and 1500 millirad/hr beta. The inspector noted that as a result of the exposure rates associated with this decontamination, the radiation work permit (RWP) for this job was changed to increase the allowable exposure from 300 millirem/day to 600 millirem/day for personnel performing the torus decontamination. Inspector discussions with the facility Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) indicated he was not aware of the exposure increase implemented for this RWP (No. 1288, "Decon Inside of Torus").

The inspectors expressed concern with the torus work, particularly since the licensee had been aware of the increase in radiation associated with this work prior to commencing the outage. The inspector noted no apparent advanced planning or preparation was performed by the licensee to reduce the personnel exposure on this job to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The inspector also expressed concern with regard to the decon-

tamination methods used by the licensee which resulted in additional personnel exposure. In addition, the inspector noted no procedures to be in use for decontamination of the torus.

The inspector indicated the licensee's ALARA program would be reviewed during a subsequent inspection to ensure high personnel exposure jobs receive adequate ALARA review prior to start of the job (50-219/80-03-06).

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

5. Qualification of Personnel

The inspector reviewed the qualifications, through examination of resumes, of all contractor radiation protection technicians indicated by the licensee to meet or exceed the requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971, "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." The contractor technicians are being utilized by the licensee to supplement his radiation protection staff during the current refueling outage.

The inspector randomly selected 10 contractor technicians, performing various responsible radiation protection functions throughout the controlled area. Inspector review of the selected technician's qualifications indicated the individuals did meet or exceed the qualification requirements of the ANSI N18.1.

Inspector review of the remaining contractor radiation protection technicians' qualifications, however, identified several individuals, who did not appear to meet ANSI qualifications. The inspector discussed these individuals with licensee representatives who indicated the individuals were not performing work requiring their need to be ANSI qualified. The inspector reviewed the individual's job functions and concurred.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

6. Exposure Control

a. Exposure Records

The inspector reviewed 100% of the exposure records for those individuals who received in excess of 1250 millirem for the first quarter of 1980. The inspector reviewed the exposure records against the requirements of 10 CFR 20.101, "Radiation dose standards for individuals in restricted areas" and 10 CFR 20.102, "Determination of prior dose."

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

b. Personnel Monitoring

10 CFR 20.201, "Surveys", states in Paragraph (b), "Each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations in this part. A survey as defined in Paragraph 20.201(a) means, "an evaluation of the radiation hazards incident to the production, use, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive materials or other sources of radiation under a specific set of conditions. When appropriate, such evaluation includes a physical survey of the location of materials and equipment, and measurements of levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material present."

10 CFR 20.202, "Personnel Monitoring" states in paragraph (a) that "Each licensee shall supply appropriate personnel monitoring equipment to, and shall require the use of such equipment by . . . (1) Each individual who enters a restricted area under such circumstances that he receives, or is likely to receive, a dose in any calendar quarter in excess of 25 percent of the applicable value specified in paragraph (a) of § 20.101."

In reviewing licensee radiation and contamination survey records, the inspector noted several areas to exhibit high beta radiation fields. These areas included:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Dose Rates</u>
Bottom of torus (Floor area near south hatch)	500 millirem/hr gamma 1000 - 2000 millirad/hr beta
Main Steam Line Relief Valves	600 millirem/hr gamma 6800 millirad/hr beta
Reheater 1-4 (Screen)	250 millirem/hr gamma 1000 millirads/hr beta

The inspector noted from the above data that, depending on stay times and the protection factors afforded by protective clothing, individuals may be likely to receive a quarterly dose to the skin in excess of 25% of the applicable value specified in 20.101.

The inspector discussed the above dose rate information with licensee representatives to determine if surveys (i.e., evaluations) were performed to determine if appropriate personnel monitoring devices

were required or provided as required by 10 CFR 20.202. The discussions indicated that as of January 25, 1980 no surveys had been performed by the licensee to determine if worker protective clothing provided adequate skin protection from beta radiation or the monitoring equipment (i.e., thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs)) provided by the licensee was capable of monitoring the beta dose accurately.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the above and conducted a preliminary TLD test to determine TLD beta response characteristics. The TLD dose was compared to that obtained by use of a radiation survey meter with the capability to monitor doses thru skin equivalent material ( $\sim 7 \text{ mg/cm}^2$ ). The following data was obtained:

<u>Monitoring Device</u>	<u>Gamma Dose (mrem)</u>	<u>Beta Dose (mrad)</u>
TLD (No Shielding)	425	515*
RO-2A	438	2250

\*TLD response low by a factor of  $\sim 4.4$

The inspector expressed concern with the above particularly since the TLD appeared to respond low by a factor of 4.4 and the licensee had not performed an evaluation to determine if the protective clothing was providing adequate protection from beta radiation.

The inspector discussed the above with licensee representatives and indicated that failure to survey as required by 10 CFR 20.201(b) to ensure the requirements of 10 CFR 20.202 were met constitutes noncompliance with 10 CFR 20.201(b) (50-219/80-03-01).

Inspector discussions with licensee representatives indicated the following actions will be taken by the licensee to resolve the concerns identified by the inspector:

- the licensee plans to contract for an independent laboratory to perform beta dosimetry tests on the licensee's TLDs.
- the licensee will have a beta quality assurance program in place, including procedures as necessary, after the current outage ends.
- a complete review of high beta radiation jobs will be accomplished by February 1, 1980 to determine if any individual has exceeded the allowable quarterly dose limits. A preliminary review conducted on January 28, 1980 indicated no individuals had exceeded regulatory limits for skin exposure.

Inspector telephone discussion with licensee representatives on April 2, 1980 indicated the maximum exposure was approximately 150 millirem, which the inspector noted to be 20% of the allowable quarterly limit.

c. Respiratory Protection

The inspector viewed the licensee's respiratory protection program against the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103, "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive materials in air in restricted areas."

10 CFR 20.103(c) requires that when respiratory protective equipment is used to limit the inhalation of radioactive materials pursuant to 20.103(b)(2), the licensee may make allowance for such use in estimating exposures of individuals provided that such equipment is used as stipulated in Regulatory Guide 8.15, "Acceptable Program for Respiratory Protection."

The inspector noted the licensee is using respiratory protective equipment to limit intake of radioactive materials and has made allowance for such use.

Regulatory Guide 8.15, Regulatory Position C.4 states in part: "The licensee is to maintain and implement a respiratory protection program that includes, as a minimum...e. Written operational and administrative procedures for control, issuance, proper use, and return of respiratory protective equipment...(NUREG-0041, Sections 2, 9, 10, 12)."

In touring the controlled areas, the inspector noted that breathing air fittings, normally used by the licensee to supply breathing air to personnel using airline respirators, were also being used to supply air to non-respiratory protective equipment such as pneumatic tools. In one instance, during a tour on March 23, 1980, the inspector observed air being supplied to a control rod drive wench using breathing air fittings. The inspector noted that the licensee was using an airline sparger for supplying this air. The licensee representatives indicated the Service Air System is used to supply both breathing air and operating air from these spargers. During further review of the system, the inspector noted that "in-line oilers" (to provide an oil mist) are at times attached to these spargers to provide an oil mist to certain pneumatic tools.

The inspector discussed the above findings with licensee representatives and questioned them as to the nature of controls placed on breathing air fittings to prevent inadvertent attachment of breathing air fittings to the oiler system. The discussions indicated the licensee had no written operational and administrative procedures for

controlling the use of these fittings. The licensee has established procedures 915.5, Rev. 3, "Respiratory Protection", however, this procedure did not address fittings control.

The inspector expressed concern with the above since no control was in place to prevent workers from breathing air which may have been passed through an in-line oiler through compatible fittings. Inspector review of procedure 915.5 did locate a note (Section 5.4.2) not to connect to an oiler, however, inspector questioning of a licensee Radiation Protection Technician revealed the technician believed the oiler to be a flow control device.

In reviewing this item further, the inspector noted through discussions with licensee representatives that breathing air fittings are readily available from the facility storeroom, even though the fittings may be used for a non-respiratory protection function.

The inspector noted NUREG-0041, "Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne Radioactive Materials" requires in section 9.8 that all fittings and components shall be standardized so that introduction of gases other than pure breathing air or oxygen into a respirator system is impossible.

As a result, the inspector indicated to licensee representatives that the current procedures in use were inadequate to prevent introduction of other than pure breathing air or oxygen, i.e., oil mist into a respirator system and indicated that failure to establish such procedures for control and issuance of breathing air fittings, i.e., respiratory equipment as required by Regulatory Guide 8.15 as referenced in 10 CFR 20.103(c) constitutes noncompliance with that requirement (50-219/80-03-02).

The inspector noted licensee representatives to immediately take steps to collect and control all breathing air fittings.

d. Whole Body Counting

The inspector reviewed the licensee's whole body counting program with respect to 10 CFR 20.103, "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive materials in air in restricted areas", Technical Specification 6.3, "Procedures" and licensee procedure 915.8, Rev. 0, "Bioassay Program".

The inspector selected 12 individuals and reviewed their whole body counting records to ensure counting frequency and results were consistent with the above requirements. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the whole body count data for all individuals counted for the period November thru December of 1979.



In reviewing the licensee's whole body counting program during the inspection, the inspector noted that, 1) no procedures have been established or implemented addressing verification of whole body counter results and 2) no method was in place to correlate whole body counting results with the effectiveness of the respiratory protection program. The inspector noted the above items had been identified in an NRC inspection conducted during October of 1979 and later transmitted to the licensee in a letter dated January 4, 1980 (Inspection Report 50-219/79-18).

Based on telephone conversations held with licensee radiation and protection representatives on April 2, 1980, the licensee:

- has established and implemented procedure 915.11, "Calibration Surveillance of the Helgeson Whole Body Counter," Revision 0, dated March 14, 1980.
- is in the process of revising procedure 915.8, "Bioassay Program" to correlate whole body counting to the respiratory protection program.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

#### 7. Radiation Protection Procedures

The inspector reviewed selected radiation protection procedures for consistency with the following:

- Technical Specification 6.8, "Procedures"
- Technical Specification 6.11, "Radiation Protection Program"
- 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation"
- ANSI N18.7-1972, "Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants"
- Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972, Appendix A, "Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors and Boiling Water Reactors"

Technical Specification 6.11, "Radiation Protection Program", states that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

##### a. Procedure Adherence

- (1) Procedure 902.7, Revision 1, "Drywell Occupancy and Evacuation During Fuel Handling Operation", developed pursuant to the above, requires in section 5.4 that the alarm set point of the

radiation monitors shall have alarm set points set between two and five times the value of the background in the area of the detector.

During inspector review of drywell activities during fuel movement on January 24, 1980 at 9:00 p.m. the inspector noted the following readings on the radiation monitors used for evacuation monitors:

<u>Monitor</u>	<u>Reading (mr/hr)</u>	<u>Alarm* Setpoint (mr/hr)</u>	<u>Background (mr/hr)</u>
North	20	300	~ 25
South	110	500	~ 100

\*As determined by licensee test conducted at ~ 9:15 p.m. on January 24, 1980.

The inspector noted that the alarm setpoint for the north radiation monitor was set at approximately 12 times the value of the background in the area of the detector. The inspector discussed the above with licensee operations shift supervision who indicated that procedure 902.7 implementation was a prerequisite for fuel movement. The inspector noted licensee shift supervision to halt fuel movement and subsequently reset alarm setpoints prior to continuation of refueling.

- (2) Procedure 915.7, Revision 0, "Personnel Monitoring", developed pursuant to the above, states in section 5.3, "the TLD and self-reading dosimeters shall normally be worn in the front of the body between the head and waist".

The inspector reviewed activities associated with operation and use of a 161.4 curie Cs-137 instrument calibrator. In reviewing calibration of instruments on January 21, 1980, the inspector observed the individual operating the calibrator to be wearing his TLD and self-reading dosimeters suspended about three inches below and behind his belt against the left rear pocket. The individual was positioned in front of the calibrator in such a manner that in the event of the failure of the calibrator malfunction radiation monitor, the individual's TLD and dosimeter location would preclude proper personnel monitoring.

The inspector discussed the above with licensee representatives who immediately reinstructed the individual in the proper placement of the TLD and self-reading dosimeters.

- (3) Procedure 9.11.1, Revision 0, "Radioactive Waste Material Storage", developed pursuant to the above, states in procedure section 5.1, that "all radioactive waste material shall be stored in such a manner so as to reduce to a minimum: ...5.1.2 The radiation exposure dose rates for working personnel."

During tours on January 24, 1980, the inspector observed radioactive waste drums at the entrance to the torus and on the torus catwalk emanating contact dose rates of 40 millirem/hr and 3000 millirem/hr, respectively. The drums were stored in such a manner that personnel were routinely passing by the drums on their way to and from their work locations. At times, the inspector observed individuals leaning against the drums at the torus entrance. This practice was immediately halted by licensee representatives.

The inspector discussed the above with licensee representatives. The inspector noted the drums were subsequently removed and properly stored by licensee personnel.

The inspector indicated to licensee representatives that, the above instances of failure to follow procedures represent non-compliance with Technical Specifications 6.11 (50-219/80-03-03).

b. Drywell Initial Access

The inspector reviewed data associated with initial drywell entry and general access. The review included licensee adherence to the following licensee procedures:

- 902.5, Rev. 13, "Preparation for Initial Drywell Entry"
- 902.6, Rev. 9, "General Drywell Clearance"
- 902.8, Rev. 0, "Drywell Fuel Handling Radiation Testing"
- 665.5.002, Rev. 2, "Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test"

The inspector reviewed the secondary containment leak rate test performed January 4, 1980. The test indicated the licensee was able to maintain 0.266 inches of water vacuum on the secondary containment with a standby gas treatment system flow rate of 2500 cfm. The inspector noted this met the requirements of Technical Specification 4.5.J.2.

In reviewing procedure 902.6, the inspector noted that section 5.7 requires that radiation protection personnel shall check out the service air system for O<sub>2</sub> content if it is to be for breathing air. The inspector requested tests of the service air and was presented

tests results dated June 19, 1978. The inspector noted this test to have been conducted approximately 1.5 years prior to the use of the service air for breathing air during the current outage. The inspector expressed concern with this and noted licensee representatives to indicate a more recent sample was obtained, however, this sample data could not be located.

The inspector discussed the above with licensee representatives. As a result, licensee representatives indicated meetings will be held with the Safety Department to ensure air samples air taken as required. The inspector indicated this will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-219/80-03-05).

#### 8. Radioactive and Contaminated Material Control

The inspectors toured the controlled areas and reviewed licensee control of radioactive and contaminated material with respect to the following:

- 10 CFR 20.203, "Caution Signs, Labels, Signals and Controls"
- Radiation Protection Procedure 911.1, Rev. 0, "Radioactive Waste Material Storage"
- Radiation Protection Procedure 915.4, Rev. 0, "Contamination Control"

10 CFR 20.203(f), "Containers", requires that each container of licensed material shall bear a durable, clearly visible label identifying the radioactive contents. The label shall bear the radiation caution symbol and the words "Caution Radioactive Material" or "Danger Radioactive Material". The label shall also provide sufficient information to permit individuals handling or using the containers, or working in the vicinity thereof to take precautions to avoid or minimize exposures.

During tours of the areas located outside and around the old and new rad-waste buildings on January 21, 1980, the inspector identified two 4' x 4' x 6' metal containers of bagged radioactive trash. The inspector noted the containers to indicate 8-10 millirem/hr on contact with same. The containers were not marked in any manner to indicate the nature of the radioactive material found in them or the radiation dose rates emanating from them as a result of the radioactive material contained therein.

The inspector discussed the use of the containers with licensee representatives and noted that the licensee representatives were unaware that these containers were being used for storage of radioactive waste and could therefore not label them. The inspector noted the licensee representatives to survey and subsequently label the containers as Radioactive Material.

During tours of the torus area on January 25, 1980, the inspector noted two 55 gallon drums located on the floor of the torus area. The inspector discussed the contents of the drums with licensee representatives and learned the drums contained radioactive material. Upon further review, the inspector noted the drums indicated up to 5000 millirem/hr on contact, as determined by licensee radiation surveys, and were not labeled in any manner. The inspector noted the licensee to subsequently label and remove the drums.

The inspector discussed the above instances of failure to label containers of radioactive material with licensee representatives. The inspector noted that the containers did not meet any of the labeling exemptions listed in 10 CFR 20.203(f)(3) and as a result were required to be labeled. The inspector indicated to licensee representatives that failure to label containers of radioactive material as specified in 10 CFR 20.203(f) represents noncompliance with that requirement (50-219/80-03-04).

#### 9. Plant Tours

The inspectors toured the controlled areas upon initial arrival and at various times during the inspection. The inspectors performed radiation intensity measurements where necessary to verify licensee compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203(f), "Caution Signs, Labels, Signals, and Controls" and Technical Specification 6.13, "High Radiation Area".

The inspector tours indicated Radiation and High Radiation Areas are being posted, barricaded and/or locked in accordance with the above requirements.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

#### 10. Additional Items

##### a. Industrial Safety

During tours of the controlled areas, the inspector noted several items which appeared to be of an industrial safety concern. These items included:

- personnel walking across nonsecured planks placed as a walk way from the torus vent header to the catwalk. This walkway was approximately 40-50 feet off the floor of the torus.
- drums blocking the catwalk used as an exit from the torus.
- numerous hoses and cables strewn throughout the drywell making walking difficult. Some of the hoses, used for breathing air purposes, were piled on the contaminated drywell floor.

- sections of grating missing from the catwalks of the drywell. The sections were missing from walkways 30-40 feet off the floor of the drywell.

The inspector expressed concern with the above and brought the above items to the attention of the licensee's Safety Department and plant management. Licensee representatives indicated the above items were corrected after their identification by the inspector.

b. Instruments and Equipment

On January 23, 1980, subsequent to the inspector's tour of the controlled areas, the inspector examined the supply of portable radiation monitoring instruments maintained at the monitor and change room. The inspector noted approximately 10 instruments in the cabinet. The calibration stickers indicated the instruments had been calibrated and were within the calibration due date.

The inspector attempted to source check several RO-2s and PIC-6As for response using the wall mounted check sources near the instrument cabinet. The licensee representative accompanying the inspector was unable to state what the acceptance or rejection criteria was for the check sources including whether the instruments should be checked with open or closed beta windows. The inspector noted no acceptance criteria to be posted near the sources.

The inspector selected 2 PIC 6A instruments and 1 RO-2A and requested that they be source checked on the licensee's calibration source. The instruments, Serial Nos. 1284, 1476 and 591 appeared to respond properly.

The inspector expressed concern with licensee representatives regarding the check sources used by the technicians prior to use of the instrument. The inspector noted this item had been addressed in Inspection 78-09 and 78-23.

No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.

c. Security

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DELETED; IT CONTAINED 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION -  
NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.

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11. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 25, 1980. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection.