



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE DIRECTORATE OF LICENSING

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 5 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-38
CHANGE NO. 15 TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS;

AMENDMENT NO. 5 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-47
CHANGE NO. 10 TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS;

AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-55
CHANGE NO. 2 TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS;

DUKE POWER COMPANY

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

Introduction

By letter dated September 4, 1974, Duke Power Company requested changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 for the Oconee Nuclear Station. The proposed changes involve the action to be taken should a containment personnel hatch, emergency hatch, or isolation valve become inoperative or require maintenance when the plant is in an operating condition.

Discussion

Air locks are provided to allow personnel to enter the containment when the plant is operational without violating containment integrity. Both the inner and outer doors on these air locks meet the design specifications for structural integrity and leak rate. This design feature allows one door to be open without violating containment integrity.

Containment integrity presently requires that all isolation valves be operable, locked closed, or secured by a blind flange. Should an isolation valve be found to be inoperable, prompt action is necessary either to repair the valve, secure the valve, or shut down the reactor.

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The current Technical Specifications do not permit continued operation should a containment personnel hatch, emergency hatch, or isolation valve become inoperative when the plant is in an operating condition. However, the allowable times for remedial action are not specified. This proposed change would prescribe the time allowable for remedial action and specify the action that must be taken should the equipment be inoperative at the end of this period.

Evaluation

In reviewing this request, the staff determined that it was not the original intent of the Technical Specifications to preclude timely remedial action to restore inoperative containment doors and isolation valves to an operable condition.

The proposed Technical Specification change would add a new Section 3.6.4 as follows:

3.6.4 Exceptions to 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.3 shall be as follows:

- a. If either the personnel or emergency hatches become inoperative, except as a result of an inoperable door gasket, the hatch shall be restored to an operable status within 24 hours, or the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

If a hatch is inoperable due to an inoperable door gasket:

1. The remaining door of the affected hatch shall be closed and sealed.
2. The hatch shall be restored to operable status within seven days or the reactor shall be in cold shutdown within the next 36 hours.

- b. A containment isolation valve may be inoperative provided either:

1. The inoperable valve is restored to operable status within four hours.
2. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a deactivated automatic valve secured and locked in the isolated position.
3. The affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a closed manual valve or blind flange.
4. The reactor is in the hot shutdown condition within 12 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours.

These limitations are consistent with the current staff position as represented by technical specifications being issued with new operating licenses.

This proposed change was also reviewed to determine the effect on containment integrity. In the case of a defective air lock door or gasket, Section 5.1.4.4 of the Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report states that the personnel air lock doors are designed to withstand all reactor building design conditions with either one or both doors closed. These doors are equipped with interlocks which prevent both doors being open at the same time. Thus, continued operation with a defective door for the very short periods of time allowed for repair does not represent a significant degradation of safety margin.

The containment isolation system is addressed in the Oconee Final Safety Analysis Report. Section 5.2.1 states that no single failure of an active component could result in a loss of isolation or intolerable leakage. Thus, with this available redundancy, continued operation of the reactor with an inoperable isolation valve for the very short period of time allowed for repair (four hours) does not represent a significant degradation of safety margin.

Based on this review, the staff concluded that the containment integrity assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident analysis will not be jeopardized by this change and that the probability or consequence of an accident will not be significantly affected.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the reasons discussed above, that the authorization of these changes does not involve a significant hazards consideration. We also conclude that there is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by these amendments can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: October 23, 1974

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270, AND 50-287

DUKE POWER COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES

Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments No. 5, 5, and 2 to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, respectively, issued to Duke Power Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, located in Oconee County, South Carolina. The amendments are effective as of the date of issuance.

These amendments prescribe the action required should a containment personnel hatch, emergency hatch, or isolation valve become inoperative or require maintenance when the plant is in an operating condition.

The application for the amendments complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendments dated September 4, 1974, (2) Amendments No. 5, 5, and 2 to Licenses No. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, with any attachments, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items

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are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Oconee County Library, 201 South Spring Street, Walhalla, South Carolina 29691.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, Directorate of Licensing - Regulation.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 23rd day of October 1974.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION



Robert A. Purple, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Directorate of Licensing