



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TERA

August 12, 1980

Docket No. 50-293

Mr. G. Carl Andognini
Boston Edison Company
M/C NUCLEAR
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02199

Dear Mr. Andognini:

The enclosure is a request for additional information regarding BECo letter 76-11 of January 27, 1976. This letter proposed exemption to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J (Containment Leakage Testing).

Your response is requested within 45 days of the receipt of this letter. Any questions should be addressed to your project manager.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "T M Novak".

Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Licensing

Enclosure: Request for
Additional Information

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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Mr. G. Carl Andognini
Boston Edison Company

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cc:

Mr. Paul J. McGuire
Pilgrim Station Acting Manager
Boston Edison Company
RFD #1, Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Henry Herrmann, Esquire
Massachusetts Wildlife Federation
151 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Plymouth Public Library
North Street
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Resident Inspector
c/o U. S. NRC
P. O. Box 867
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
IMPLEMENTATION OF 10CFR50, APPENDIX J,
CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TESTING
PILGRIM STATION UNIT 1

1.0 BACKGROUND

By a letter dated January 27, 1976, Boston Edison Company (BEC) requested certain exemptions from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Containment Leakage Testing for Pilgrim Station Unit 1.

2.0 INFORMATION REQUIRED

2.1 FEEDWATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES

BEC requested an exemption to test feedwater check valves with water as a medium in lieu of air or nitrogen. This approach is acceptable provided the test is used to verify that the check valve will remain water-covered throughout the post-accident period.

Provide the following information needed to complete our review of this request:

1. The initial volume of water in the line at the start of the accident.
2. The acceptance criteria for the hydrostatic test (e.g., leakage rate limit, pressure decay limit, etc.).

2.2 ISOLATION CHECK VALVES IN THE REACTOR WATER CLEAN-UP RETURN, REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) PUMP DISCHARGE, HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) PUMP DISCHARGE, CORE SPRAY TO REACTOR, AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) VESSEL INJECTION LINES

BEC has stated that replacing these check valves with air-testable check valves was not considered justified since the purpose of these valves is to limit reverse direction flow in case of a postulated upstream pipe break until downstream motor-operated isolation valves are shut. The statement implies that testing of these valves with water as a medium is at least possible and perhaps currently required.

Provide your proposal to verify that these valves will limit reverse direction flow for a sufficient period of time to permit downstream isolation including:

1. Indications available to the operator to identify a line which should be isolated by its downstream motor-operated isolation valve.

2. The initial water volume in the line at the start of the accident.
3. The acceptance criteria for any required test.

Additionally, provide the following information needed to complete all aspects of this review:

1. For each of the penetrations involved (9a,b; 10 a,b; 51a,b) identify the valves installed to perform a containment isolation function in accordance with General Design Criterion 55 (10CFR50, Appendix A).
2. Indicate the location (inside or outside containment), type valve, and automatic features for each of the valves of paragraph 1 above.