

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 M A P P S I 2 0 5 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 _____ 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 - 0 2 9 3 7 0 8 1 8 8 0 8 0 8 2 9 8 0 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Contrary to Technical Specification, Table 3.1.1, the "Mode Switch in Shutdown" tri;
0 3 function of the RPS failed when "B" vital MG set tripped. Public health and safety
0 4 were not affected since movement of the mode switch through startup to shutdown would
0 5 have scrambled the reactor on 15% APRM trip had a scram been necessary.
0 6
0 7
0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE I A 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE S 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 0 EVENT YEAR 8 0 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 3 8 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 REPORT TYPE T REVISION NO. 0
ACTION TAKEN X 18 FUTURE ACTION F 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation showed that relay 5A-K16B was energized and relay 5A-K17B was de-energized.
1 1 The problem was resolved by manually picking up the 5A-K17B which dropped out 5A-K16B
1 2 and reset the logic. A design change is being processed to provide permanent correction
1 3 of the problem.
1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 0 9 8 29 OTHER STATUS N.A. 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operational Event 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N.A. 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N.A. 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N.A. 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N.A. 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 80
1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N.A. 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 80
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION N.A. 45 NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 80

8009030607

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 80-038/01T-0

On 8/18/80 at 1100 hours the "B" vital MG set failed causing the associated reactor protection system bus to go dead. When the alternate power was applied, operations noted that the annunciator "shutdown scram reset permissive" came in and stayed in. A request was made to investigate the problem with the alarm.

At 1530 hours, investigation showed that relay 5A-K16B was energized, and relay 5A-K17B was de-energized.

With this configuration, the mode switch channel "B3" manual scram by going to the shutdown position was bypassed.

The scenario of this event follows:

1. On loss of AC power 5A-K17B timed out in 2 seconds and closed contacts 1-2 and 3-4.
2. When power was re-established to the "B" RPS bus, the 5A-K16B relay picked up immediately and opened contacts 1-2 preventing 5A-K17B from resetting.
3. With 5A-K17B contacts 3-4 closed and 5A-K16B contacts 3-4 closed, the shutdown position mode switch scram is precluded for channel "B3."

The immediate problem was resolved at 1730 hours by MR 80-3138 being generated to manually pick up 5A-K17B which dropped out 5A-K16B and reset the logic. The final resolution, however, will require a design change.