LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)/0/1//V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2)/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3)/4/1/1/1/1 (4)/ / / (5)LICENSEE CODELICENSE NUMBERLICENSE TYPECAT
$\frac{\frac{10}{1}}{\text{SOURCE}} \xrightarrow{\text{REPORT}}{\frac{11}{1}} (6) \frac{\frac{10}{5}\frac{0}{0}\frac{0}{3}\frac{3}{3}\frac{9}{9}}{\frac{10}{1}} (7) \frac{\frac{10}{7}\frac{3}{3}\frac{0}{8}\frac{10}{8}}{\frac{10}{1}} (8) \frac{10}{10}\frac{3}{2}\frac{2}{1}\frac{10}{3}\frac{3}{2} (9)}{\frac{10}{10}}$
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
<pre>/0/2/ / On July 30, 1980 while operating in Mode 2 at 3% power the bypass feedwater /</pre>
<pre>/0/3/ / regulator valve failed open causing a high water level in "A" steam generator. /</pre>
[0/4] / This resulted in a cool down of the Reactor Coolant System to a Tave of 537°F. /
<pre>/0/5/ / Since Tave was returned to within the proper limit (>541°F) in two minutes, the/</pre>
<pre>/0/6/ / health and safety of the public were not affected. Reportable pursuant to /</pre>
/0/7/ / 6.9.1.9.b, and the applicable T.S. 3.1.1.5.
/0/8/ / SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE /
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
<u>/0/9/</u> <u>/C/H/</u> (11) <u>/E/</u> (12) <u>/B/</u> (13) <u>/V/A/L/V/0/P/</u> (14) <u>/D/</u> (15) <u>/Z/</u> (16) SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.
(17) REPORT NUMBER /8/0/ /-/ /0/4/5/ / \/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
$\frac{X}{(18)} \frac{Z}{(19)} \frac{C}{(20)} \frac{Z}{(21)} \frac{0}{0} \frac{0}{0} \frac{1}{2} (22) \frac{Y}{(23)} \frac{N}{(24)} \frac{X}{(25)} \frac{F}{1} \frac{1}{3} \frac{0}{0} (26)$
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
/1/0/ / The operator for the feedwater regulator bypass valve caused the valve to move /
/1/1/ / erratically and then fail open. The exact reason for why the valve operator /
<pre>/1/2/ / failed is unknown, however, it is suspected that water got into the instrument /</pre>
<pre>/1/3/ / air line causing the valve operator to malfunction. Instrument technicians /</pre>
/1/4/ / inspected the valve thoroughly, and blew down the instrument air line. / FACILITY METHOD OF
STATUS *POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) /1/5/ /B/ (28) /0/0/3/ (29) / NA / (30) /A/ (31) / OPERATOR OBSERVATION /
ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) /1/6/ /2/ (33) /2/ (34) / NA // NA // NA //
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) /1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /2/ (38) / NA
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /2/ (42) / NA PUBLICITY //
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) 8009030586 NRC USE ONLY
<u>/2/0/ [N/ (44) / NA /////////////////////////////////</u>
NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station Docket Nol 50-339 Report No. LER 80-044

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

On July 30, 1980 while operating in Mode 2 at 3% power the bypass feedwater regulator valve failed open causing a high water level in "A" steam generator. This resulted in a cool down of the Reactor Coolant System to a Tave of 537°F. Reportable pursuant to 6.9.1.9.b, and the applicable T.S. is 3.1.1.5.

Probable Consequences of Event

Since Tave was returned to within the proper limit (> 541°F) in two minutes, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The operator for the feedwater regulator valve caused the valve to move erractically and then fail open. The reason for why the valve operator failed is unknown, although it is suspected that water got into the instrument air line and caused the valve operator to malfunction.

Immediate Corrective Action

Instrument technicians inspected the valve thoroughly, and found no mechanical deficiencies. The instrument air line was blown down to clear it of any water that might have been in it.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No scheduled corrective action is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No action is required.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implication based on maintenance history to date.